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I.

REVELATION AND THE BIBLE.

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THE WAY. *The Nature and Means of Revelation.* By John F. Weir, M. A., N. A., Dean of the Department of Fine Arts in Yale University. Houghton, Mifflin & Company, Boston & New York. 1889.

WE have found this book to be no light reading. In fact we succeeded in working our way through it only after several attempts, and by a determinate effort of will. This was not because we met with any great difficulty in comprehending the thought presented in it, nor because that thought is not expressed, for the most part at least, in clear and intelligible language; but because we found it as a whole to run contrary to our most fundamental ideas of divine revelation, and therefore to excite our opposition and protest at almost every step. Although here and there it contains views of truth with which we could agree, yet our reading of the book was attended all the while by the conviction that what is here set forth as the way of revelation, is decidedly *not* the way, and that there can, therefore, be neither edification nor profit in walking therein.

Another difficulty with the book is the lack of a clear logical arrangement of its subject-matter. There is, indeed, a *partition* of the book into eight sections, which bear the following headings: *The Beginning and the Ending; The Seers and Prophets; The Old Testament in the Light of the New; The Son of Man; The Risen Christ; The Holy Ghost; The Spirit of Truth.* But this, on closer inspection, is found to be only a mechanical partition, and not a logical division of thought. As far as its thought is concerned, the book is one homogeneous mass, in which there is no distinction of members or parts; reminding one of certain sermons, occasionally heard, which are said to be divided into *three parts*, but in which one would suspect no division at all, if it were not formally announced, and of which one would expect no end either, if it were not understood that the physical limitations of the preacher would somewhere make an end necessary.

The aim of the book before us, as intimated in the preface, is to serve as a countercheck to the recent naturalistic methods of treating the Bible, whereby it is emptied of its divine authority and force, and reduced to a level with the sacred literatures of the nations. This naturalism in religious and theological thought is rightly regarded as a reaction against "the extreme supernaturalism of the older estimates of the Bible," which virtually turned it into an infallible code of doctrines miraculously communicated from heaven. Both of these tendencies are assumed to be wrong, and destructive of sound Christian thinking; and an effort is made by the author to escape the dangers on either side by what is called a *spiritual treatment* of the Bible; which consists simply in substituting for the literal or natural sense of Scripture another and different sense, believed to be obtained by "spiritual insight," and supposed to be more worthy of God, while the notion of a miraculous communication of the letter is allowed to stand the same as before.

The conception of revelation that underlies Mr. Weir's book is the idea of a communication of divine or spiritual truth through the agency of spiritual beings, which are supposed to

be intermediate between the Absolute Spirit, or God, and man. This intermediate spirit-world is a graded realm of psychical beings, at the head of which stands Jehovah, the God of Israel and the Logos of the incarnation: next to Him comes the "angel of the presence;" and after this one, a numerous host of angelic beings of various orders and various degrees of perfection. This psychical realm forms the medium through which only God, the Absolute or "free Spirit," can hold communion with the mind of man, at least in its present *human* stage of progress. In a way that Mr. Weir does not attempt to explain, the Absolute Spirit is supposed to communicate His mind to beings in the spiritual or psychical realm; and these then communicate it, by means of visions, verbal messages, signs, and symbolical manifestations, to the minds of seers and prophets on earth. Man as a psychical being has a natural affinity for the psychical world, and natural aptitudes for intercourse with psychical beings. He has psychical senses, corresponding to the senses of the body—a psychical eye and psychical ears, by means of which he may be made to see and hear spiritual or divine things; or the spirits may take possession also of his outward senses, and of his bodily organism, and through these give expression to the truths which they are sent to communicate. This is declared to be no more mechanical a process than that by means of which men communicate with each other in the flesh.

It is in this way that the revelation of God is supposed to have been brought to pass. Holy men spake as they were moved by holy spirits. And the Bible is the result or consequence of this revelation. The Bible, however, is not the revelation itself; that is to say, the truth revealed, or "the word of God," is not identical with the Biblical narrative. "The word of God," the author declares, "is wholly incapable of being expressed in human language;" for it has in it an "element of infinity and eternity," because it comes from the infinite and eternal Spirit. The outward form or letter of Scripture, being derived from the psychical instruments through which the revelation is conveyed, both angelic and human, is not an ex-

pression, but a veiling rather of the spiritual truth intended to be made known. It is, however, only in this form and through these instrumentalities that any revelation from God to the natural mind is supposed to be at all possible.

Great account is made, in the book under consideration, of the difference between the natural and the spiritual mind, or the natural and spiritual consciousness. The natural mind consists of the faculties of understanding and reason which belong to the human soul in virtue of its natural constitution. The spiritual mind, on the other hand, is the result of an infusion into the soul of a new element from above, namely, that of the spirit. This constitutes a new stage in the process of the creation of man. But when this stage has been reached in any individual case, revelation is no longer necessary, because man becomes capable then of communing with God directly—spirit with Spirit. Revelation is only necessary for the natural man. But the natural man, it is said, can only receive spiritual things when they are veiled under symbols and signs, whose meaning the natural mind does not discern. Hence also, we are told, our Lord usually spoke to the multitude in parables. Divine revelation moreover, we are further told, "is always ahead of the human understanding, and it is therefore a matter of necessity that its truths should be veiled in symbols having an outward natural sense as well as an inward spiritual meaning." The outward natural sense is thus one thing, and the inward spiritual sense is another and different thing. The whole of the Bible becomes thus substantially a collection of allegories or parables "through which the truths of revelation are tempered as it were to the natural mind."

The relation between the letter and spirit, according to the scheme here presented, is, however, not such that the latter could in any measure be learned by the study and penetration of the former. It is not like the relation between a word and its contents, nor like that between a picture and the idea of beauty which it enshrines, which is always constant and definite. The letter and spirit in Scripture are not joined together by

any natural law of association discoverable by reason. "The spiritual essence or divine intention of revelation is not in the form," says our author, although he adds that "it may be discerned through the form." It cannot be discerned, however, by any intellectual or rational process, or by any activity of the human mind according to its own inherent laws. Rules of grammar and logic, and canons of historical criticism, may lead to the understanding of the external historical or natural sense; but that does not bring the mind a whit nearer to the understanding of the spiritual intention or meaning. That can be reached only by direct spiritual enlightenment or inspiration, "by which a spiritual order of discernment, something *ab extra*, is added to the natural endowment of faculty with which the mind is provided in the order of nature." As the divine truth is not revealed in the letter, but rather concealed in it, it follows that it cannot be ascertained by any process of literal or philological interpretation. To understand the literal meaning of some passage of Scripture may, therefore, be quite possible for one who has not the least idea of the meaning of the Spirit; for the meaning of the Spirit could not be deposited in any finite form of words; and to suppose that the truths of revelation could be discovered in the letter of Scripture, would be to suppose the "Spirit to be imprisoned in fixed forms, which would render it lifeless and void of spiritual energy." This is what is supposed to be meant by St. Paul's declaration that "the letter killeth but the Spirit maketh alive." The sense of the Spirit in revelation is infinite, and can, therefore, only be ascertained by a new spiritual sense in the soul, which is implanted in it in consequence of the new birth; and this new birth is for it the dawn of the last day.

This we believe to be a fair representation of our author's idea of the method of revelation and of the nature of the sacred Scriptures. Up to the time of Abraham the Biblical narrative is supposed to be entirely unhistorical. The account of the creation and of the patriarchs is merely a collection of "representative allegories" under which are veiled truths

relating to the progressive development of human consciousness. From the time of Abraham onward, it is asserted, on what grounds we do not know, that "the record assumes a historic basis;" but the history that underlies it had its significance not in itself, nor in its real historical issue in the fullness of time, but in an order of ideas wholly outside of itself. "That the Jews were a divinely chosen people," the author says, "implies that they were selected to enact a part under supernatural guidance, and this gave to their history the character of a realistic allegory, marking the passage of the soul from a state of nature to a state of grace."

It might be supposed that a method of dealing with the Bible like that which is here proposed, would greatly enlarge the sphere and number of one's religious conceptions. If there is no discoverable law that connects the spiritual sense with the outward letter of Scripture, then what is to hinder the religious fancy from running riot and producing an indefinite multitude of theological vagaries? In fact, however, this result does not seem to follow, or at least only partially. On the contrary it would seem that this method of treating the Bible really tends, not to an enlargement, but to a contraction of the extent and limits of religious thought. Instead of a quickening, there appears to be a paralysis of the powers of the imagination, upon which, under this method, everything depends; and the mind seems to be restricted to a few common-place religious ideas which are discovered in every thing and every where. In the system of Swedenborg, as is well known, these ideas are the notions of the divine *love* and *wisdom*, which "flowing into" the human soul there produce *goodness* and *truth*. Around these simple, though of course not unimportant, ideas the mind of the seer and the minds of his followers in the "New Jerusalem," are continually revolving. Here the Bible is supposed to derive its origin and nature from the principle of a correspondence between the nature of God and the constitution of the world. Every fact in nature or history is believed to have something corresponding to it in the being and character of

God. This seems at first sight to be a grand scheme, and to promise a vast enlargement of the sphere of religious conceptions, especially of conceptions relating to God. But in fact it is otherwise. There is an infinite variety of things in nature, each one, on the theory of correspondence, pointing to some fact in the being or character of God. But how to explain this correspondence in detail—there is the difficulty—a difficulty by which even the imagination of the prophet seems to have been overwhelmed. And so the explanation commonly gets no farther than the general notions of divine love and wisdom or of goodness and truth, and their opposites, which are discovered in the sun, moon, and stars, in earth and sea, in mountains and hills, in rivers and fountains, and in everything else that is mentioned in the Bible.

In the scheme of Mr. Weir, which in other respects has a good deal of affinity with that of the Swedish prophet, every thing is made to revolve around the idea of the progress of the soul from a state of nature into a state of grace. In fact the whole body of revelation, from beginning to end, is but a symbol or allegory of the growth of the soul, or, as Mr. Weir expresses it, "of the creation of man." The six days of creation, for example, are symbolic representations of "six stages of consciousness," through which every man must pass before he comes to be a complete man through the addition to his soul of the element of spirit. "The allegory of creation," we read, "as contained in Genesis comprises a general survey of all the days or states of being, through which the soul passes, from the incipient act of creation till it comes into the perfect likeness of God, who wills to dwell therein in all his fulness. The terms *creation*, *days*, *earth*, *firmament*, *waters*, *life*, *death*, etc., once literally construed in the narrowest sense as referring strictly to natural things, are now again regarded as symbols of spiritual things." And these spiritual things are simply successive states and conditions of the human soul. "The earth," for example, "is but the type or symbol of a *natural* consciousness gradually awakened in the souls of men; and

which at the dawn of a new day is destined to yield to the creation of a spiritual consciousness." So again the seven churches of the Apocalypse are said to "stand as representative symbols of the seven successive stages of consciousness through which the soul passes from its Edenic state to its final union of will and life with God."

The term *Edenic state* is used to denote the condition of the soul previous to the awakening of the moral sense. The garden of Eden is merely "a symbol of a state of childlike innocence, without knowledge, when the soul has not yet learned to know good and evil." "It is a purely psychical state wherein the moral sense is dormant . . . a state of innocent purity in which every child coming into the world still lingers for a time, but from which it gradually falls away through self-will, by yielding to a natural desire for knowledge and experience." This natural desire for knowledge, which is a universal human instinct, is symbolized by the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. And the eating of this tree signifies yielding to this instinct, whereby, at one and the same time, the moral sense is aroused, or the soul is made to know good and evil, and "through a further persistence of carnal desire and self-will the evil is converted into sin." This is the fall, which, accordingly, is not, as has so long been believed, a single fact in past history, but a fact that occurs necessarily in the life and progress of every soul. In consequence of this occurrence, man passes from the Edenic or pre-moral, into a moral state, which is, however, at once also a carnal or sinful state. There is, according to this view, no such thing as hereditary sin in the old theological sense; and yet sin is a natural necessity in the case of every human being, inevitably resulting from the aptitudes, tendencies, dispositions, and the like, implanted in the flesh, or in the carnal mind.

And as the fall consists in the transition of the soul from the Edenic to the carnal state, so salvation consists in the transition from the carnal, through the moral, into the spiritual state. In other words, the soul's salvation consists in the

formation of a spiritual consciousness. This is also its resurrection from the dead, its new birth, its entrance into the kingdom of God, and the commencement of the last day. This state is brought to pass through a knowledge of Christ and imitation of His example, in which men are assisted by His ghostly presence and power; although the awakening of the spiritual conciousness itself is the result in the end of an impartation to the human being of the element of spirit from above. Although the author speaks of a ghostly presence of Christ as aiding in the salvation of men, yet essentially Christ is related to human salvation only in the way of example and representative type.

As to the nature of Christ's person, Mr. Weir teaches that He is a divine, though created being. He had a pre-existence in the psychical world previous to His appearance in the flesh as the Son of man. The statement in Isa. 43: 10, "before me there was no God formed," is supposed to refer to the premundane formation or creation of the divine soul of the Messiah, the Jehovah or Logos, that became incarnate in Jesus. Before its coming in the flesh that soul was "filled with the Spirit," and was therefore divine. That was the glory which He had with the Father before the world was, and which He laid aside when He descended into the carnal realm and was made man. This entrance of Jehovah into the conditions of humanity is believed to be symbolically represented by the story of the madness and dethronement of Nebuchadnezzar. It is supposed to be alluded to also in the 40th Psalm, in which the "horrible pit and the miry clay" out of which the Psalmist says that his soul was delivered, is said to signify the carnal conditions into which the Messianic soul entered at His incarnation. With these carnal conditions the Son of Man "waged a ceaseless warfare until He overcame them; for these conditions were contrary to the impulses of His being. It was thus that He bore our sins in His own body." Though His will was entirely free, like that of any other human being, and though He was really assailed by temptation, He remained wholly without

sin; and His sinlessness is the only real miracle of His life, because this transcends the ordinary capacity of humanity; while His works, if they were thoroughly understood, would be found not to go beyond the power which belongs essentially to all men. But "though Himself without sin, He entered into the full consciousness of the sinner. He suffered even as the sinner suffers, until His soul was again quickened by the indwelling presence of God." The atonement consisted merely in the moral assimilation of Jesus, the Son of man, to God. "Gradually the will of Jesus as the Son of man became so identified with the Father's will, as Son of God, that eventually perfect at-one-ment was consummated, and He declared, 'I and the Father are one.'" This unification or oneness holds, however, only between the particular soul of Christ, and God, and must be brought to pass in other souls by a process that is essentially the same. The atonement of Christ is not in itself the reconciliation of the world, but only an illustration of the way in which the world may become reconciled. "The life of Jesus was the representative life of the soul:" that, and nothing more. Even the resurrection of Christ was nothing extraordinary or miraculous. It was simply His appearance in the psychical state, into which every man enters at death. His ascension into heaven, finally, was His glorification in the psychical realm, or His re-investment with that Spirit with which He was filled before His incarnation. And as thus filled with the Spirit He afterwards appeared as the Holy Ghost, and in the same character He still continues at times to act upon men, although now invisibly. The Holy Ghost, accordingly, is the disincarnated soul of Jesus. Christ and the Holy Ghost are two forms or *persons* of the same soul or self, the word *person* being used in the old sense of *mask*. Such is the outcome of this "spiritual explanation" of the Bible, so far as the leading doctrines of Christian faith are concerned. We have given our author's views on these doctrines, perhaps at an undue length, in order that the reader may see the consequences which, according to his own mind, flow from his funda-

mental position in regard to the nature of revelation and of the Bible.

It is not our purpose, in this paper, to criticize the particular views of doctrine presented in Mr. Weir's book. With some of these, as we have already intimated, it is possible, more or less, to sympathize. This is the case, for example, with the view of original sin; which although, as we believe, not adequate to the truth involved in the old doctrine, inasmuch as it ignores anything like the fact of a historical fall, and makes sin a natural necessity in the development of human life, we yet regard as more rational than the old traditional conception which allows every human being to be born in a state of damnation on account of the imputed guilt of Adam's transgression. So also the view of the atonement here presented, although in our conviction falling far short of the profound teaching of the New Testament on this subject, is at least free from those notions of imputation and of a substitutionary punishment of sin, which, to our mind, involve a confusion of all moral judgment and a dishonor to the character of God. And, finally, there is something also in that softening of the idea of the miraculous which constitutes a feature of the book before us, that will commend it to modern habits of mind trained in the school of physical science. In its views of Christology, Pneumatology and Soteriology generally, however, the book must be regarded, we believe, as subversive of the fundamental articles of the Christian faith; and, therefore, even the truth which it contains will, because of the connection in which it appears, largely fail to get a patient hearing.

But our chief concern now is with the method of revelation advocated in this book, and with its conception of the nature of the Bible. It is to this latter conception that we propose principally to devote our attention. In regard to the notion of a world of psychical beings intermediate between God and man, and serving as instruments of divine revelation, it may be sufficient for the present to call attention to the similarity between this and the notion of *æons* in the various sys-

tems of ancient Gnosticism. According to Mr. Weir, as well as according to Marcion and Valentinus, God dwells in an unapproachable height, between which and man there is an impassable gulf, that has in it a host of intermediate psychical beings including Jehovah and the angels, but that is not filled up in any such way as to make possible an immediate communication between God and man. Mr. Weir speaks at times of an immediate indwelling of the Absolute Spirit in the human soul as in a "vessel;" but it is easy to see that, in view of his fundamental conception of the relation of the infinite to the finite, this after all implies no real union between the Divine and human natures. These must forever stand apart as incompatible entities. This conception, we hold, renders impossible the very idea of divine revelation in any true sense. Man cannot know God; he can know only what the spirits report concerning Him; and how they get their knowledge of Him remains an unexplained mystery.

There are probably few theological thinkers in modern times who will agree with Mr. Weir in this notion of a realm of intermediate beings, whether they be called *psychæ* or *æons*, as connecting links between the Divine and human worlds. But the theory of the Bible, which underlies his speculations, and by means of which he gets out of the Bible these fantastic doctrines, appears at first sight to be more plausible. There are obvious difficulties connected with the literal interpretation of at least some passages of the Bible. On the supposition that the Bible as a whole is the result of a divine infusion either of words or thoughts into the pens or minds of sacred writers, so that every letter in it must be supposed to owe its origin to a direct divine agency and to form an essential part of divine truth, it is difficult in the case of many passages by means of a literal interpretation to obtain a sense that is worthy of God. Hence many good and great men, both in ancient and modern times, have had recourse to allegoristic methods of interpretation. They said, if the literal explanation of any statement of the Bible will not yield a sense that

is worthy of God and profitable to the Church, then it is necessary to find some other sense that shall be worthy and profitable; and this then must be regarded as the sense intended by the Spirit. Origen and the school of Alexandria furnish illustrious examples of this method of dealing with the Bible. According to the then current division of human nature into body, soul and spirit, they distinguished a threefold sense of Scripture, namely, the natural or historical, the psychical or moral and the spiritual or religious, each of which they believed to be intended for the instruction and edification of men in different stages of religious development.*

All this, we say, sounds more or less plausible, and helps us in a fashion to get over some of the difficulties connected with the Bible. So there is something plausible also in Mr. Weir's notion of "an infinite and eternal element" as connected with the word of God, which must be in its very nature incapable of being expressed in any finite form of words. "Truth," Mr. Weir tells us, "is many-sided, and a word of God as a spiritual utterance embracing the elements of infinity and eternity is inexhaustible in the depth of its riches and mystery: that which is above time and space is incapable of being compassed by any human thought." This conception seems at first sight to exalt the Bible and to enhance its value; as does also the idea that revelation is always ahead of the human understanding, and can therefore be adapted to the understanding only by being veiled in types and symbols whose meaning is inexhaustible. Is not this magnifying the Bible?

But let us endeavor to realize now what all this amounts to. What would be the value of any word or proposition whose meaning should be *infinite*, or rather, to use the proper term, *indefinite*? We would say that practically such a word or proposition would have no meaning at all, and would therefore be wholly without value. A word that may have any one

* Cf. Origen de Principiis, IV. I. 13. Origen contends that this method of a threefold interpretation is ascertained from Scripture itself, and refers to the LXX. version of Pro. 22: 20–21, in confirmation of his view.

out of an indefinite number of significations has practically no signification at all, except such as the thinking mind may at any moment choose to impart to it. Mr. Weir himself has a feeling of this difficulty; for, when speaking of the explanation of the symbols and figures of the Old Testament in the light of the New, that is, the discovery of the "spiritual sense" which they contain, he says, "It is not to be expected that there will be agreement on this point, nor is it necessary that there should be, for truth is many-sided . . . and a word of God is inexhaustible in the depth of its riches and mystery." That means, we suppose, that any sense which the "spiritual mind" may get out of any word of God, or any statement of Scripture, will be a correct and legitimate sense because it must necessarily be included among the infinite number of significations which belong to that word or statement of Scripture! Now if the case of Sacred Scripture stood thus, then we should say that it were utterly worthless as a means of revelation. The utterances of the Bible would then be vastly greater riddles than were those of the Delphic oracle; for these usually admitted at most only two or three different interpretations, which was perplexing enough to those concerned, while those of the Bible would admit an indefinite number. Such a revelation would be utterly valueless.

The same result follows, also, from the proposition that revelation is always in advance of the human understanding, and therefore cannot be expressed in words having a definite natural signification. What good would there be in such a revelation? Mr. Weir himself admits that for the spiritual mind and for the knowledge of spiritual things revelation is of no use, serving only to prepare the natural mind through cultivation of the moral nature, to enter into the spiritual condition; and then, when the Spirit has once come into the soul as into a "vessel," that will produce an immediate understanding of the spiritual truth which was not revealed, but concealed in Scripture. On this point we quote his own words near the close of the volume: "The object of a written revelation is to guide the soul until it

comes under the immediate personal dispensation of the Spirit. Thence on it is under a direct inspiration from God, Spirit to spirit." But, we ask, how can a written revelation that is never really co-ordinate to the "natural understanding" serve to guide the soul while it remains in the natural condition? Would not a black stone answer the purpose as well?

We maintain, on the contrary, that divine revelation is never ahead of human understanding, or reason, but always fitted and adapted to it. A revelation that is not understood, we hold, would be no revelation at all. The very conception of a revelation implies the idea of a becoming known, and where there is no knowledge there can be no revelation. The idea of a revelation of God implies the existence of a mind capable of knowing Him. God could not reveal Himself to a block or stone. If there were no mind in the universe, kindred to the mind of God, then God might have given expression to His power and wisdom by the creation of an infinite number of worlds, but there would be in all this no revelation of Himself. He would then neither be *known*, nor loved, nor adored. The idea of revelation implies a self-manifesting activity of some being on the one hand, and a cognitive activity of some other being on the other hand, and a correspondence of these two activities. If either of these conditions were wanting, there could be no revelation. A revelation of God to man implies that man has a nature and mind akin to the nature and mind of God, and that the self-manifesting activity of God is adapted to the measure and capacity of knowledge in the mind of man. Thus instead of being always ahead of the human understanding, and uttering itself in incomprehensible mysteries and riddles, whose meaning can only be guessed at in after ages, divine revelation is itself progressive, advancing with the advancing development of the human mind. God progressively reveals as much of Himself as man is capable of knowing, until in the fulness of time His entire nature and character are manifested in the person of His Son.

This conception of divine revelation as historical and pro-

gressive will serve at once to clear up a number of difficulties connected with the Sacred Scriptures. For example, many of the ideas entertained concerning God and His character in early periods of revelation, and expressed in early portions of the Bible, are manifestly imperfect and inadequate, as judged from the standpoint of the New Testament; and many statements of facts in nature and history are found to be incorrect or defective, when weighed in the balance of modern science or historical criticism. When God is represented as smelling and enjoying the odor of Noah's sacrifice, or as ordering the offering up of Isaac, or as commanding the wholesale destruction of the Canaanites, we can easily see that the conception of God underlying such representations is not the conception of the New Testament, or the conception which we receive from Christ. And so when the creation is spoken of as a work of six days, or when a solid expanse is spoken of as existing above the clouds, or when the earth is said to have been founded upon the waters, it is easy to see that the conceptions underlying such language do not agree with modern well-established views of nature. What shall we say of these disagreements? Shall we say that underneath these ancient representations of God and of His operations in nature and history, which, literally understood, can be no longer regarded as true, there are concealed treasures of spiritual wisdom, the understanding of which has been reserved for the "spiritually illuminated" in modern times? To our mind this would be sheer nonsense. To find in the six days of creation a divine description of six stages of consciousness through which the soul must pass before it can enter into the kingdom of God, or a symbolical exhibition of the divine love and wisdom, or of human goodness and truth, appears to us to be a species of trifling, that is only equaled by the performance of those theologians who still labor to prove that the world actually was created in six literal days not quite six thousand years ago. To us the only rational course seems to be to admit the inadequacy and defectiveness of certain representations of God and of His character and

work, in the early records of the Bible, and to set this to the account of the immature and infantile condition of the human mind in the early ages in which revelation first began to take place. God revealed Himself really in those ages, and men really knew God; but men knew God only in the measure in which they were prepared to know Him, and it was only to the extent of this measure that God could reveal Himself to them. And hence, in connection with much that indicates a true knowledge of God and His character, there is much, also, especially in the early portions of the Bible, that points to the existence of misunderstanding and error. Besides the eternal and universally valid truth, or word of God, the Bible contains elements of human limitations and imperfections.

Thus it will be seen that we, too, make a difference between the Bible and revelation, or the word of God, but in a very different sense from that which lies at the root of Mr. Weir's distinction. For us the Bible is the record in human language, the original and inspired record, of divine revelation. By revelation itself we understand a divine activity in nature and history on the one hand, and in the human soul on the other, by which God makes Himself known as man's Creator, Redeemer and Perfecter.* What God reveals is not primarily a view of the human soul and of its development, but Himself, His nature and character, His mind and will. The substance of divine revelation consists not in doctrines concerning God or concerning man. What is revealed is not a theology, nor a psychology, or ethics, any more than an astronomy or geology; but what is revealed is primarily God's own being and character, His mind and will; and doctrines concerning God and man are possible only in the way of reflection upon the facts of revelation and of inference from those facts.†

* On this point compare Rothe, "Zur Dogmatik," p. 55 sq.

† Exercises of such reflection, as well as of devotional meditation, are met with in the Bible itself. These possess various degrees of authority, in proportion to their participation in the power of inspiration, but not such as belongs to the facts and truths of revelation themselves. For example, the impreca-

The form of divine revelation consists not in a miraculous communication of ready-made ideas—certainly not in a communication of ideas shaped and fashioned in the angelic world or in angelic minds—but in a divine activity in nature and history as well as in the human soul. God manifests Himself in His works. These are an expression of His power, His wisdom, and His goodness; and in them the human mind, because of its constitutional kinship with the mind of God, may read something concerning His nature and character. To this form of divine revelation belongs also a certain manifestation in the constitution of the human soul—in its innate laws of reason and conscience, in consequence of which there spontaneously arise ideas of an unconditioned Being, as well as ideas of truth, of goodness, and of right. This form of divine revelation is recognized in Sacred Scripture, when it is said, for example, that "the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy work," or when it is said that "the invisible things of Him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived by the things that are made, even His everlasting power and divinity." And it is especially this form of the revelation of God, in connection with a general revelation of Himself also in history, that furnishes what light there is in the sacred literatures and what reality there is in the religions of the nations.

God reveals Himself in history as well as in nature. There is in historical events something more than the thoughts and

tory Psalms are not of equal authority for Christian faith and life with St. Paul's sublime Psalm on charity, and St. Paul's directions concerning marriage are not of equal weight with the instructions contained in the Sermon on the Mount. But if there are thus human as well as divine elements in the Bible, may not men sometimes mistake the one for the other, and so fall into error? Certainly they may. There is no infallible rule by which the danger could be avoided. For the practical need of an honest mind there is enough truth in the Bible that manifestly bears upon itself the stamp of divine authority and certainty; but there exists no infallible code either in or out of the Bible, that is intended to save men from the responsibility of thinking for themselves or from the inevitable danger which thinking involves.

purposes and actions of men. There is a higher power, a higher will—a divinity that, in the way of interaction with human agencies on the one hand and with the powers of nature on the other, guides and controls the destinies of men and of nations. This entrance of the Divine into history, and this participation in human life and development, has its order, and its various degrees of directness and intensity. In this regard the nations do not all stand on the same level at the same moment. In the past the people of Israel was the one nation that was chosen above all others to be the recipient and bearer of the self-revelation of God. The constitutional character, the temperament, the mental and moral endowment of this people, as well as its geographical position, doubtless all combined to fit it for this high destiny. Here God manifested Himself in particular events of nature and providence, in acts of judgment and deliverance, in national as well as individual fortunes and misfortunes, that were so striking and extraordinary as plainly to betoken his hand;* accompanying this

* It is customary to call these acts of self-manifestation on the part of God *supernatural* or *miraculous*, though as now usually employed the two words are not strictly synonymous, the former denoting that which is above the realm dominated by the law of strict and necessary physical causation, the latter that which is above the sphere and power of the human will as well as above the system of nature. In the past the conception of miracles was rendered difficult by the notion of a suspension or violation of the laws of nature which they were supposed to imply. In more recent times this difficulty has been in a good degree obviated by conceiving of God, after the example of the sacred writers, as *immanently* related to the forces and laws of nature. The forces of nature are the energies or operations of God's will, and the laws of nature are the unchanging modes of this operation. Hence so far as the laws of nature are concerned it is no longer difficult to conceive the possibility of miracles. If God exists as a free personal being, and if He is capable of energizing in nature in one way, He must be capable also of doing so in another. But we get into difficulty with this conception when we consider it in relation to the divine being itself. God is supreme reason as well as supreme power. Hence His ordinary mode of working in nature must be considered to be supremely rational, and any departure from this mode as *less* rational if not *irrational*. Thus the miracle would be a contradiction of God Himself. This difficulty would be insuperable if we were to contemplate God merely in relation to Himself and in relation to the physical world. But there exists a realm

activity all the while by an inward illuminative and interpretative activity of His Spirit in the minds of prophets and wise men. And in this manifestation He showed Himself to be "a God full of compassion and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy and truth; keeping mercy for thousands, and forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin; and one that will by no means clear the guilty."

This process of the self-manifestation of God in history came to its culmination and completion finally in the person and in the life and work of Jesus Christ, in whom "dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." And for this final and absolute manifestation all previous partial manifestations were preparatory, and in the light of this only do they all find their own proper illumination and meaning. This absolute manifestation of God in Christ—God manifest in the flesh—presupposes that the nature of God and the nature of man are essentially homogeneous, and that man as the offspring of God is not only capable of knowing God, but of entering into immediate personal union with Him. There exists no impassable gulf between God and man—no yawning chasm that needs to be filled up or bridged over by an intermediate order of *psychic* or *œonic* beings. Human nature is of such sort that God can enter into it, make it His own, and manifest Himself in it—and this without doing any violence to Himself or to man. He has done so in the person of His Son Jesus Christ, who is not a being intermediate between God and man, but Himself God manifest in the flesh. Jesus says, "He that hath seen me hath

of free personal beings, who are capable to some extent of affecting and modifying at will the operation of the forces of nature, and with whom God stands in reciprocal relations. In these relations there are given both the occasions and the possibility of the miraculous. God does not contradict Himself when, for the attainment of the highest ends of reason, He adapts His working in nature and history to the activity of a world of free personal beings with whom He maintains relations of interaction. The necessity of the miracle does not grow out of God's relation to nature, but out of His relation to the free will of man, to whom He proposes to manifest Himself as a Father and whom He seeks to educate for His kingdom and glory.

seen the Father; how sayest thou then, Show us the Father? Believest thou not that I am in the Father and the Father in me? the words that I say unto you I speak not from myself: but the Father abiding in me doeth His works." We repeat, then, that the person, the life and suffering, the words and works of Jesus Christ are a complete manifestation of the being and nature, the mind and character, the will and purposes of God.

But to this objective manifestation of God in nature, in history and in Christ, there must correspond, in order to the realization of the revelation, a subjective manifestation, or an illuminative divine activity in the human soul. And these two forms of divine activity must be simultaneous and co-ordinate; or rather it must be one and the same activity, that, addressing the soul in the outward fact, also excites and quickens its inward powers of apprehension. The objective divine activity would not be revelation if it were not apprehended and understood. The events of history, in which God's hand appears, the life, the words and works of Christ in which the Father's being, and mind and will are expressed, must be apprehended and formulated in human thought and speech, in order that there may be an actual revelation of God. To this end there must be an inward affection of the human soul by the same objective divine Spirit that appears in the outward historical fact—an impression or feeling that may afterwards be transformed, in accordance with the laws of mental activity, into conception and thought. This subjective divine activity may be said to be of the nature of *inspiration*, which does not consist in a communication of ready-made ideas, but in an inward affection or impression of the mind by the divine Spirit, in whom we live, and move and have our being. * It is primarily a sensation, an inward experience, a state of feeling, out of which ideas, thoughts, sentiments, moral and spiritual princi-

* This is the sense in which Rothe uses the word *inspiration*, to whom we here acknowledge ourselves indebted for some of the views presented in this paper. Cf. *Zur Dogmatik*, p. 112 sq.

ples may be framed by the mind's own activity. The revelation of God can only be brought to pass in harmony with the universal laws of human thought; so that our knowledge of God comes to us in a way that is perfectly analogous, for example, to the way in which we acquire our knowledge of the outer world. The world impresses our senses. This impression is at first merely a confused state of sensation or feeling. Out of this feeling the mind, by its own activity, in accordance with laws inherent in itself, builds up its knowledge of the external world. So inspiration is an inward impression or feeling produced by the Spirit, under the historical conditions of the objective manifestation of God, out of which the mind itself, according to its capacity, constructs its ideas and conceptions corresponding to that objective manifestation; *and this is revelation.* As a typical illustration of this process we would refer to the case of Peter, who, for a long time had seen the outward manifestation of God in the words and works of Jesus, but whose knowledge of Him as the Son of the living God proceeded, after all, from an inward inspiration: "flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven." We would also refer to St. Paul's statement (1 Cor. 2: 10, 11) that the invisible divine things are revealed to men through the Spirit, who alone knows the deep things of God, as the human spirit alone knows the interior things of man.

Divine revelation, according to the view here presented, is a continuous historical process, consisting in an objective as well as subjective divine activity in the life of humanity, and culminating and completing itself in the person of Christ; who is, therefore, the absolute revelation of God in humanity, both the objective manifestation and the subjective power of apprehension having in Him reached their utmost limit of completeness, From this point forward the process of revelation unfolds itself in the inspiration of the Apostles and in the organization of the Church as the necessary medium for the communication of the knowledge and power of God in Christ to the end of time.

And of this process of revelation *the Bible is the original and inspired record.* It is the *original* record, in the sense that it was composed by authors who stood within the movement of the historical process of revelation, and were themselves for the most part actors in that process, and so forms itself in some sense a constituent factor of the process which it records; as the original records of a government, for example, its decrees and dispatches, form themselves a constituent part of its history, not merely in the subjective, but also in the objective sense of the word. The Bible is not a historical treatise at second hand, composed by persons who lived remote from the facts and outside of the historical process which they undertake to describe. We may not accept in all respects the traditional views of the authorship of the various books of the Bible; but so much is certain, at least, that all these books, with possibly a few unimportant exceptions, originated within the historical period and belong themselves essentially to the historical process of which they bear record.

And this record is *inspired.* By inspiration, in the sense in which the term is applied to the Bible, but few theologians would now understand a dictation of words from the Holy Spirit to the sacred penmen, or even a miraculous infusion of infallible knowledge into their minds. The sacred writers were not mere passive instruments, whether conscious or unconscious, through which the Holy Spirit committed to paper divine truths for the benefit of men. It is this conception of the Bible as a book of miraculous or magical origin, emanating entirely from a source beyond the minds of its professed authors—a conception that was once generally current and that still lingers in the minds of some belated thinkers—it is this conception that has given rise, as we have already seen, to the various methods of allegoristic or spiritualistic interpretation, from Origen down to Swedenborg. Nor must the inspiration of the Scriptures be supposed to have consisted in such an influence exerted upon the minds of their authors by the Holy Spirit, as secured them absolutely from all error and made

them infallible in all that they wrote. The Bible proceeded from the minds of its authors according to the laws which govern literary composition universally, and it gives us their apprehension and understanding of the facts and truths of divine revelation. But there is something peculiar in the way in which it gives these facts and truths: it gives them in such a way as to bring the mind of the reader as it were into immediate contact with them, so as to make him see and feel them in the same manner as the writers themselves did. Those who were eye and ear witnesses of the facts of divine revelation have so borne their testimony as to put their readers virtually into their own positions, and enable them to be affected by these facts as they were themselves affected in the moment when the revelation came. Thus the same Spirit that breathed upon the minds of prophets, and apostles and holy men, from the facts of revelation, and especially from the one central fact around which all others revolve, namely, the person of Christ, now breathes upon our minds from the Sacred Scriptures and enables us to realize the very impressions, the affections and thoughts which were in the minds of their authors. This we believe to be the true inspiration of the Bible; which, instead of being an influence of the Spirit exercised merely in the moment of its composition in order to make it either an infallible code of doctrine or a collection of spiritual riddles, must be regarded as a permanent quality belonging to the Bible itself, and making it a book of life, or of living oracles, for all time.

To define the precise nature of this quality may be a matter of difficulty, and we do not here attempt it. It is a matter of difficulty also, as we know, to define the quality of a great poem by means of which the sympathetic reader is made to reproduce in his own soul, as far as the particular character of his mind permits, the ideas and sentiments which filled the soul of the writer in the moment of composition; and yet this is a quality of which we are all aware, and which we at once discern in some literary compositions and miss in others. So it is a matter of difficulty also to define the quality of a great statue

or picture, by means of which it excites in the mind of the beholder, in as far at least as he possesses the artistic faculty, the same ideals and feelings of beauty that thrilled the soul of the artist and animated his chisel or his pencil. We call the power by which this quality is impressed upon a poem, a statue, or a painting, *artistic genius*, which is a gift of nature bestowed upon certain favored individuals and aroused and cultivated by the historical environment into which they are placed by Providence. The inspiration of the prophets and apostles, of the writers of the sacred Scriptures, we hold, must be regarded as something analogous to this. It was an exaltation of their spiritual nature by the Spirit of revelation, involving all the higher faculties of mind; presupposing a peculiar original constitution or endowment of soul, and dependent for its realization on peculiar historical circumstances occurring only once in the history of the world. And in virtue of that exaltation the subjects thereof have given us, in the Bible, a representation of the facts of divine revelation, which enables us, in proportion to our own spiritual capacity, to see those facts in the same light in which they saw them, to draw from them the same inferences, and to be filled with the same religious ideas, sentiments, and aspirations.

This spiritual exaltation did not make the writers of the Bible infallible in all that they wrote. There are physical conceptions and historical statements in the Bible, of which it would be vain to endeavor to maintain the literal accuracy. It is not the purpose of the Bible to furnish us infallible information concerning matters of science and history, which have no direct bearing upon moral and religious truth; and the statements of the Bible in regard to matters of this kind can claim no more authority than belongs to other respectable writings of the same age. Nor is it the purpose of the Bible to serve as a magazine in which all moral and religious truth may be found in the form of explicit infallible statement. The inspiration of its authors was not meant to fit them to write a book of that sort; and even if they had written a book of that sort, it

would have been useless so far as the attainment of infallible knowledge is concerned, unless its readers were also in like manner made infallible. But the inspiration of the writers of the Bible did qualify them to give us a true and adequate representation of the facts of divine revelation, so as to make the Bible for us a sufficient and reliable source of knowledge of that revelation.* And this is the true object of the Bible. Or we may say that its object is to set before the spiritual vision of the reader a picture of Christ and of the facts of history which led up to and which followed from His manifestation—a picture such as formed itself in the minds of His immediate followers and apostles, and received its first authentic interpretation in their religious thought. But as thus defined the inspiration of the various writers of the Bible is not the same in degree and intensity. As there are diversities of artistic or poetic inspiration, so also are there diversities of Biblical inspiration. Those writings are most inspired which deal most directly with the manifestation of Christ. We believe that we only express a fact which all readers of the Bible have felt more or less, when we say that the New Testament possesses more of the force and fire of inspiration than the Old; and that of the New Testament the Gospels possess more than the rest; and that of the Gospels that of St. John possesses most of all, for in it is given the most life-like and complete picture of Christ. And it is this picture or representation of Christ in Scripture that forms the ultimate source as well as the final rule and measure of Christian faith and doctrines; in other words, Christ Himself as known in Scripture becomes, by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, the absolute source and standard of Christian knowledge.

But if such be the nature and object of the Bible, it is plain

* We could not say that the Bible is the *only* source of the knowledge of divine revelation. There are countless multitudes of Christians whose knowledge of divine truth is not derived directly from the Bible at all. Christian *tradition* is also a source of Christian or religious knowledge. But the Bible is the *normal* source, by which Christian tradition must ever be measured.

that there can be no ground whatever for that notion of a "manifold sense," which underlies all mystical or allegoristic methods of interpretation. There is not in it one sense intended by its immediate authors and another sense intended by the Spirit, or, as Mr. Weir would say, by the spirits. The Bible is like any other book in this respect, that its statements have but one true sense, namely, the sense which its authors meant to express, and which the grammatical and logical construction of their language implies. There is, of course, much in the Bible that is not to be literally understood. There are figurative modes of expression—similes, metaphors, parables, allegories, and perhaps, myths, too—which must be interpreted figuratively. And such figurative language, owing to a peculiar characteristic of the Hebrew mind, is more common in the Bible than in any other body of literature either ancient or modern. To explain such language figuratively is not to go beyond the sense intended by its authors. So, again, much of the Bible is poetry, and must be construed according to the laws of poetical composition. A poem is not to be explained with literal exactness—like a lawyer's brief, in which important consequences may be suspended upon the choice of a particle, or upon the repetition or omission of a word. If some of the writers of the Psalms and of other poetical portions of the Bible, yea, and of some that are not poetical in form, could know what doctrinal inferences have been drawn from their inspired and impassioned language, they would no doubt be greatly astonished; for they would find themselves made responsible for ideas and opinions of which they never dreamed. But could not the writers of the Bible have been made to give expression to thoughts of which they were not conscious at the time, and which yet must be supposed to be contained in their language? To some extent this may be admitted. It happens to all writers and speakers that in the formation of their thought and in the selection of their words they are influenced by ideas and sentiments current in their age and nation, of which influence they are at the time unconscious; and their

words may, therefore, have implications of which they are not always aware. So the sacred writers also were influenced by the historical and spiritual atmosphere of their times; and this fact must be taken into consideration in the interpretation of their language; that is, their language must be interpreted historically and psychologically as well as grammatically and logically. But this is no more than is required in order to the understanding of any other ancient writing; and to deal with the Bible in this way is not to transcend the laws of natural or literal interpretation.

The object of the study and interpretation of Sacred Scripture, then, is to ascertain the sense intended by its authors; and this can only be done in obedience to the laws which govern the interpretation of literary compositions universally. But is not this in contradiction with St. Paul's declaration that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit," and that "spiritual things are spiritually judged"? We do not think it is. We do not believe that this declaration implies any thing more than the requirement of a Christian frame of mind or temper in order to the right understanding of spiritual things. It does not imply the notion of an addition, from without, of a new organ for spiritual things to the natural or constituent faculties of the soul. St. Paul spoke in the psychological terminology of his time; and his language, when translated into modern phraseology, implies no more than the idea of an attuning and qualifying of the native faculties of the soul for the performance of their highest spiritual functions, by bringing them into sympathetic relation to the objects of the spiritual world. It is only a poetical mind that can fully understand a poem. In order to understand a poem it is necessary that the reader should not only possess a poetic faculty, but also that it should be at least in some measure cultivated. But the possession of a cultivated poetic faculty does not enable one to dispense with the ordinary intellectual operations required for the understanding of a literary composition, but rather qualify him for the right conduct of those operations. So we hold that

the right understanding of the Bible is only possible for a Christian mind, or a mind that is in sympathy with Christian truth. "The Christian consciousness," as it has been formed by the teaching of the Bible under the influence of the divine Spirit, becomes in turn a light to illuminate the truth of the Bible itself. The necessary condition for the right understanding of the Bible is, first, the possession of a religious nature, which is the common property of all men, and, secondly, some degree of culture of the religious nature. But the possession of a quickened and cultivated religious nature or of a "spiritual mind," does not enable one to get at the sense of Scripture without the use of the ordinary rules of grammar, logic, and rhetoric, which govern all intellectual processes. Neither does the possession of a "spiritual mind" enable the reader of Sacred Scripture, by any supposed method of "spiritual interpretation," to arrive at any spiritual sense different from that of the letter, which we claim would be no sense at all.

We hold that there is properly no such thing as a "spiritual interpretation" of the Bible. What is sometimes called *spiritual* interpretation, but might more properly be called *practical* interpretation, is not interpretation or explanation of the Scripture at all, but *application*, consisting in the employment of the *truths* of Scripture for the teaching, reproof, correction, or instruction in righteousness, of men in all possible positions and circumstances of life. This is a legitimate operation, but it belongs to *preaching*, not to interpretation. It is the function of the preacher, not merely to explain the original and true meaning of Scripture, but to apply its truths to the hearts and consciences of men in their various situations, trials, sorrows, and temptations. For example, in preaching on the calming of the tempest, it is legitimate to compare the storm-tossed sea to the world agitated by sin and evil, and to say that the ship in which Jesus sailed with His disciples represents the Church, which cannot perish, but will safely land those who faithfully cling to it in the haven of eternal rest and peace. The same application might also be made of the ark of Noah in

preaching on the flood. But this is preaching, and not exegesis, and something quite different from the assertion that the ship on the sea of Galilee or the ark of Noah *means* the Church in any "spiritual" or dogmatic sense. The office of exegesis is to ascertain and explain the original, simple meaning or truth of Scripture; the office of systematic theology to organize this truth into a logical system; and the office of preaching to apply it to the actual needs of men. Such application of the facts and truths of Scripture derives its warrant from the innumerable correspondences that occur in the evolution of human life. A Christian who is in danger or distress, is in a situation corresponding to that of the disciples on the raging sea; and if he is tempted to despair, or to lose his trust in God, then there may be applied to him the language of Jesus, "Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith?" It means him, but not in a dogmatic sense—not in the sense, for example, that Mr. Weir says the seven churches of Asia mean seven stages of consciousness; it means him because it is applicable to his present condition. In this sense, and in this sense only, we believe that it is allowable to ascribe to the Bible an *infinite meaning*. The *applicability* of its truth is infinite, according to the infinitely diversified situations and needs of men; and in this appears its wonderful character, that there is never any spiritual or moral need among men for which it does not contain the requisite supply of instruction, of admonition, of reproof, or of comfort. It is this quality of the Bible, namely, the infinite applicability of its truth, that makes it a *means of grace* for all men—that is, a means for developing and cultivating the spiritual life. And, finally, this view of an infinite applicability of Scripture, by reason of a never-ending series of correspondences in human life, will explain some of the references to the Old Testament in the New, in which the statement, that certain events were a fulfillment of certain Old Testament Scriptures, merely means that there was a parallelism or correspondence between them.

But it may be objected that these endless applications of the Scriptures were all directly intended by the Holy Spirit, under

whose influence they were produced, although their proximate authors were, of course, unconscious of any such intentions. Our reply to this is that it would imply the notion of a magical origin of the Scriptures, which we have already set aside, as well as the notion of a fatalistic fore-ordination of all human events. But even if the objection were granted, it would not cover the notion of a manifold sense, in a dogmatic view, against which we have been contending in this paper; for these practical applications of the Scripture are something vastly different from the "spiritual" or dogmatic truths supposed to be derivable from it by the so-called "spiritual methods" of interpretation. In the latter case truths that are not contained in the letter are inferred from the letter because they are supposed to have been in the mind of the Spirit; in the former case the truths contained in the letter, and obtained from the letter according to fixed exegetical canons, are applied to the practical needs of men. It may be said that the Spirit intended the application of the truths of Scripture to all cases in human life to which they may be applicable; but this is something different from saying that all these cases were directly in the mind of the Spirit, and that the application, therefore, is a part of its original signification.

What is sometimes called doctrinal or theological interpretation of Scripture labors under the same fundamental error as the spiritual interpretation of Mr. Weir. Here the object is to get out of the Bible directly a doctrine or a system of doctrines, simply by collating and comparing its statements in what is supposed to be their true or literal sense. A doctrine that may be fortified by some quotation of Scripture, having at least a resemblance of sound, is supposed to be all right, as when the decisiveness of the present life in reference to men's eternal destiny, is proved by the statement that "it is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the judgment;" while a doctrine or theory that can not be thus fortified is presumed to have no right to exist. This operation presumes that the Bible, instead of being a book of life emanating from the warm life

and faith of holy *men*, is an arsenal of infallible proof-texts, miraculously let down from heaven, which only need to be collected and placed side by side, according to some logical scheme, in order to obtain theological doctrines or systems of doctrine. The Bible is thus a miraculous book, emanating wholly from a superhuman source, which is here supposed to *express* the mind of the Spirit, but which Mr. Weir says *conceals* the mind of the Spirit. That is the only difference; and the refutation of Mr. Weir's fundamental error is at once also a refutation of the error which we have in view here.

This refutation consists in showing that revelation is primarily not a communication of doctrines across a great gulf between God and man, in a way that contradicts the ordinary laws of the human mind, but the actual communication of the divine being and life itself, and the unfolding of this in human consciousness in a way corresponding to the laws of action and development belonging to the latter. St. John's great sentence: "The Word was made flesh, and dwelled among us, and we beheld His glory," is at once a death-blow to all theories of revelation and of the Bible that are based upon the idea of an absolute separation and contradiction between the divine and human natures. God has become man and manifested Himself in human nature; and the Bible is the consequence and product of this manifestation in the mental life of humanity conformably to the laws of the latter. The Bible is not a miraculous portent or prodigy appearing in our mental sky, whose meaning can only be guessed at by the "illuminated," or explained by an infallible pope or priesthood; but it is a book which, although speaking to us of the mysteries of the kingdom of God, and conveying to us eternal and universally valid moral and religious truth, yet speaks to us in our own tongue, in words which we can understand, and which we must read and interpret, loyally, indeed, and sympathetically, and yet in accordance with the mental laws which govern the reading and interpretation of literary compositions universally. As Christ is God in the form of man, so the Bible is divine truth in the form of human

language. And such manifestation of God in man, and of divine truth in forms of human thought and speech is possible because God is our Father and we are His offspring, or because there exists an original eternal relation of affinity between the nature of God and the nature of man.

As a fitting conclusion of this discussion we take the liberty of quoting a few sentences from a source which the readers of this *Review*, in its heroic period, will at once recognize. "All revelation, as distinguished from magic, implies the self-exhibition of God in a real way, through the medium of the world in its natural form. To a certain extent, we have such a revelation in the material universe. The outward creation is the symbol, mirror, shrine and sacrament of the divine presence, as a supernatural fact, in the most actual way. The word of prophecy and inspiration is the gradual coming forth of eternal truth into time, in a like real way, through the medium of human thought and speech; a process which completes itself finally in the full domiciliation we may say of the Infinite Word in the life of the world by Jesus Christ.—In Him, most literally and truly, the supernatural order came to a living and perpetual marriage with the order of nature; something which it could not have done, if the constitution of the one had not been of like sort with that of the other—if man had not been made in the image of God—so as to admit and require such a union as the last and only perfect expression of the world's life." (Dr. J. W. Nevin, on *Brownson's Quarterly Review.*)

II.

THE SEED OF THE WOMAN.

BY REV. A. R. KREMER, A. M.

ALL intelligent believers in redemption through Christ have made supreme account of the first proclamation of the Gospel to our sinful race. Indeed, it seems to have been universally felt among Christian people that without the promise in Eden Christianity would have no foundation or source; and that without the record of it in the Bible the Bible itself would be unintelligible, or that, in fact, the Bible could have no existence without it. It is universally accepted as the gospel in a nut-shell; that is, a divine promise of a Saviour who would bring about the restoration of fallen humanity.

And yet it is a question worthy of consideration whether this great Scripture lesson, at almost the opening of God's revelation to men, is generally apprehended aright, or its vast truth clearly seen and felt, by the great body of those who profess and call themselves Christians. What do the mass of Christians understand by "Seed of the woman?" Only this, it would seem, namely, that after a space of four thousand years a descendant of Eve, without partaking of human guilt, being conceived by the Holy Ghost, appeared in the world, and, being divine as well as human, became the Mediator between God and man for man's redemption, performing all the legal requirements which God exacted of His fallen creature by doing and suffering in his stead the full equivalent demanded by the divine law and sanction. The philosophy of redemption as thus briefly outlined is, that man could not save himself, and God, taking no pleasure in His destruction, conceived the in-

finitely wise plan of both maintaining the honor of His throne and saving His creature from the evil consequences of wrong-doing. The plan was that at some future time His eternal Son should unite himself with humanity, so as to become true man, the Seed or Descendant of the woman who sinned, yet without the least taint of human sin or guilt in himself, true God and true Man in one person. Then, by doing and suffering just what He did and suffered as a full equivalent for man's deserts, He accomplished all the requirements in the case. Christ thus became the instrument of man's redemption; His coming into the world was something entirely outside of any necessity for the completeness of creation; His coming did not enter into the original thought or purpose of God; it was an after-thought, suggested by the misery into which our first parents had so grievously fallen; a plan, a scheme, of immense magnitude, to save man's soul and God's regal dignity and honor, and thus hold the moral universe in eternal equipoise.

Now the question here is not whether all this is true or false, but whether, as a dogmatic statement, it is true as a whole and should be accepted as a symbolical view of the gospel. It seems to fall considerably short of this. It seems like a too mechanical view of the great redemption: all plan, scheme, device, brought in from afar and applied to man as a counter-force, and so acting upon him as to remove the legal impediments standing in the way of a reconciliation between him and God; as if God were chiefly concerned about the *forms* of law, and to avoid the appearance of any letting down concerning law itself. It will be observed that Christ is here mainly regarded as a means to an end,—an infinitely wise conception of the Almighty,—the end being deliverance from the consequences of transgression, and the securing for men of eternal life and blessedness. According to this view, it is by a divine *plan* that salvation comes to men, the whole being operated by Christ not as the Source and Power of redemption in Himself, but only as the medium prepared expressly for the purpose, and as having no need to exist in such form without such purpose.

But it appears quite evident that the language itself of the first gospel proclamation expresses something different and better than that. "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." There surely cannot be derived from this utterance the doctrine that the Seed of the woman was an entirely new thought of the Almighty, incidental to the fall of man. That is, the woman's Seed does not seem to be spoken of as coming into existence for an end made possible only by the fall of man. As if to say: If man had not sinned there would be no such outcome, no such development of humanity, as we see in Christ, inasmuch as such glorious crowning of the human race would not then have been necessary. But does not God here speak otherwise? We could not, without great straining, interpret His language to mean, that only in some remote age the Seed of the woman could have any real existence, as a remote descendant simply of the mother in Eden. On the contrary, it is not hard to see in this divine and gracious promise a reference to what already existed in man, the Seed of the woman, not yet manifested, but nevertheless real. Eve so understood God; so that when her first offspring appeared she hailed him as the promised Seed. Nor was she as far in error as is by many supposed. It is true, Cain developed into a murderer, and became the head of Satan's seed, yet Eve's mistake was not fundamental or essential. She thought her first-born was the "man from the Lord," the promised seed, but she only erred as to which of her sons was to be the bearer of the blessed gospel spoken to her in the garden. It has been supposed that Eve's mistake lay in this, that she expected the Redeemer to be her immediate offspring, and was therefore disappointed by his non-appearance. But such was clearly not the case. She was disappointed in Cain, but she had spirituality sufficient to perceive that Abel, and not Cain, was the child of God's gracious promise. She sorrowed over the loss of the true Seed when Abel was slain, and rejoiced at the birth of another, whom by faith in God's word she named

Seth, because, as she said: "God hath appointed me another seed instead of Abel whom Cain slew." Eve did not look far off into the centuries merely for the fulfillment of the great promise. The salvation promised was to her a present reality, and she received its benefits as her own. How much she knew about the complete redemption in Christ, the full manifestation of the Seed, there is no possibility of our knowing; but it is evident that her faith was real and properly directed—fixed on the proper object. She believed in the true Deliverer, and that He apprehended her by His grace in some way through her immediate offspring.

But not simply her offspring *κατα σαρκα*; for such was Cain as well as Abel and Seth; but also and especially, *κατα πνευμα*, for then, as ever since, the flesh profiteth nothing (John 6: 63). The true Seed was spiritual, elect according to the divine foreknowledge, and holy. And through the ages following the same law of grace prevailed, as witness the case of Isaac and Ishmael, the one the child of promise and of divine election, the other only the natural product of the flesh. There was an unbroken line from Seth to the full manifestation of the Seed in Christ. At certain periods the line seemed to bend in the direction of the non-elect part of mankind, and the stream of spiritual life to mingle with that of the carnal world. Thus Rahab the harlot became an ancestress of Christ, as also Ruth the Moabitess, and others, thus showing that the divine election is not a cold, heartless and arbitrary choice on the part of God, and that "for His own glory" (whatever that may mean) He divided the race into the two classes of acquitted and condemned without reference to anything but His own sovereign will and pleasure.

The relation of the Seed, Christ, to the first woman is more than that of mere natural descent. Christ came into relation with humanity from the beginning of the creation. Not at the beginning of man's sinfulness, but at the beginning of human existence, when God breathed into man and formed him after His own image. The divine in man was not totally obliterated

by the fall, and so God could speak of the woman's Seed as a present reality, the germ thereof being in her and waiting for development into the full power of Judah's Lion, having all power in heaven and on earth, power to crush the serpent's head and establish forever the Kingdom of righteousness, against which no enemy in the universe should ever prevail. The Seed of the woman preserved a remnant of humanity from destruction, which remnant contained the life of the Seed, and was the salt of humanity's whole lump, which would otherwise have fallen into still worse condition. It was the divine-human in man of which God spoke when He said that the Seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head, and which continued in it to leaven and fortify it, ever enlarging and developing until it bloomed forth in the person of the world's second Eve, the blessed Virgin, and ripened in the person of her more blessed Son, the serpent Bruiser and Saviour of the world.

During the whole period, from the promise in Eden until its perfect fulfillment in Bethlehem, the Christ in humanity was its moral power and its true life. There were also certain leading points in that history, suns in the moral firmament, that shone down through the shadows of those imperfect dispensations of grace, and, not unlike Bethlehem's star, guided and directed the faith of God's ancient people. For example, in the time of Abraham there appeared that mysterious personage, a man, yet without carnal human relationships, Melchisedek, priest of the most high God, representing and foreshadowing the fullness of Christ's priesthood and its true order, far transcending the economic order of Aaron, as declared by the psalmist and confirmed by apostolic reiteration: "Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchisedek." And David, the royal representative of Old Testament Christianity, was also the bearer of the Seed that was to bless mankind. "The sure mercies of David" is the grace of Christ. And Christ in glory, speaking to His servant John on the Isle of Patmos, sealed forever the truth that He was the life of our race,

and the Seed, from the beginning, when He proclaimed: "I am the root and the offspring of David" (Rev. 22: 16). That is, He came not only after David, but was before him also. He was the Source of David's spiritual life, his Lord as well as his Son. And so the evolution of man's true substance, imaged after God, proceeded until "the fullness of the time," when the elect race reached its last stadium, the point where earth and heaven met, and man and God were united in hypostatic union in the person of the world's Redeemer.

This doctrine is, that Christ was in all the Old Testament history not merely as an influence, or as a foreign power, coming from the distant heavens in some form or manner sporadically, but ever present, ever dwelling, though not in all His fullness, with the chosen race. What else can be meant by the Heidelberg Catechism in the answer to the question concerning the Holy Catholic Church of Christ?—"That the Son of God, from the beginning to the end of the world, gathers, defends and preserves to Himself by His Spirit and word, out of the whole human race, a church, chosen to everlasting life." But Christ is *Head* of the Church, and was from the beginning of human existence, before and after the fall of man. We know what that must imply:—that Christ has always been the all-comprehending Seed of humanity; the Head which is the Source of its life; the Root of David and the whole company of God's elect, and the Product in the fullness of time of the historical life forces in humanity; and the necessary Culmination of its development. As Head of the Church, "from the beginning to the end of the world," He could not at any time have been a foreign Prince or Potentate, but the inseparable companion as well as the Lord of His people.

What then is Christian theology, if it is not Christology? What is the principle of Christianity, if not Christ Himself? And so Christianity is not the result of a scheme outside of the fact of Christ's presence from the beginning in man as the imperishable Seed. The Christ of history and of redemption is not the result of a legal conference on the throne of divine

justice. He is not, therefore, the instrument projected from the divine counsel for human redemption made necessary by the transgression in Eden. On the contrary, He is the same yesterday, to-day and forever. Redemption was not so much planned as it was organized. It is organic, because redeemed humanity is recapitulated or reheaded in Him, "who is, and who was, and is to come!" The original divine idea of humanity as constituted in the likeness of God required the headship of Christ from first to last and forever.

And this is not to reject the commonplaces by which Christian thought is usually expressed. It only seeks to set them in right relations. It would indeed correct many expressions which are highly prized, set phrases that are believed to be inspired because so constantly used. There are idols of that sort which might be shattered with no loss, but rather gain, to Christianity. A little iconoclasm within the precincts of recognized orthodoxy might prove rather wholesome than otherwise. Yet, on the whole, the terminology and phraseology of orthodox Christianity are less objectionable than the mechanical theories which they are made to support, especially on the subject of Christ's atonement for sin. It is represented as the result of a grand "scheme," or "plan," conceived and projected with mathematical accuracy, in which all intelligent beings would be shown that God could pronounce a death sentence and prevent its penal effect on transgressors without relaxing in the least His justice, and without remitting the sentence. So, having matured His "plan," God informed our sinful first parents of it, in brief terms; and in due time the work was accomplished. There was nothing at all in the human race from the beginning, of which the Christ was not the ripe product and fruit; He came at a period which for some reason is called "the fullness of the time;" became man chiefly that He might receive the punishment due to man, redeeming the sinner and satisfying God, who is now appeased and reconciled. As if such legal substitution had any power to cleanse a soul from moral impurity!

Why not consider Christ as that which He is called, "the First-born of the whole creation of God?" As such He is the true Seed of the woman and true substance of the human race; and redemption through One who is thus necessarily identified with humanity, whose relation to it is essential and not accidental, can only be properly viewed from the Christo-centric standpoint. Christ and the Church, "from the beginning to the end of the world," is the doctrine not only of the catechism, but also of the Bible throughout. Christ is the centre and principle of humanity as such, and so the natural principle of redemption. Christianity itself, therefore, is not the result of the accidental fact of sin, but it is the original thought and conception of God as the only true form and mode of human existence. The change effected by sin and the simultaneous work of redemption was, the necessary conflict between good and evil in man—between the Seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent—and the varied consequences resulting from such conflict; yet in all the struggle going on through the ages there has been the constant evolution of the Christ forces of humanity, the good surviving in the midst of evil, meanwhile humanity rising toward its perfect state and destined finally to reach it. The Christ principle in humanity from the beginning will eventually bring up man to his glorious and ever-living Head, Christ Himself, to share with Him in eternal glory and blessedness.

Call sin an accident; but do not make the Christ of history dependent for His very existence on the devil-play in Eden. The Christ who has passed into the heavens as the everlasting and true God could not be the result of an accident. Through sin the face of Christ was marred, His heel was bruised, and on account of sin the wonders of His grace are displayed as they could not be under any other conditions, and yet *He* is and remains ever the same. St. John says He "is the true God and eternal life;" St. Paul, that "by Him all things consist," that He is "the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings and Lord of lords; who alone hath immortality, dwelling in

the light which no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen nor can see,"—in His glory, with the eye of flesh,—"to whom be honor and power everlasting, Amen." On the throne He appears as the Lamb that had been slain, and yet with the seven eyes of divine omniscience and the seven horns of universal dominion and power. And this is the Seed of the woman; by many regarded as a divine contrivance to save man and God's authority and honor, very like the ruse of the Persian autocrat, in Esther's time, to save the Jews from the consequences of his royal decree; but if Christ were nothing more than such expedient for the compassing of man's salvation, how could all be said of Him that is recorded in the apostolic epistles and in the Book of Revelation? His humanity and divinity, His person, is clearly more than the incidental union of God and man, which it is imagined would never have been at all had not sin made it necessary. His genealogy, as given by Luke, is traced through the elect line back to God himself, in which Adam is called the son of God, showing the relation of the human to the divine to be originally that of offspring to the uncreated Source. Sin did not obliterate that relation; it put man on the road of a downward and sinful career, but the divine in him would yet develop and unfold itself and finally ripen into the maturity of the Virgin's immaculate Son, the universal Man, the First-born and Head of the whole creation—born "when the fullness of the time was come."

And right there also we have the truth concerning the Seed of the woman. There could have been no "fullness of the time" for Christ's appearing if there had not been in the womb of humanity an organic and living preparation for it. The time of preparation was from the creation of man in Eden to the new creation in Bethlehem. "The fullness of the time" was not merely the end of four millenniums, but the termination of the woman's labor and pain in the birth of humanity's Product and Heir, the second Adam and Son of God—the Seed of the first woman, born of the second, and now manifested as the perfection of humanity and divinity.

According to the popular traditional way of regarding the advent of the God-man there is some account made of His descent from Abraham, but it would seem only because it is an emphasized Bible truth, which must not be theologically ignored. It is treated somewhat as is the Apostles' Creed by some denominations,—held to be true, but made to occupy a subordinate place in the church confession. But Christ's descent from Abraham, and through a sacred line from Adam, means everything that we have been affirming concerning the Seed as the Life and Head of true humanity from the beginning; which doubtless has little in common with the notion that Christ is an expedient contrived for man's benefit, the mainspring in the moral mechanism being the Substitute taking man's "law place," as it is called, in order to shield men from the law's curse. So far as the divine "scheme" of redemption is concerned, it did not matter when Christ appeared or of whom He was born. Hence very little account is made of His holy virgin mother, though it is most evident that in her was realized the full glory of the gospel as spoken in Eden; the second Eve, developed from the Seed lodged in humanity, and therefore the mother of that same Seed now manifested in person to take away sin. It is very much overlooked that Christ has been the great moral power in man from the beginning. It is allowed that He in some way influenced the Old Testament saints from without, yet not as the Seed of humanity from within. According to this view Christ is only the instrumental cause of redemption and necessary only because redemption became a need. Against which it is here maintained, that Christ was essential to the full development and perfection of humanity under any and all conditions; that He was the Seed which, even after sin had polluted the fountain of the human race, survived the moral wreck and developed into the God-man and Saviour of the world.

Here we have the true idea of that much abused doctrine of *satisfaction*. What could be more satisfactory to God and His righteousness than the perfect life of Christ? "This is my

beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased," was the testimony of the Father. But, it is said, Christ must suffer for men's sins as their substitute in order to satisfy law and justice; He must pay the penalty of human guilt by suffering and dying in man's stead, otherwise God cannot be well pleased with Him, His words of commendation anticipating the expiation on the cross. But how could Christ take the sinner's place in such a way that His sufferings would be an equivalent for the penalty due to sin? Christ could not suffer in such way, inasmuch as the penalty of sin must be, in its inmost essence, of the nature of sin itself. It means eternal banishment from God and the most awful pains of an accusing conscience, neither of which could possibly pertain to Christ. His sufferings could be only the result of faithfulness to duty, obedience to the divine will, and unconquerable love to God and fallen men. "He was obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." And it was that obedience, that righteousness, which pleased the Father. And for that reason, and not on account of any amount of pain that He endured, God "highly exalted Him, and gave Him a name that is above every name." His sufferings were of value, not from what they were in themselves, but for what they exhibited and illustrated in the life and character of the Sufferer. His perfect holiness was the cause of every trial and sorrow that He endured, and they were efficacious in taking away sin only so far as they were the full superscription, seal and evidence of His exalted virtues.

All this is plain from the testimony of St. Paul: "As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of One many were made righteous." He does not say that by paying an equivalent in the way of suffering many will be made righteous, but by the obedience, as the primary consideration, that is, by the righteousness of Christ. Which could satisfy God most—enduring an affliction of pain, or rendering Him the service that is due Him, whether this be accompanied with pain or otherwise? The question answers itself. If a man obey and serve God faithfully and cheerfully,

it will add much to the proper estimate of his worth if he did all in the face of bitter persecution and a martyr's death. So the righteousness of Christ is commended to us by the proof of it; and the cross is that proof. He did not endure the agony of the cross in order that a scheme of justice and mercy might be filled out, and satisfaction thus made to the divine dignity and honor, but because He could in no other way meet the enemy in his stronghold, wrestle with him and overcome him; and in doing so He accomplished precisely what He told His disciples He would accomplish as the good Shepherd giving His life for the sheep. In all this we see the Seed of the woman perfect in righteousness, having resisted every temptation to a life of ease and worldly glory, intent only on doing the will of His Father, and calling upon all men to follow Him in the way of truth, holiness and sacrifice of the old Adamic self, as the only way back to God. We do not see here the working out of a mechanical scheme, the chief actor in which could have no existence but as being made for the specific end in view; but we see redemption as an organic, living process, the divine and human in conjunction, not by a forced operation from without, but by a living process from within the bosom of humanity itself. Not, of course, independently from within, because "that which is born of the flesh is flesh," but through the divine activity from above, the end and consummation being Jesus the Christ.

It may be said that the satisfaction theory of the atonement, as popularly held, or idly accepted, and which we regard as altogether *unsatisfactory*, is taught in the Heidelberg Catechism. If this were so there would still be no good reason why a different view should not be advanced, unless the Church confession is to be regarded as the end of all controversy, and its dictum as infallible. But this is not claimed for it, nor can it be, so long as the evangelical Church is true to its formal principle. But we do not, however, admit an essential difference between the views here presented and those of the catechism, which says: "God will have His justice satisfied; and therefore we

must make this full satisfaction, either by ourselves or by another." This is precisely what we believe. "*We*," let it be noted, "must make," &c. We cannot do it by ourselves, yet "*we*" must do it, though "by another;" which means, that Christ, our representative and living Head, must make satisfaction to God, and we through Him as being members of His body. But *how* is the satisfaction to be made? *What* will satisfy God and His justice? Is it a certain amount of penal suffering, pains and terrors? No; these are necessary concomitants, but not the essential thing itself, which is obedience rendered to God, and such a life of holiness that even the sorrows and pains coincident with it do not reduce its joys and delights. As was well said by Dr. J. W. Nevin, seventeen years ago, that "Christ was not made for the cross, but the cross was made for Christ;" and the meaning is, that not the crucifixion, the crime of men and devils, is the Gospel to the world, but "Christ crucified" (a different thing entirely), "the power and wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1: 23, 24).

Then further on (Ques. 14) we are told that "the justice of God requires that the same human nature which hath sinned should likewise make satisfaction for sin"—just as we have been asserting, but that the satisfaction required is not a fixed amount of penal suffering, but obedience or righteousness. Nor does Question 17 contradict our view of satisfaction; for Christ in the performance of His redeeming work had to encounter opposition that no mere creature could have withstood; and the wrath of God against sin He alone could quench, not by receiving punishment as a Substitute for guilty sinners, but by perfectly fulfilling the divine law; the benefits of which satisfaction coming to all who become united to Him by true faith as their new and living Head. The same truth is taught in Questions 37 and 40.

It is not pretended here that this view of satisfaction is precisely the same as that held by the authors of the Catechism, but that the Catechism itself may fairly be so interpreted. The mind of the Church three hundred years ago, and long enough

since, was controlled by the substitution theory as wrought out by Anselm. But in this vigorous latter half of the nineteenth century theological thought refuses to move in a rut simply because it *is* a rut, and time-honored; and it would be strange indeed if in this age of intellectual achievements there were no advance in theological science. But there has been advance, and especially on the subject of Christ's person and work. More than ever Christ is viewed as the principle and substance of Christianity, from the beginning of human history, and not merely or mainly as a legal expedient or intervention to stay the divine wrath and lock the wheels of justice, in order that mercy might flow in. And the Heidelberg Catechism, Question 36, strikes the very keynote of the organic view of redemption, however it may seem to follow a somewhat different theory in other places. "What profit dost thou receive by Christ's holy conception and nativity? That He is our Mediator, and with His innocence and perfect holiness covers, in the sight of God, my sins, wherein I was conceived and brought forth." That is it precisely: Christ takes away sin by "His innocence and perfect holiness"; in other words, by His perfect righteousness or obedience. And that alone gave such character and virtue to His bitter sufferings and violent death that it can be truly said men are saved by them, saved and washed by His blood, cleansed from sin and guilt. The strongest language may be used in declaring that Christ's agony, bloody sweat and sufferings in body and soul atoned for human guilt, if it is not forgotten that these are the true and proper expression of the "innocence and perfect holiness" of the God-man. On that everything else turns as the centre. To that all the bloody types of the Old Testament ritual point, and by that every sentence in the Bible bearing on the work of Christ is to be interpreted, and to that every declaration on the subject in the Catechism is subordinate.

On the other hand, a right conception of Christ's person—that is, Christ Himself,—insures the very highest regard for His vicarious sacrifice and inexpressible sufferings. The view here

presented makes more real account of these than does the substitution theory, because it emphasizes the moral character of the sufferings of Christ, and estimates them by the moral worth of the sufferer. Then, also, viewing Christ as the universal Man and "First-born of the whole creation," and the "quickening Spirit" of the human race from the beginning, we may understand the glorious meaning of 2 Cor. 5: 14: "Because we thus judge, that one died for all, therefore all died" (Revised Version). Christ, as the Head of the new creation, died, not as a substitute, but as man's Representative, His death not being in the place of theirs, but actually *theirs*, as well as His own, His sacrifice and death, He being the Head, including the sacrifice and death of His members. If Christ had been *only* an individual man, His humanity free from sin on account of its personal union with divinity, and bearing to the whole human race no more than the common relationship that pertains to every other human being, then there would be room to speak of Him as a substitute to take the sinner's place and suffer and die in his stead. And yet, what would such sacrifice avail? The holiness of the substitute—that is, of one individual man,—could pertain only to Himself. Among Pagans such substitution would be regarded as proper, though the good resulting from it is only imaginary; and by an arbitrary decree of a despot an innocent person might be made to suffer instead of a multitude of guilty ones; but in neither case is there more than a political end accomplished, and the injustice of such proceeding is too manifest to need remark. Then we will not charge God with anything of this kind. Great as is the mystery of godliness, we are not left to grope in darkness in regard to it. The Seed of the woman, "the second Man, is of heaven" (1 Cor. 15: 47, Rev. Ver.); which must mean that the perfect humanity of Christ embraces all that belongs generically, in original design, and in possibility, to the race, so that His sacrifice and death cannot be substitutionary, but truly vicarious; that is, *for* men, and applying with redeeming and saving efficacy to all who believe. The death of the second

Adam is the death of the whole new race as being comprehended in Him. We are children of God in Christ if we suffer with Him; and sharing with Him in His sufferings we shall also be glorified with Him (Rom. 8: 16, 17).

The word *propitiation*, occurring in Rom. 3: 25, and in 1 John 2: 2, and in 4: 10, as relating to the sacrifice of Christ, is supposed by many to settle the whole question in favor of the substitution theory. This might indeed be conclusive if the word was understood and used by the apostles in the classic heathen sense. The ancient Greeks and Romans, in crises of national danger, would sometimes offer in sacrifice to a supposed angry deity a pure and lovely virgin, not unfrequently a princess, expecting thereby to appease the anger and ill will of the god, and such sacrifice was called propitiatory. The Jews, whose religion, as far as it went, was according to truth, never offered human sacrifices, but such as they offered were called propitiatory in the better sense that they reconciled God to men who had sinned against Him, and secured His pardon. These were at best only adumbrations of the truth as it is in Christ, very imperfect, though suited to that age and people.

In the New Testament the word is employed, partly at least, in accommodation to the ancient Gentile and Jewish uses made of it, to be understood now in the higher Christian sense, that God is become reconciled to men on account of the perfect righteousness of Christ; that is, to all men who are in living union and fellowship with Him. As if St. Paul had said to the Gentiles: "We use your own word and say that *Christ* is the true propitiation for our sins. When your people offered to the gods a princess beloved by all to appease their wrath and propitiate them, they imagined they had secured their good will; but we preach to you the gospel of Christ's *true* sacrifice. He was not carried with loving tenderness to the altar by sympathizing friends to take the place of the condemned multitude as their substitute; on the contrary, He was forcibly put to death by the most malignant enemies, not because He was good and holy, but because they regarded and hated Him as a blas-

phemer and impostor." Certainly propitiation cannot then mean the same in the mind of St. Paul as it did in the minds of pagans. He is not here showing the similarity, but the difference between his idea of propitiation and theirs, at the same time using their own word to express the glory and excellence of the sacrifice of Christ. A higher meaning was attached to this word by the people of the old covenant than the heathen mind was capable of, and foreshadowed the still higher sense in which it is used in the New Testament. The "mercy seat" is called in the Septuagint version, "the propitiatory covering,"—ἱλαστηριον ἐπιθεμα,—and designed to convey the idea that God is reconciled to men through the offerings of the people, but yet only typifying "the innocence and perfect holiness" which alone is pleasing to God, and which gives to the sacrifice of the cross its saving efficacy. And it is not straining a point in the least, when we say that this is the interpretation, in brief, of the "propitiatory sacrifice" spoken of in the 37th question of the Heidelberg Catechism. It was well pleasing to God, not because it was attended with exquisite suffering, but because it was the sacrifice of obedience and perfect holiness.

If it be said, in answer to all this, that "without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sins," we would only say that those inspired words are symbolical, and cannot possibly be taken literally. It is the same thing as saying that without Christ's perfect obedience unto death there is no remission of sins. So also the declaration: "The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth from all sin;" not literally, however, as every one must know. Both texts are, of course, true, and are very precious, teaching us in symbolical form what is the moral power of the great sacrifice for sin—unless in very deed God could not be satisfied without seeing blood, and therefore demanded it as a primary and absolute consideration. But then we are quite certain that God is neither a Shylock nor a Being who thinks and acts on the *quid pro quo* principle of "an eye for an eye"—a principle so utterly condemned by Christ. Christ died for us, not because God thirsted for blood, but

because He was the Good Shepherd, and so gave His life for the sheep. Christ crucified is the power of God, the Alpha and Omega of the whole Christian salvation; because in Him regenerated humanity, following in the way of the cross, throws off the body of sin in death, in order to reappear in the restored likeness of God in the resurrection. "Buried with him in baptism, wherein also we are risen with him." But the glory of the cross is not the cross itself, but Christ, the Seed of the woman and serpent bruiser.

A legalistic or commercial view of the atonement might be satisfied with a Christ that was created by the accidental occasion of sin,—made for the emergency,—but the organic or life view sees in Christ the natural and true product of humanity, its Life and its Immortality. He was the life of the world from the beginning of human history; the bearer of men's iniquities, in that He suffered on account of them; and the Redeemer of the world, in that He fulfilled the divine law.

III.

THE GOD-MAN.

THE DIVINE AND THE HUMAN NATURE IN CHRIST DISCUSSED WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO NESTORIAN AND EUTYCHIAN CONTROVERSIES.

BY REV. O. E. ACCOLA, D.D.

HERE we approach holy ground. We stand before an abyss of mysteries. The history of the human race tells us of great persons and of wonderful events, but Christ is the greatest personage, and His life the most wonderful life. The Bible relates many miracles, but the greatest of them all is Christ Himself. Among the mighty works of God, redemption stands next to creation; among the mysteries of the divine being next to the Trinity is the Person and nature of Jesus Christ. Indeed, everything relating to Christ, but especially His twofold constitution, the relation of God to man in His personal life, is the most profound and unsearchable mystery. To explain it is impossible, and an attempt to do so might even be regarded as presumptuous. For if it could be explained and made comprehensible by human reason, it would cease to be a mystery.

There is hardly any subject of thought and investigation that has engaged the mind of great and good and wise men more intensely than the person of Christ. And naturally so, for He is and must be the central point of all religious thought in Christianity. The first question is: Who is or who was Christ? If the answer is given: He is the Son of God, who has become man, then the next question will be: In what relation does He stand to God and to mankind? If this is answered according to Scripture, there remains yet another important question to be answered: How could He be both God and man,

Creator and creature, and what is the reciprocal relation of divinity and humanity in Him? Here is a *problem;* who is able to solve it? Yet earnest thought upon these questions and the endeavor to arrive at a definite answer is no empty and vain speculation, but a matter of paramount importance. As our conception is of the *person* of Christ, so will it be of His *work;* and it will involve the gravest consequences for our Christian life and hope. It was therefore a life-question which the Lord put to His hearers: What think ye of Christ?

The early Christians had a lively consciousness of the importance of this subject. Hence the eagerness with which they exerted their mental powers to explain the mystery in which the person of Christ is enshrined and to put their ideas in words. In doing this, they became involved in great difficulties and exposed to great dangers. As the depths of divinity cannot be fathomed, and metaphysical truths cannot be made comprehensible, it is very difficult to express such truths in appropriate terms and define them dogmatically, so that all will be satisfied.

The Church before the reformation was never engaged in more bitter quarrels, the parties stood never in stronger opposition, and never were more passionate anathemas pronounced upon the dissenting party, than when the mystery of "God manifested in the flesh" was to be expounded, and the true meaning thereof expressed in a formula of creed. There has, however, never been, and never will be, a person or a party that will succeed in framing a formula in which *all* believers may find expressed just *their* view or idea about the relation of the two natures in Christ. The Christological controversies lasted almost continually over two centuries, and when at last such a formula was found, to which it was thought the whole Church should give her assent, the peace was by no means universally restored. Setting aside those who were excluded and who seceded from the Church, it is at least very doubtful whether the fathers, who signed the creed formed at Chalcedon, did so from choice and conviction, or out of regard

to the Emperor and the fear of evil consequences to themselves.

But if the person of Christ, the God-Man, is so great a mystery, inscrutable and incomprehensible to every finite mind, would it not be better merely and simply to adhere to the words of Scripture, and not to speculate at all? There is great danger in certain kinds of speculation; this must be admitted. The attempt to comprehend everything, and to make every truth taught in Holy Scripture conformable to our understanding and reason, is likely to lead into rationalism. Yet, nevertheless, an intelligent and thinking believer should not be contented with superficial knowledge of the truth in general, but as he is called to grow in grace and to be strong in faith, so he must also grow in the knowledge of all the truths that are connected with his salvation. And since Jesus Christ is the centre of our faith, the source of our spiritual life, the foundation of our hope, the object of our deepest reverence, love and adoration, therefore to think about *Him*, to ponder and to penetrate with our whole mind into all that relates to His person and His work, which are inseparably connected, should afford every Christian the greatest pleasure.

Although we know that the human mind is far too weak to form an adequate idea of the subject under consideration, and though human language is too poor to give the idea always in proper expressions, and no man is able to give a fully satisfactory answer to all the questions that may be asked in reference to this great and exceedingly important subject, yet we shall try to give some, though imperfect, explanation, according to the ability and knowledge God has given us.

We divide the subject into three parts:

In the first place, we shall ascertain what the Scriptures teach on the person of Christ.

Secondly, we shall give a sketch of the development of Christology in the history of the Christian Church and the results which were attained.

Lastly, we shall review and sum up the whole matter.

There is an idea of a supreme Being implanted in the hearts of all men. Yea, more than this. Since the fall of man and the first promise in Paradise even an idea of a Redeemer and of redemption is diffused among the whole race; in some nations, however, it is more clear than in others. This idea is, of course, vague; and it cannot be otherwise. We could know nothing *positively* of a Redeemer, and we could have no *clear* idea either of what He *is* or of what He *did* without a divine revelation. Whatever assured knowledge we can have in this matter, we receive only from the Scriptures. Hence the first question is not: What is my view or the view of any other man about Christ? Neither: What does the Church teach concerning Him? But only: What do the Scriptures teach?

From most of the literature about religious questions the canonical writings differ obviously in two ways. The Scriptures do not contain a *system* of Theology, but announce different divine mysteries here and there, as occasion requires, intermixed with a narrative of facts, or with promises, admonitions, exhortations, warnings, just as holy men were moved by the Holy Ghost. On the other hand, the writers do not endeavor, or at least very seldom, to *prove* the truth of what they assert, but they speak in so positive, unhesitating and decided a manner, that doubt is regarded as disobedience toward God. Their first object was to impress the mind, to arouse the conscience, to awaken faith and so to save sinners; it was left to a later age to build up a system of revealed truth and to defend doctrines against unbelievers, objectors and heretics. What has been said here in general is true also in regard to the person of Christ.

The Bible, especially the New Testament, brings before our view a Man, so great, so wonderful, so mysterious in every respect, that no other one is found in the whole human race who might justly be compared to Him. In one aspect, this man is as human in His whole appearance and life, in His coming into the world, His walking upon it, and His going out of it, as any other human being. In another aspect, however, He is surrounded by such a halo of divine glory, in His words and

works, in His daily walk and conversation, even from His birth to His death upon the cross, there is such a wonderful sublimity, that He is far above everything human. As Christ appears in the gospel, we are entitled to say of Him: He is bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh; we may call Him one of us, our brother; but on the other hand we are bound to confess: He is infinitely above us; He is our Lord and our God. The *divine* and the *human* are in Him so closely conjoined that it is impossible to draw a definite line between one and the other. Sometimes we observe in Christ more distinctly the human character, sometimes more the divine, but mostly the divine-human is clearly recognizable.

Jesus was born, like many other children, in low and poor circumstances, yet His birthplace is illumined with divine splendors, and heavenly hosts attend His coming into the world with songs of praise. That little babe, lying in a manger, wrapt in swaddling clothes, an angel of the Lord announces to be the Son of David, the Christ, the Saviour of the world. The aged Simeon presses the same child to his bosom and beholds in Him the comfort of Israel, the light of the nations. Wise men from the East come a great distance, directed by a wonderful star. Though their bodily eyes see only a helpless child, nursed by a poor mother, yet they acknowledge in Him their king, and worship Him. The infant grows as other children grow; He learns with them and no doubt plays with them; yet His answer to His mother: Wist ye not that I must be in my Father's house, or about my Father's business? evinces the consciousness of being something more than a man. Having grown to full manhood, He commences His public ministry by submitting to the baptism of John, like other Israelites, in order to fulfill all righteousness. John recognizes Him, and declares Him to be the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world, and the voice from on high proclaims to him, He is the beloved Son of the Father. Soon after He is tempted of the devil, and then the angels of God minister to Him.

By the people Jesus is generally regarded as the son of Joseph

and Mary; they are somewhat acquainted with His kindred and the circumstances under which He grew up. Therefore they could not conceive whence He had His learning, and the power and authority with which He spoke; especially were they puzzled by His miracles; occasionally they so marveled that they were constrained to exclaim: A great prophet is risen among us, and God has visited His people.

From His public life we shall select only a few instances out of the many, where the divine and human are so wonderfully and beautifully united. He is invited to a marriage feast; He eats and drinks with the guests; He is sociable and rejoices with them; He supplies their wants by turning water into wine, so revealing His glory. He sits down upon a well, hungry and thirsty, and asks a poor, degraded Samaritan woman for a drink, and then, to her great astonishment, tells the same woman: Whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him, shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life. Weary, He lays himself down in a boat and soon falls into a sound sleep. The troubled sea and the waves, tossing the boat to and fro, threatening to swallow it up, do not disturb His slumber; but the cry of the terrified disciples awakes Him. Knowing that He is Lord over the powers of nature, calmly and quietly He rebuked the winds and the sea, and lo! there was a great calm. He is supported by His friends; He receives contributions from their hands for Himself and His disciples, because He had not where to lay His head; yet He fed thousands of people with a few loaves of bread and some fishes. How touching is His sympathy with human woe and misery, which He showed on many occasions, especially at the grave of Lazarus, when the Jews said: "Behold, how he loved him!" Then He speaks as one who has command over the world of spirits: "Lazarus come forth!" Exhausted by His terrible struggle with the powers of death and darkness, He comes forth from Gethsemane to meet a crowd of armed enemies; at His few words, quietly spoken: "I am he," that

crowd falls to the ground. Upon the cross, Himself condemned by men, He acts as judge, who has power over souls as well as over bodies, pardoning a condemned criminal and opening to him the gates of Paradise; but soon after He cries with a loud voice: My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? Finally, as His birth, which was truly human, was accompanied by wonderful signs from heaven, so was His death, just as truly human, accompanied by signs not less wonderful.

These are only a few outlines of the portrait of Christ, as it is drawn by the four Evangelists. We shall now turn our attention to the still more direct and positive testimonies for the divine and human natures of Christ. We shall confine ourselves almost exclusively to the New Testament and to such passages as are most clear and decisive and admit of double interpretation. This will be sufficient for our purpose.

In the first place, we shall consider two names, which occur so frequently and are of such importance that they must not be overlooked. These names are, Son of man and Son of God. The first title is mainly used by our Lord Himself, and He applied it to Himself very often; by the other title He is commonly designated by the Apostles.

When Christ calls Himself the Son of man, does He refer to His divinity or His humanity? Expressions like the following: The Son of man, who is in heaven; when ye see the Son of man ascend into heaven, where he was before, and some others, might be understood as referring to His divine nature. But such phrases receive their explanation from the truth, that the Son of man and the Son of God are *one* and the *same person*. The term as such points plainly to the *human* nature of Christ, and is very significant. He is not a son but *the* Son of man in distinction from all other sons of men. He was the first and only pure and perfect man, the second Adam, the ideal man who united in perfect harmony in Himself all human attributes and characteristics, as far as they belong essentially to human nature. He was that man, who was already promised in paradise as the woman's seed,

the true *representative* of humanity in its normal and ideal condition.

In the same unparalleled and exclusive sense in which Christ is the Son of man, He is also the Son of God. A candid and unprejudiced examination of those passages in which this title occurs must convince every reader, especially in comparing the connection, that Christ is not called the Son of God in the same sense in which pious men before and after Him are called God's children; that He stands by no means on a level with them in relation to the eternal Father; but that He is singled out from among all other men. The difference can hardly be better expressed than in the words of the Heidelb. Cat. Quest. 33: Christ alone is the eternal Son of God, but we are children of God by adoption through grace for His sake.

It will be sufficient, further, just to quote, without comment, first, those passages of Scripture that witness to His divine nature, and then those that witness to the human nature. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father hath declared him. For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son. That they may be one, even as we are one, I in them and thou in me. I am come forth and came from God. This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father. He that believeth on me, believeth not on me, but on him that sent me. And he that beholdeth me, beholdeth him that sent me. We have beheld and bear witness that the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world. Herein was the love of God manifested in us, that God hath sent his only begotten Son, that we might live through him. He was declared to be the Son of God, with power, by the resurrection from the dead. When the high priest in Israel asked Him, Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed? He answered, I am. Peter said unto him: Thou hast words of eternal life. And we have believed and know that thou art the

Holy One of God. (The quotations are mostly taken from the revised edition of the New Testament.) Could Christ apply such appellations to Himself and accept them from His disciples without being guilty of blasphemy? If He was not what do these words imply? That He used them in the same sense in which all Christians have ever taken and still take them, there can be no reasonable doubt. The Jews, too, understood them in this sense and accused Him of blasphemy, for the very reason that he made Himself equal with God. Would it not have been His highest and unavoidable duty to do everything in His power to remove such conceptions respecting Himself from the minds of his hearers if such conceptions had been wrong, if He did not want to be acknowledged and believed in as the very Son of God, essentially one with the Father? We will add only a few more testimonies. John, the apostle, says: And we know that the Son of God is come, and has given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true, and we are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life. In the Epistle to the Hebrews we read: Of the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever; and the sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of thy kingdom. Thou hast loved righteousness, and hated iniquity; therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows. If these testimonies, when each is taken separately, are not decisive proof that the Scriptures ascribe to Christ divine nature, they surely have the force of a demonstration when taken collectively.

But there are other very strong testimonies, which come under consideration. We refer next to Christ's works. Not to His miracles, for they of themselves do not prove His divinity, but only in connection with His whole life. We refer to those divine works which are ascribed to Him. These are: Participation in the creation, the preservation and government of the world. Through the Word are all things made, and without Him was not anything made that hath been made. Through Him, the Son, God made the worlds, who being the effulgence

of His glory and the very image of His substance; the image of the invisible God; in Him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things have been created through Him; and He is before all things, and in Him all things consist. Further, He is the Redeemer of mankind, and the restorer of that part of the world which is fallen and ruined. He forgives sins. He raises the dead at the end of the world. As the Father raiseth the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son also quickeneth whom He will. The hour cometh in which all that are in the tombs shall hear His voice and shall come forth. He is also the Judge of the world. He will gather all men around Him and separate them as the shepherd separates the sheep from the goats. We must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ.

There are also divine attributes or perfections ascribed to Him, partly in plain words, partly they are to be inferred from His works. He is from eternity to eternity; without beginning of days and without end of life. Before Abraham was, I am. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last. Immutable: Jesus Christ the same yesterday and to-day, yea, and forever. Omnipresent: Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them. Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Almighty: All things have been delivered unto me of my Father. All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth. From declarations like the following: He knew their thoughts; He needed not that any one should bear witness, for He himself knew what was in man, and He knew them all, —some infer His omniscience, but they prove nothing in this respect, for they may be explained as denoting merely a deeper and clearer insight into the nature of things, of man especially. His omnipresence, His office as Judge of the world, presupposes also His omniscience. When He calls Himself the light of the world, the truth, His universal knowledge is implied; for how could He be *the* light, not only *a* light, to whom nothing is dark?

How can He be the truth, who does not himself know all that is true? Besides this we must draw the following conclusion: whoever possesses any exclusively divine prerogatives, must possess them all, as they cannot be separated. Finally, He claims for Himself divine honor and adoration. All must honor the Son as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son honoreth not the Father which sent Him. All knees must bow in His name and all tongues confess that Jesus Christ is Lord. All angels of God shall worship Him. It is an undeniable historical fact, that the apostles and early Christians, who knew nothing of the worship of the Virgin Mary and other saints or angels, did worship Jesus as their Lord and God.

From all these Scriptural testimonies, which might be considerably extended, it is clear that Jesus Christ, though *personally* distinguished from the Father, is *essentially* one with Him, not merely similar to the Father, but consubstantial, not ὁμοιούσιος, but ὁμοούσιος.

In order to be candid, however, and impartial, we dare not fail to quote also some of those passages of Scripture which, considered without regard to the context, appear to ascribe to Christ a beginning as to creatures. He is, accordingly, the first and highest in the order of creation, but still a creature. This Arius and others maintained. They appealed to expressions like these: He is the first-born of all creatures; He is begotten; the Father has *given* to the Son to have life in Himself; He has *given* Him authority over all flesh. We cannot enter upon a close examination and exegetical interpretation of these and similar phrases, but will offer only a few remarks in reply to Arian Christology.

When Christ is represented in a certain sense as the first of different classes or orders of angels, it is done in such a way that He is at the same time declared to be the Head of creatures, and is clearly and plainly distinguished from all creatures, and brought in so close and intimate a connection with God as is no creature. Even of the most mighty and elevated angels, those that are nearest to the

throne of God, it is said, that they throw down their crowns and bow their knees and hide their faces in the presence of the Most High; but of the Son this is never said. In the Old Testament He is the angel of the covenant, the great I Am, Jehovah, who revealed Himself unto Moses in the burning bush; the face of God that went before Israel in the wilderness; the Rock of Salvation. In the New Testament He is the Lord of the heavenly hosts. As the first Adam was of the earth, so is the second Adam the Lord from heaven. For unto which of the angels said He at any time: Thou art my Son, and, sit Thou at my right hand. He is above all rule, and authority, and power, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. When He will appear again to judge the quick and the dead, accompanied by His holy angels, He will not be regarded as one of them, but as their Lord and King: King of kings and Lord of lords.

Only a few more remarks on this point. God, as to His essence, the Godhead (Gottheit) as such, is invisible and unapproachable. Whom no man hath seen nor can see, for He dwelleth in a light unapproachable; but in Christ God is revealed, is seen and approached; above all others appeared in Him the kindness of God and His love towards man. He who is in the bosom of the Father is the image and revealer of the Father. No one knoweth the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him. So then the Son came not into existence out of the non-existent by the all-mighty fiat of God, but He co-existed with the Father in, and came forth from, the very essence of God; and in Him dwelleth all the fullness of God bodily, being Light of Light, God of God.

As certainly as Holy Scripture declares Jesus Christ to be the Son of the living God, so certainly it declares Him also to be a true man. To that which has already been said upon this point little needs to be added. It is above all reasonable doubt that the evangelists relate the birth, the life, sufferings and

death of a real man. In plain words the apostles assert His true humanity. Since the children are sharers in flesh and blood, He also himself, in like manner, partook of the same. He took upon Him the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and found in fashion as a man. There is one God, and one Mediator between God and men—the man Jesus Christ. Since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For verily He took not on Him the nature of angels, but He took on Him the seed of Abraham. God sent forth His Son, born of a woman, in the similitude of sinful flesh. The Word was made flesh. His growth, physically and mentally, His obedience to parental authority, His life of prayer, His temptation, His weariness, His hunger and thirst, His susceptibility to joy and sadness, His gloom and prostration before the approaching death, together with His whole life—all this, if it means anything, it teaches that He was really and truly man. The apostles did not represent a passing phantom, not one who had only assumed the form of that which is human, but they describe a real human life—a being that partook of our nature in every respect except sin; and sin does not belong to human nature in its normal condition. Christ was a man, and nothing that is human is foreign to Him.

If, nevertheless, the apostles in their teaching do not bring the *humanity* of Christ to the foreground, but dwell more particularly upon the divine glory of our Saviour, and if they endeavor chiefly to convince their hearers and readers of the *divinity* of Christ, this is founded in the nature of the case and in the existing circumstances. It is easy to comprehend, and therefore much easier to believe, that Christ was a true man, as every rationalist does, than to believe that He was also God. The Christians of the apostolic age had previously been either Jews or Gentiles. Concerning the Jews, it is not at all an established fact that they believed the promised Messiah would be a person partaking of the divine nature. A few of the most enlightened Jews may have had a faint idea that came near the

true Christian conception; the majority certainly had not. It is most probable that they expected a messenger sent from God, clothed with extraordinary divine powers, of which they saw the types in Moses and Elias. It cannot be expected otherwise. They lived under the dispensation of laws, types, shadows, and promises; the full light did not yet shine unto them. Hence it is not strange that even the best of those Jews who were inclined to look upon Jesus as the Messiah, recognized in Him, for a season at least, a great, a powerful teacher and prophet. The divine prerogatives, however, which He claimed appeared to them as boundless presumption, and even as blasphemy, and from their standpoint His claims could hardly appear otherwise. The *divinity* of Christ cannot be maintained without belief in the *trinity* of God; but of this they who held so tenaciously to the *unity* of God had scarcely any conception. To the disciples, who recognized the divine nature of Christ, He said that flesh and blood had not revealed this unto them, but the Father in heaven. It was therefore not necessary to prove to the Jews, and to converts from Judaism, that Jesus was a *man*, for this they did not question. They were much more inclined to overlook and to doubt His *divinity*. It is significant that the first Christian sect which denied the divine nature of Christ, the Ebionites, was the offspring of Jewish Christianity.

Somewhat different was the case with the Christians who had been Gentiles, in the beginning mainly Greeks. Some philosophical ideas were generally diffused among them. The system of Epicurus was followed by the great mass of the pagan people, because it agreed best with man's sensual nature. The nobler class, however, and the better educated adhered to Plato or Aristotle, and some of the ideas of these schools converts from paganism brought over with them when they accepted Christianity. To them, ideas of divine manifestations in human form (incarnations, as they are taught in the Hindoo system of religion) were not unknown. Some of them were inclined to deny the true *humanity* of Christ and to explain

His incarnation as a merely shadowy appearance, without reality, as a veiling of the invisible Logos. Hence, in opposition to the Ebionites, or as their antipodes, from the Gentile-Christians sprang the Docetists and the different schools of gnosticism, all of whom denied that the Son of God had come in the flesh. But, in general, it was not difficult to show that Jesus, who suffered under Pontius Pilate, who was by him sentenced and executed upon the cross as a malefactor, was really a man. For as to the Jews the preaching of a crucified Messiah was a stumbling-block, so to the Greeks the preaching of a crucified God, or Son of God, was foolishness.

That Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, that He has come in the flesh, became man,—this, then, is the sum and substance of the teaching of Holy Scripture concerning the person of our blessed Saviour. Great is the mystery of godliness: God is manifested in the flesh.

Scripture does not *explain* this mystery; it merely states the *fact*. This fact was the object of faith of the early Christians; this has always been and still is the faith of all Christian people, who hold simply to the revealed and written word, without much speculating, and without troubling themselves with subtile inquiries. Simple faith is perfectly sufficient in order to live a pious life and to die a happy death. Within the first three centuries this truth was never brought into a system nor expressed in the form of a church dogma. There was no special need of doing it; and it would have been more injurious to the Christian faith in that age than beneficial. The attention of the early Christians was directed more to the practical than to the speculative sphere of life. Under the first powerful impressions and influences of the miraculous operations of the Spirit upon the hearts of believers; as long as the new faith was sound, pure, strong and vigorous, and the first love was burning in their hearts, they lived less in theories than in the faithful performance of their Christian duties. They were above all called to maintain a warfare against the idolatry which they had forsaken and by which they were still

surrounded, and against the moral depravity of the world, from which they had to keep themselves unspotted. Their first and main concern was (as should indeed be the concern of every Christian of every age, for not theory, but life and activity are the test of true faith) to prove to the world by continual self-denial, by works of charity, by holy conversation, by sufferings and sacrifices, that faith is the power to overcome the world. With them the feeling, the mind (Gemüthsleben) and the will were taken hold of by the gospel rather than the intellect. They realized the saving virtue of Christianity; they enjoyed the peace and happiness of the new life and did not trouble themselves much with the task of solving the great problems involved in the Christian Faith. They received and believed the facts of Christianity with simple, childlike faith, and so much the more as they belonged largely to the lower and uneducated classes of the people.

But so the Christian community did not and could not remain. As the conditions and circumstances of the Gentile world changed, so changed the situation of the Christian Church. The gospel spread rapidly and extensively; in the same measure the enmity of the Jews and pagans increased; their wrath was inflamed, and persecutions became more severe and more general. But when the carnal weapons of rude power proved to be unavailing, enemies had recourse to the use of other weapons, which they took from the armory of philosophy. They attacked the Christian *doctrines* and attempted to refute them with all the objections that human reason and philosophy could bring forth. Civil *persecutions* the Christians bore patiently, and even suffered death willingly for Christ's sake. They did not try to prove the truth of Christianity theoretically; Justin Martyr in his Apologies addressed to the Emperor Trajan, excepted. But against the assaults of heathen philosophy and the ridicule of human reason, Christians felt themselves bound to *defend* their faith. At first this was done in a general way by the so-called apologists, who desired to give an account not only of their faith,

but also of the *reason why* they believed. Not only, however, did the attacks of their pagan enemies from heathenism call for defense. In the church herself teachers arose from time to time who endangered the purity of faith. Platonic and Aristotelian ideas found their way into the church, and greatly influenced some Christian teachers, who tried to amalgamate philosophy with Christianity. Even in the apostolic age, under the very eyes of the apostles, some heresies had made their appearance, but they were soon suppressed. But when Christian Churches increased in number and strength, and persecutions (which acted as a purifying process) ceased; when paganism lost ground and began to totter, and when Christianity became popular; then crowds of unconverted people, touched with the spirit of Christianity, but not permeated by it, flocked into the church; thus the Christian life became greatly weakened and worldliness gained much ground. This condition opened the church and made her susceptible to heresies of all kinds.

Further, as intelligent Christians, especially teachers of the Christian religion, began to penetrate more deeply into the articles of faith, and to meditate upon them for their own edification and satisfaction, it could not be otherwise than that, as the result of closer investigation, they would arrive at different conclusions; for as soon as men commence to speculate they commence to differ in their views, and are liable to run into errors. But it was the duty of the Church to watch over the truth that was delivered to her, and to preserve it whole and pure. Here again was imposed the necessity of studying the Scriptures carefully, not only for the purpose of edification, but to gain sound, deep and full knowledge of the truths therein contained.

Still another fact is to be considered. In the apostolic age the simple (in the good sense of the word) preaching of Christ and Him crucified, confirmed by signs and miracles, was sufficient to awaken faith in the hearts of hearers. St. Paul writes to the Corinthians: "And I, brethren, when I

came to you, came not with excellency of speech, or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God. And my speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit, and of power." Then also only a short, plain confession of faith in Christ was required in order to be baptized and be received into the Church. Later, however, more thorough and systematic instruction was deemed necessary. For this purpose regular classes of catechumens were organized. But he who has to teach the truth ought to know it himself; he should have a good understanding and a clear conception of the doctrines he wants to expound to others. Hence an educated class of teachers and ministers was required. The apostles, who had had the privilege of hearing the best of all teachers for three years in succession, who were, besides, specially enlightened and blessed with an extraordinary measure of the Holy Ghost, could, without disadvantage to themselves or to others, dispense with that kind of education which is generally acquired at ordinary schools. In a certain measure this was the case, too, with their co-workers and immediate successors, for they were taught directly by the apostles. But after the church had been firmly established—after the apostles had gone to their reward—those supernatural gifts and powers gradually diminished and were withdrawn, and the Church had to develop her life in a more natural way and under less immediate direction of the Holy Ghost. This explains, in part at least, how it was possible that the Church could, for centuries, be engaged in bitter quarrels and severe controversies about mysteries which no one ever was able or is able fully to comprehend. It is true, the Holy Ghost never forsook the Church, but great scope was left to human activity and human passion.

The felt need of a well educated class of religious teachers and leaders of the congregations, or perhaps more properly the need of elders or bishops, suggested the necessity of higher schools. These schools were not universities, like those of later

and of modern times. They may best be compared to the schools of the prophets under the old dispensation. The oldest and most celebrated schools of ancient Christianity were those at Alexandria in Egypt, and at Antioch, the capital of Syria. The first, established in the latter part of the second century, reached its highest bloom under the leadership of Origen; the second flourished from the beginning of the fourth century. As to-day every theological school or university has its peculiar types, and as in each the mind of the scholar receives its special turn, so it was then. In the Alexandrian school a speculative and mystic tendency was prevailing, and to such a degree that occasionally the sober and sound interpretation of Scripture truths was displaced by philosophical and allegorical subtleties. In the school at Antioch, on the other hand, plain human intellectualism was predominant, which now and then bordered on rationalism. These divergent tendencies must be taken into account if we would properly understand the controversies of those times, and do justice to each party. Nor must the jealousies be overlooked, which so frequently arise between different schools.

So it came that the intellectual faculty of the Christians, especially of their spiritual leaders, was occupied, and found scope enough for exercise. The fundamental truths of Christianity were to be explained in their fullness, in their inner connection, and in their relation to the plan of salvation. Erroneous doctrines, real or imagined heresies, whether coming from outside of the Church or originating within her fold, were to be refuted and repelled. This mental activity led naturally to the formation of dogmas. In the beginning dogmas were constructed by a school or by a prominent teacher or bishop. But as every Christian reads the Bible with his own eyes, perceives and apprehends its doctrines according to his peculiar disposition, his ability and clearness of mind, often influenced more or less by preconceived notions, it is natural that different, even contradictory, explanations of the same truth are the result. It would be a miracle if it were otherwise. Further, it

is true that everybody tries to propagate his own views, and to gain adherents. Thus parties are formed; and each party tries to vindicate its views, as Scriptural, sound and orthodox. All this is applicable to the age of which we are speaking. In consequence, controversies arose which were first confined within a small district, and were of minor importance; then followed controversies of vital importance; the Church at large was affected, but mostly that of the Orient, which was greatly irritated, sometimes shaken to her very foundations.

Who, amid the diversity of opinions, should decide what was orthodox or heterodox? The Church, of course. In theory the Church consisted of all the faithful; but practically, the faithful were represented by presbyters and bishops, and eventually these were regarded almost as constituting the Church, while the so-called laity were more and more retired into the background. The representatives, either of a single province, or of the entire Church, convened, as emergency required, for the purpose of settling questions which arose in the Church and which could not otherwise be settled, but especially questions of doctrine. So originated the Synods or Church councils, which were either provincial or universal (ecumenical), and had their warrant and type (or at least should have had their type) in the convention of the apostles held at Jerusalem, A.D. 50. These councils were no arbitrary inventions; under the circumstances they were a necessity, and, as a rule, a real blessing to the Church. Although political power and arbitrariness, though human passions and party factions played often a *rôle* in those assemblies, we must not, on that account, undervalue their importance, nor think light of the results which were achieved.

The fundamental truths of revelation, the very pillars upon which the Church is built, are: Theology proper, Christology and Soteriology. All other questions of faith are connected with one or the other of these three. Here is a wide field for speculation; it may also become a dangerous field, as many problems arise which no man can solve. If reason undertakes

to *analyze* what only a believing heart is able to *embrace*, one may lose his foothold, and be plunged into infidelity.

The object of our investigation is exclusively Christology, and only one side of it: The relation of the two natures in Christ. The *divinity* of Christ, His eternal Sonship and unity with the Father, as also the distinction of persons in the Godhead, were settled at the Council of Nice, A.D. 325, against the Arians on one side and the Monarchians on the other. There remained, however, another great problem, standing in very close connection with the doctrine of redemption, which demanded solution. The Church was not willing to leave this question open, and allow every Christian to believe about it as he pleased; but she desired that all should have a correct understanding and hold the same views.

Scripture tells us in plain words that the Son of God had become man; but the question will enter into every thinking mind: How is this to be understood? How could He, who is in His very nature infinite, and to whom space and time are as nothing, become finite and enter into relations to space and time? For this is obviously the import of the incarnation. How could He be divine and human, God and man, and what were the relations in this duality of nature? Into this mystery the Church tried to look. The result of inquiries and researches, after long, hard and bitter contentions, was finally put down in a definite formula. We shall, in another article, try to describe the beginning, development and end of the controversy, which lasted, with some short intervals of rest, for about two hundred and fifty years.

IV.

THE WORK OF WICLIF.

BY REV. JOHN ALFRED FAULKNER, B. D.

In the following essay I shall attempt to show what Wiclif's work was, its greatness and importance, wherein its results have come down to us, and what are the lessons of his life.

Let us look first at his work for civil liberty. England was at this time quite under the heel of the Pope. He claimed her crown as a fief held by the King as long as the latter was his loyal subject; her sees he filled with foreign prelates, many of whom never set foot in their dioceses; ecclesiastics filled the offices of state; and tribute must be paid and was paid by his faithful vassal. Against all this Wiclif protested. In his book on the Divine Dominion, he laid down his principles thus:

"In God alone dominion in the highest sense vests; He is the suzerain of the universe, who has delegated his own power to no vicegerent, but deals out his rule in fief as it were to man on condition of obedience to His commandments. If therefore God has allotted portions of dominion to man, it is not granted to one man, his vicar on earth, as the Pope alleged, but to all. The King is as truly God's vicar as the Pope, and His power is as sacred as the ecclesiastical and as complete over temporal things—even the temporalities of the Church,—as that of the Pope over spiritual things." The Pope is not over all earthly authorities. That sovereignty God has not delegated to any man. "The King is as much bound by his office to see that temporal goods are not wasted or mis-applied by the clergy, as the latter are to direct the spiritual affairs of the King, and while the King and the Pope are each supreme in his own de-

partment, every Christian man holds directly of God—the final and irrevocable appeal therefore is to the court, not of Rome, but of heaven."

These far-reaching principles left the Pope no control in English affairs of state, made the state responsible for the abuse and perversion of Church property, and emancipated the consciences of men from the rule both of King and Pope. They at the same time included the independence of the Church from the state for all her proper work. It is not strange, therefore, that King Edward III., in his contest with the Pope over the tribute, should have called upon this bold advocate for his support. This support was given in the Good Parliament (1376, if we may accept the opinion of some authorities), in the mission at Bruges (1374), and in opposition to Garnier, the collector of the Papal revenue (1372–1374). As a result, among other provisions, it was enacted that no tribute should go to the Pope that was needed for home defences, and that all annates and first fruits unpaid were to be remitted.

Another service which Wiclif rendered to the final emancipation of the Church and state of England, was his memorable appeal to the King and Parliament in 1382, against the Royal Ordinance which Archbishop Courtenay had procured against him. In words substantially as follows, he says:

"I cannot expect at your hands anything else but to be silenced, and, what is more, according to your ordinance, imprisoned. I know what that means. I demand, therefore, that the lay voice shall be heard. I have appealed to the King against the University. I now appeal to the King and Parliament against the synod which is now about to use the secular arm—the arm of Parliament. If I am to be tried, let me have a fair trial, and argue my case before the world. If that is not to be, I will at least take care that Parliament shall at least understand the essential points at issue, and the use that is to be made of its power, and I will also do my best to secure that the ecclesiastics shall be forced to consider some things as open questions, which they now count it heresy on my part to

attack. . . . If the laity see their way to clear off some of the most open corruptions of the Church, the English people will speedily perceive that I am no heretic, but the truest Churchman in the land." (See Burrows, *Wiclif's Place in History*, London, 1882, p. 119.) This bold but calm appeal secured Wiclif from molestation the rest of his life, and it was remembered years afterward, when England's day had fully come. When Henry VIII. was battling with the Pope, he sent to Oxford for Wiclif's articles, the articles which had been condemned in London in 1410, and at Constance in 1414, knowing well that the controversy had been fought out a century and a half before. These articles the University transmitted, and "after due consideration of the said articles," says Wood (in his Annals, 1530), "wherein, as 'tis said, he found that the Pope's power was not found nor founded on God's word, the King took occasion thence to vex the Pope, who hindered his design for being divorced from his brother's wife, by promoting Wycleve's doctrine, and ejecting Papacy out of his kingdom." Among the illustrious men, therefore, who labored for the liberties of the English people and the English Church, let us not forget that Wiclif stands in the front rank.

Closely allied to this is his work as a religious reformer. Of this work there are many aspects. His theological revolt underlying it was very radical. He renounced almost all the mediæval accretions to the doctrines and practices of the early Church. The invocation of saints is useless, except so far as it incites to the love of Christ, and is of a benefit to secure His mediation, for he is the only Mediator. If prayer were directed only to Him, the Church would be more flourishing. Pilgrimages to religious shrines are of no avail. Confession might be made to God, and to the common people, as it was in the times of the Apostles. Regarding absolution, he says, "There is no greater heresy for a man than to believe that he is absolved from sin, if he give money, or because a priest layeth his hand on his head and saith, I absolve thee; for thou must be sorrowful in thy heart, else God does not absolve thee." On indulgences

we find these ringing words one hundred and forty years before Luther protested against the same abuse:

"It is plain to me that our prelates in granting indulgences do commonly blaspheme the wisdom of God, pretending in their avarice and folly that they understand what they really know not. They chatter on the subject of grace as if it were a thing to be bought and sold like an ass or an ox; by so doing they learn to make merchandise of selling pardons, the devil having availed himself of an error in the schools to introduce after this manner heresies in morals. I confess that the indulgences of the Pope, if they are what they are pretended to be, are a manifest blasphemy, inasmuch as he claims a power to save men almost without Christ, and not only to mitigate the penalties of those who have sinned by granting them the aid of absolution and indulgences, that they should never come to purgatory, but to give commandment to the holy angels, that when the soul is separated from the body, they may carry it without delay to its everlasting rest." (Quoted by J. L. Wilson in *Life of Wycliffe*, N. Y., 1884, p. 240.)

To the doctrine of Purgatory, Wiclif clung almost to the last. It is only in his latest polemical Latin works that we find him first doubting it, and then using language which implies a distinct and positive denial. Concerning the Virgin Mary, he urges good Christians to endeavor to "please our Lady," and recommends her as an object worthy of imitation, because of her purity and humility. The present Mary-cultus in the Roman Church would have been abhorrent to Wiclif. As to the Lord's Supper, he held that the body of Christ was truly present in the sacrament, and was given, taken and eaten in the supper, but only after a heavenly and spiritual manner. This doctrine was not that of Luther, nor of Zwingli, but substantially that of the Church of England.

"As the words of Holy Scripture tell us," he says, "that this sacrament *is* the body of Christ, not that it *will be*, or that it is sacramentally a figure of the body of Christ, so, accordingly, we must admit without reserve, on this authority, that

the bread which is the sacrament *is* truly the body of Christ. But the simplest layman will see that it follows that inasmuch as this bread is the body of Christ, it is therefore bread, and remains bread—being *at once* both bread *and* the body of Christ. . . . The nature of bread is not destroyed by what is done by the priest; it is only elevated so as to become more honored. Do we believe that John the Baptist, when made by the word of Christ to be Elias, ceased to be John, or ceased to be anything that he was in substance before? In the same manner, the bread, while becoming by virtue of Christ's words the body of Christ, does not cease to be bread. When it has become *sacramentally* the body of Christ, it remains bread *substantially*. . . . Should some idiot demand how the bread may be the body of Christ and still remain the same, according to its own substance and nature, let him bear in mind his faith in the Incarnation, and see how two different natures may be united, and still both may not be the same nature."

At first sight, Wiclif's doctrine of the Supper seems to be a peculiar one; but it easily resolves itself into this, viz.: that while the bread remains the same, and is physically partaken of for the purpose of the sacrament, it is the body of Christ, which must be spiritually received. This doctrine cannot well be discriminated from that afterward maintained by the best of the Reformers, and may be considered the teaching of the Church Catholic. Against Transubstantiation he directed all the powers of argument, sarcasm and wit. His words on this point are full of sturdy English common-sense.

"If bread consecrated and unconsecrated be mixed together, the heretic cannot tell the difference between the natural bread and his supposed quality without a substance, any more than any of us can distinguish in such case between the bread which has been consecrated and that which has not. Mice, however, have an innate knowledge of the fact. They know that the substance of the bread is retained as at first. But our believers have not even such knowledge. They never know what bread or what wine has been consecrated, except as they see it consecrated.

But what, I ask, can be supposed to have moved the Lord Jesus Christ thus to confound and destroy all natural discernment in the senses and minds of the worshippers." Then with great boldness he says: "Of all heresies that have ever sprung up in the Church, I think none was evermore cunningly brought in by hypocrites, or cheats the people in more ways than this; for it robs the people, it makes them commit idolatry, it denieth the faith of Scripture, and, in consequence of unbelief, provokes the Truth in many ways to anger."

On the atonement, Wiclif held the necessity and the reality of the substitutionary work of Christ. If he did not emphasize the doctrine of justification by faith, as Luther emphasized it, it is too much to say that he did not see with more or less clearness this fundamental truth. "As a right looking," he says, "on the adder of brass saved the people from the venom of the adder, so a right looking by full belief on Christ saveth His people."

Wiclif would not have objected to the spiritual supremacy of the Pope, if that supremacy had been in the interest of sound doctrine and sound living, as it ought to have been, and as it once was. But at a time when rival Popes were thundering anathemas against each other, when the Papal court—now at Avignon—was itself corrupt and playing into the hands of the French, and when principles which Wiclif knew were true and scriptural were placed under the ban, it did not take long for such a man as he to see and to say that between Christ and the Pope there was very little agreement. Neither was he careful as to how he said it: "Now is the head of Anti-Christ cloven in twain, and one priest contendeth against the other. Both Popes were apostates and limbs of the devil, and not members of the body of Christ." When the Pope and the Church of which he was the head depart from Christ, then must they part company with Wiclif.

The Pope's protégés, the friars and mendicant orders, who were now very different from what they once were, also fell under his scathing denunciations:

"In such infinite blasphemies [as granting absolutions and indulgences to any extent] the infuriated Church is involved, especially by means of the tail of the dragon, that is, the sects of the friars, who labor in the cause of these illusions and of the Luciferian seductions of the Church. But arise, soldiers of Christ, be wise to cast away these things along with the other fictions of the prince of darkness, and put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and trust undoubtedly in your own weapons, and sever from the Church such frauds of Anti-Christ, and teach the people that in Christ alone and in His law they should trust; that in so doing they may be saved through His goodness, and learn above all things honestly to detect the devices of Anti-Christ."

Judged, therefore, by all the standards of the Catholic Church of his day, Wiclif was an incorrigible heretic, and our only wonder is that he did not meet the fate that has been accorded to those who were much less heretical than he. But the greatness of Wiclif as a religious reformer is not that he, single-handed and alone, dared to question the dogmas of the Christendom around him, and from his chair at Oxford and his pulpit at Lutterworth call back the Church to the purer faith of its earlier days, but that he conceived the idea of indoctrinating all England with these sentiments. This was no sooner determined than he set himself at work. It was an herculean task. Printing was unknown. He was without support, because the influential men of the state who had stood by him in his earlier work against the Papal claims, would not follow him in his later doctrinal advances. His devotion to truth they could not appreciate. Fortunately, however, he had inspired men at Oxford with his own spirit,—his pupils there, studious, earnest men,—and these he used for this larger and more enduring work. This work for his country, as well as for the England that he saw would be, was in three distinct lines.

First, he wrote tracts, pamphlets, sermons in the language of the common people, and scattered them far and wide, sending them out as advance heralds to prepare the ground. I cannot

do better than to use here the words of Green, the historian: "He appealed, and the appeal is memorable as the first of such a kind in our history, to England at large. With an amazing industry he issued tract after tract in the tongue of the people itself. The dry, syllogistic Latin, the abstruse and involved argument which the great doctor had addressed to his academic hearers, were suddenly flung aside, and, by a transition which shows the wonderful genius of the man, the schoolman was transformed into the pamphleteer. If Chaucer is the father of our later English poetry, Wiclif is the father of our later English prose. The rough, clear, homely English of his tracts, the speech of the plowman and the trader of the day, though colored with the picturesque phraseology of the Bible, is in its literary use as distinctly a creation of his own as the style in which he embodied it,—the terse, vehement sentences, the stinging sarcasms, the hard antitheses which roused the dullest mind like a whip." (*Short History of the English People*, Lond., 1875, p. 234.)

Wiclif's second effort for the evangelization of England was in organizing and sending out a body of itinerant preachers. These men had been under Wiclif's training at Oxford, were thoroughly grounded in the knowledge of Scripture, and were full of zeal for the gospel, into the light and life and beauty of which their dear master, Wiclif, had been the first to introduce them. They had also an enthusiasm for preaching, for Wiclif was the first English Reformer to give preaching its proper place. So they went forth, making their appeal to God's law, denouncing sin in high places and low, with no pardons to dispense, with none of the tricks and vanities and intrigues of the traveling friars;—earnest, plain, yet intelligent men, "they wandered from village to village, from town to town, from county to county, without stop or rest, preaching, teaching, exhorting, warning, wherever they could find willing hearers—sometimes in church or chapel, whenever any such stood open for prayer and quiet devotion, and whenever they found the church closed, sometimes in the public street or market-place." (Lechler,

Wiclif, Lond., 1875, Vol. I., p. 310.) All the Wiclif historians call attention to this remarkable anticipation of the similar plan of Wesley, and if space offered, I should like to draw other parallels between these two Reformers. Wiclif was here, as in many other things, the pioneer, and he deserves great credit for this effort—the first of the kind in English history—to bring the gospel home to peasant and to yeoman, to reach the mass of the English people by preaching, and that by men, many of whom had University training, but who were not thereby the less willing to assume poverty and hardship. Some of the men whom Wiclif sent out in their coarse, red woolen serges, barefooted, bearing the pilgrim staff, ready to meet poverty and persecution, were not only ordained priests and graduates of the University, but men of remarkable learning for the times, such as Hereford and Purvey, whom Wiclif was compelled to use for another purpose, of which I am now to speak.

Wiclif's third undertaking for the reformation of his country —let us remember that these three lines of action were all going on at the same time, and each contributing to the success of the other—was the translation of the Scriptures into the vernacular. Wiclif had great admiration and reverence for the Scriptures, of which he was an ardent student.

"Though there were an hundred popes and all the friars in the world were turned into cardinals, yet should we learn more from the gospel than from all that multitude. . . . Since secular men should understand the faith, it should be taught them in whatever language is best known to them. . . . Christ and the apostles evangelized the world by making known the Scriptures in a language that was familiar to the people."

It is evident, therefore, that if ever opportunity occurred, Wiclif would give the people the Scripture in their own tongue. He is the father of our English Bible, as he is the father of our English prose, and every time we open our Bibles, we read those lines in the fresh, clear, ever-living forms of speech which Wiclif has given them. He associated with himself

Purvey, Hereford and other co-laborers, but he translated the New Testament and revised the whole. This translation of the complete Bible into English was the last work of Wiclif's busy life, and it might well crown a life of such services to God and his country. Copies were made by many hands; gospels and epistles were in the hands of the itinerant priests; and thus England was prepared for that final revolt which came one hundred and fifty years after. That day Wiclif saw not. For such a radical reform as he looked for England was not then ready. Church and State united to crush out every trace of his work. But he built better than he knew. For after such a work as that of Wiclif's, a few salient points of which I have touched, the English Reformation was only a question of time.

That Wiclif's influence was not lost, has not been questioned by historical students. Dr. J. Friedrich, an impartial critic of reformatory movements, refers to this fact among others. He says: "Wiclifism embraced within itself an onslaught on the Church and its dogmatic presentments, the like of which had never existed before. It belonged to the number of the greatest and most lasting movements in the intellectual domain, if not even of the greatest phenomena of the fourteenth century. It aimed in that time, calling so deeply for reform, at a Reformation, founded seemingly on the Bible and the early Church, but one which struck at the existence of the Church itself; on which account it must of necessity also be condemned by the Church as uncatholic, if the latter was not to abandon its own self." Remembering now that Friedrich recognized that John Hus' doctrine was by no means original, but only a confession of almost all the articles of Wiclif, let us quote him again: "It is indeed true, and we do not deny it for a single moment, that the modern period dawned with John Hus, and not first with Luther." (See J. Friedrich, *Joh. Hus, Ein Lebensbild*, Div. I. 13, Div. II. 5; Loserth, *Wiclif and Hus*, Lond. 1884, pp. xxxiii, xxxiv). Of the connection of Wiclif with the Reformation Hallam says:

"No revelation has ever been more gradually prepared than

that which separated almost one-half of Europe from the communion of the Roman See; nor were Luther and Zwingle any more than occasional instruments of that change which, had they never existed, would at no great distance of time have been effected under the names of some other Reformers. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the learned doubtfully and with caution, the ignorant with zeal and eagerness, were tending to depart from the faith and rites which authority prescribed. But probably not even Germany was as far advanced in this course as England. Almost a hundred and fifty years before Luther, nearly the same doctrines as he taught had been maintained by Wicliffe, whose disciples, usually called Lollards, lasted as a numerous though obscure and proscribed sect, till, aided by the confluence of foreign streams, they swelled into the Protestant Church of England. We hear indeed little of them during some part of the fifteenth century; for they generally shunned persecution, and it is chiefly through records of persecution that we learn the existence of heretics. But immediately before the name of Luther was known, they seemed to have became more numerous; since several persons were burned for heresy, and others abjured their errors, in the first year of Henry VIII.'s reign." (*Constitutional History of England*, vol I. chap. ii., *ad init.*)

Corresponding with what is stated by Hallam, is the fact that John Knox begins his history of the Reformation in Scotland by giving, in what he calls "Historiæ Initium," a chapter on the history of Lollardism in Scotland.

"In the scrolls of Glasgow is found mention of one whose name is not expressed, that in the year of God 1422 was burnt for heresy; but what were his opinions or by what order he was condemned, it appears not evidently. But our Chronicles make mention that in the days of King James the First, about the year of God 1431, was deprehended, in the University of St. Andrews, one Paul Crawe, a Bohemian, who was accused of heresy before such as then were called Doctors of Theology. His accusation consisted principally that he followed John Hus

and Wiclif in the opinion of the Sacrament, who denied that the substance of bread and wine were changed by virtue of any words, or that confession should be made to priests, or yet prayers to saints departed. . . . He was condemned to the fire, in which he was consumed, in the said city of St. Andrews, about the time afore-written." (*History of Reformation in Scotland*, in *Works*, vol. I. Ed. Laing. Edin., 1846.)

Proceeding with his narrative, Knox gave a picturesque description of what occurred in Court when no fewer than thirty persons were summoned, in 1494, by Robert Blackburn, Archbishop of Glasgow, to appear before the King and his great council. "These," he says, "were called the Lollards of Kyle. They were accused of the articles following, as we have received them forth of the register of Glasgow." Among the thirty-four articles charged against them are many of the doctrines so ably expounded and maintained by Wiclif. "By these articles, which God of His merciful providence caused the enemies of His truth to keep in their registers, may appear how mercifully God hath looked upon this realm, retaining within it some spark of His light even in the time of greatest darkness." The Lollards of Kyle, partly through the clemency of the King, and partly by their own bold and ready-witted answers, so dashed the bishop and his band out of countenance, that the greatest part of the accusation was turned to laughter. For thirty years after that memorable exhibition there was "almost no question for matters of religion" till young Patrick Hamilton, of gentle blood and of heroic spirit, appeared on the scene in 1527. "With him," says Knox, "our history doth begin." (See *Blackwood's Magazine*, Dec. 1884, pp. 761, 762.)

The limits of this essay will not allow me to speak of Wiclif's influence on the Bohemian reformation, a most fruitful theme. Suffice it to say that the researches of scholars, especially the investigations of Professor Loserth, in whose book you can find this matter fully treated, have proved that every feature of the Bohemian movement was borrowed from Wiclif, that Hus'

whole theology was taken from the same source, that Hus' principal theological works are a reproduction—often word for word—from Wiclif, Hus never claiming originality, but acknowledging his great debt to Wiclif; and that through the Oxford scholar and reformer, the Bohemian reformation took its rise.

"Through many successive decades men were wont in Bohemia to designate John Wiclif the fifth evangelist. Even in the present day he is reckoned by the learned among the four greatest schoolmen whom the fourteenth century produced, and as sharing the palm with Duns Scotus, Occam and Bradwardine. In truth Wiclif is one of the most original minds England ever produced, and the only proper so-called Reformer before the Reformation. For Bohemia, everything that recalls the name of Wiclif has a peculiar charm, for this name was for many years and decenniums the banner beneath which a powerful party fought its battles. That which Hus has deposited in the way of theological knowledge in his various Latin tractates, he owes almost exclusively to the Englishman from whose writings he has by diligent study derived it. During the last years of his life Hus in reality appears as a genuine Wiclifite, with such verbal fidelity, and not seldom with so much *naïveté*, has he copied the writings of the Englishman. It was Wiclif's doctrine principally for which he yielded up his life, and did we not know that he played a part in other than purely theological matters, we should be obliged to confess that he mounted the pile on that 6th of July of the year 1415 as an out and out Lollard." (Dr. J. Loserth, *Wiclif and Hus*, trans. by M. J. Evans, London, 1884, pp. xv, xvi.)

Thus the influence of Wiclif strikes again through the Moravian brethren and Wesley.

On the score, then, of Wiclif's historical importance it might seem that the words of Dean Hook are not too strong: "John Wiclif may be justly accounted one of the greatest men that our country has produced. He is one of the very few who have left the impress of their minds not only on their own age, but on all time." (*Lives of the Archbishops*, vol. III.

p. 76.) This importance is admirably stated by Lechler: "John Wiclif appears to us the centre of the whole pre-reformation history. In him meet a multitude of converging lines from the centuries which preceded him; and from him again go forth manifold influences like wave-pulses which spread themselves widely on every side, and with a force so persistent that we are able to follow the traces of their presence to a later date than the commencement of the German Reformation." (*Wiclif and his Precursors*, vol. I. p. 14.) Professor Loserth goes so far as to say that the complaint of Milton in his *Areopagitica* is true and just: "If the stiff-necked obstinacy of our prelates had not obstructed Wiclif's sublime and exalted spirit, to supress him as a schismatic or innovator, the names of the Bohemians Hus and Hieronymus, and even of Luther and Calvin, would at this day have been buried in obscurity, and the glory of having reformed our neighbors would have been ours alone."

Before I close, I wish to draw a lesson or two from this life.

1. How much can be done by one man, and he of frail constitution, dying before he was sixty, or, according to some authorities, before he was fifty-five, but of an indomitable will, and borne on by an unflagging purpose.

2. Back of Wiclif stood the University of Oxford, in which he spent the greater part of his life, which trained him and made him a Doctor of Theology, and gave him his intellectual life and freedom, and which supported him in all his work until at the very last it was compelled by both the King and the Archbishop to expel him from its teaching staff. In the University, Wiclif had an immense following, and if it had not been for her, he never could have done his work. In the background of every great reformer and teacher of men, from St. Paul to Wesley, stand the halls of learning, on which ever falls the light of God.

3. One of the profoundest scholars of the day, he yet speaks to us more nobly by his stainless character and his living, glowing piety. Even his enemies cannot always refrain from

involuntary tributes of admiration extorted from them by the singular and unsullied excellence of this man, who combined lofty genius, exemplary virtue and personal godliness. Hear the breathings of his exalted soul: "O, Thou everlasting Love! inflame my mind to love God that it burn not but to His callings. O, Jesus! who shall give to me that I feel thee! Thou must now be felt and not seen. Enter into the inmost recesses of my soul; come into my heart and fill it with Thy most clear sweetness; make my mind to drink deeply of the fervent wine of thy sweet love, that I, forgetting all evils, all vain visions and scornful imaginations, Thee only embracing, joying I may rejoice in my Lord Jesus."

Great in many things, Wiclif was here greatest of all.

4. Wiclif is an example of absolute fidelity to truth, as opposed to fidelity to dogma. He loved the truth, and sought for it as for hid treasures, and cared not where it might lead him. The greatest heretic of his day, he fearlessly set aside one by one the dogmas of the Church, and turned ever toward the white light of truth. Let us who now garnish his sepulchre not prove ourselves the children of those who persecuted him—persecuted him because they thought all truth was in dogma, and shut their eyes to its ever-growing light.

5. Every true man's vindication comes at last, if not in his own age, in the ages afterward. The nineteenth century enrolls men as saints whose names the fourteenth cast out as evil. Walsingham, almost a contemporary of Wiclif's, calls him "that organ of the devil, that enemy of the Church, that author of confusion to the common people, that idol of heretics, that image of hypocrites, that restorer of schism, that sink of flattery." The judgment of our own times is expressed in these just and sober words of Dr. Lechler, and with them I may well close this estimate of his work:

"Wiclif is the first important personality in history who devotes himself to the work of Church reform with the entire thought power of a master-mind, and with the full force of will and joyful self-sacrifice of a man in Christ. To that work he

devoted the labors of a life, in obedience to the earnest pressure of conscience, and in confident trust that his labor was not in vain in the Lord. He did not conceal from himself that the labors of evangelical men would in the first instance be opposed, and persecuted and driven back. Nevertheless, he consoled himself with the assurance that the ultimate issue would be a renovation of the Church upon the apostolic model. It was only after Wiclif that other living embodiments of the spirit of Church reform, a Hus, a Savonarola and others, appeared upon the field—a succession which issued at length in the Reformation of the sixteenth century," (*John Wiclif and his English Precursors*, Lond., 1878, Vol. II. p. 317.)

V.

BROWNING.

BY W. M. REILY, PH.D.

Nein, führe mich zur stillen Himmelsenge
  Wo nur dem Dichter reine Freude blüht.
* * * * * * *
Ach was in tiefer Brust uns da entsprungen
  Was sich die Lippe schuechtern vorgelallt,
Misrathen jetzt und jetzt vielleicht gelungen
  Verschlingt des wilden Augenblicks Gewalt.
Oft wenn es erst durch Jahre durchgedrungen,
  Erscheint es in vollendeter Gestalt.
Was glaenzt, ist fuer den Augenblick geboren;
Das Aechte bleibt der Nachwelt unverloren.

—*Der Dichter in "Faust."*

THE object of this paper is not to impart to the readers of the REVIEW any additional information in regard to a writer of whom, particularly since his death, so much has been said. Since the highly favorable criticism of his "Paracelsus," about a half a century ago in the *North American Review*, by James Russell Lowell, all readers of newspapers and magazines have been reading about Robert Browning. We feel tempted to state our estimate of this famous man, to indicate the qualities which seem to us to enter into his peculiar literary character, and to cite passages from his writings which might bring conviction to the mind of the reader. A task more irksome to the writer, but more instructive and acceptable to those for whom he writes, would be to gather up the opinions, pro and con, of those who, occupying high places in the Republic of letters, have passed judgment on the works of our author, and by a

process of comparison and sifting endeavor to reach a proper conception of his real worth. In this brief article we shall attempt neither the one nor the other. Our only aim is to render a little assistance to the reader, if he needs such assistance, on the basis of fundamental æsthetical laws, to reach a standpoint from which a writer of poetry and his works may be properly viewed and estimated.

The history of literature hardly furnishes another example, unless possibly that of Wordsworth, of a poet who has been at once so contemptuously decried and so extravagantly lauded as Browning. Whilst there are critics who stigmatize his writings as a mass of affected literary foppery, there are those again who rank his genius with that of Shakespeare. His foes and friends carry on a warfare of fulminations, fruitless so far as affecting one another's positions is concerned, simply for the reason that there is no ground of mutual understanding. In this way the conflict must remain undecided, until history, which is generally regarded as the only true test, furnishes the approximate verdict.

The contest is similar to the one going on in the sphere of one of the sister arts, namely, that of music. The question is whether the works of Richard Wagner are to take a front rank among musical productions. There are musicians of high culture who are prepared to say that these compositions are the last and noblest fruitage of the history of the art of music, and that the value of studying the masters preceding Wagner consists, for the most part, in their enabling us to understand and appreciate him. Others again maintain that what in Wagger is not a skillful reproduction of the elder masters of the classical period is no music at all. The discussion often assumes a form that is ridiculous to a degree, and to a great extent is a warfare of empty words. Much, it is true, is said which from the several standpoints is sensible and correct, but neither side can see the reason for the other's assuming such a standpoint.

It seems to us that any one having an intelligent conception

of the principles of the science of æsthetics, especially as light is thrown upon these by the history of art, should have no trouble in seeing where the difficulty lies. Of course we must have a clear conception of what art is. It is necessary not only to know that art is the expression of spiritual contents in sensuous forms, but also to have a proper apprehension of the process by which this definition is reached. Where this is not at hand, all discussion of topics connected with art is like beating the air. When there is agreement and intelligence here, the next question of fundamental importance for further investigation is, What constitutes perfection in art? This question may be answered in two ways. We may have art in general in mind, and speak of one art approaching nearer perfection than another. That art may be said so to do in which the spiritual contents asserts itself with more emphasis and distinctness as over against the sensuous form which it employs as the vehicle of its expression. From this point of view, poetry must rank as the highest of the arts, and with good reason this place is generally conceded to it, whilst architecture comes lowest. But keeping art in general in mind, we look at the subject from another point of view and the question will be answered differently. If we wish to form an ideal conception of art, and then ask ourselves in what form it most adequately accomplishes its purpose or mission specifically as art, we are not permitted to look to the so-called highest or lowest form which it assumes, but to some middle form which more fairly represents it. In statuary we have the spiritual contents and the sensuous form in what may be called just equipoise. Here the claims of the material are met in the same measure as those of the spiritual. The one does not assert itself unduly in opposition to the other. Accordingly the great authorities endorse the assertion, so generally acceded to, that in the Greek statue we have the perfection of beauty. Here we get the conception of what the ablest writers on æsthetics term the *ideal*, as we find it nowhere else. When we take into consideration the functions and capacities as well as the limitations of art, we are permitted to say that

statuary more adequately than anything else furnishes us the idea of art.

Now the same principle holds good when we take into consideration any particular art and attempt to classify the various objects which it may include. Take, for example, the one last named. In its beginnings, sculpture shared in most of the limitations of architecture, to which it stood related in so many ways. The material side of the work of art asserted itself strongly, whilst the spiritual side or, if you choose, its meaning, was but inadequately indicated. In its latest stages, as matter, in the former of marble, bronze, etc., became more pliable under the skillful hand of man, the immaterial side, such as the ideas, purposes, conceits of the artist, come boldly to view. In the bas-relief, for example, it seems about to invade the domain of what may be regarded, in a sense, a higher art, namely, that of painting. Its own idea is met, however, only midway between these extremes, where, as before said, the sensuous and spiritual properly balance each other. Accordingly the great art-critics seem to be agreed that the Venus de Milo, in its perfectly simple and quiet beauty, more fairly represents the perfect in art than the more generally admired Apollo Belvidere or the Venus de Medici.

If we now return to music, and inquire as to the value of the works of Wagner, we see how two different answers may be given, both intelligent and both capable of being logically maintained. The friends of Wagner claim that his is *high* art. This cannot be denied, and the reason is plain. Wagner undertook to picture forth thoughts, sentiments, convictions, etc., in tones. The main object was to give expression to these contents. He felt it beneath him to furnish people with music *for its own sake.* His mind, trained to energetic thought, was full of practical principles and instructive material which he wished to impart to and impress upon his hearers. No one will deny that he possessed artistic talent, if not genius, of a high order. He knew well how to apply art for the accomplishment of his *higher* purpose. Cultivated audiences under-

stood the lesson and they listened to it with pleasure. What the poet and the orator accomplish by their method and means, he accomplished by his. All intelligent people must rejoice in his success. Detraction from his great merit could be prompted only by bigoted zeal in the interest of some favorite master or class of masters, and his name will go down to the future as a high and worthy one, and must be immortalized as giving the title to a most interesting and important juncture in the history of music. In Wagner the contents predominate over the form. In Mozart they found their equipoise. He must be regarded as the ideal musical composer. After him there is a decline in the art of music *as such*. It seems to become conscious of its limitations. The burden of spiritual contents weighing upon the hearts and minds of great geniuses like Beethoven and Schubert seems to be too heavy for the vessel into which they would press it. They begin to undertake to accomplish what can be adequately accomplished in another domain. Listeners possessed of intellectual culture fastidiously say: "We tire of the compositions of the classic masters, for they only give us music for music's sake. We prefer the later composers, for they not only please us with their melody and harmony and surprise us with their skill, they inform our minds and stimulate our thoughts. We are satisfied accordingly that their art is *higher*."

We come back to poetry and our author. Some of our readers are at once ready to say: "We understand the case perfectly now. The admirers of Browning affect an appreciation of *high* poetry. Their favorite raises them aloft beyond the confines of all art, and allows them to soar among the clouds, some of which are so thick as to be impenetrable except to the inner vision of the enthusiastic devotee. We see that Homer is not only the father of poetry, but the ideal poet, and with what Dr. Johnson terms, 'His sublime simplicity, his artless grandeur and unaffected majesty,' the standard of all poetical merit."

It is true that Homer will forever stand as the great classic,

for no one else could accomplish what was required of the classical as did he. He was the child of his age, and as a bard he met every demand that it made upon him. But Homer himself would have recognized in Dante and Shakespeare a genius, in its way, equal, if not superior, to his own. Here, however, we miss the sweet simplicity and plastic symmetry of the classical period. It is the Romantic element that predominates in the later poetry. The language is not characterized by that limpid transparency which many would like to see, but it is answerable to the nature of the message which the poets have to convey. Many eventful centuries of the world's history had intervened. The great Italian and the great Englishman had made this history a part of themselves. They, too, were children of their own age, with its fullness, manifoldness and variety of life, so different from that of ancient Greece. They thought they understood their age, and they adapted their methods to its demands. They appreciated Homer well, but he could be no pattern for them. A scholastic critic might insist upon it that, notwithstanding all this, it was poetry declining. This is granted, if the subject is to be looked at from his point of view; but from another, it may be equally well maintained that it was poetry rising to greater heights.

Some one may here be inclined to ask: "Well! where do you want poetry to rise to?" Poetry, to be true to itself, must remain within the domain of art, and in so far as it attempts to accomplish what lies beyond the sphere of art ceases to be poetry as such. There are realms, certainly, which the poet may be tempted to enter, and from which he cannot entirely restrain his activity as poet. If he has a speculative turn he cannot fail to recognize the claims of philosophy; if of an ethical, he will see those of practical life; and if of a religious, the momentous realities of the spiritual world will never be absent from his mind. We find these elements entering, to a greater or less extent, into the writings of all the great poets. We find them in Homer, but more fully and in an entirely different form in the other great geniuses just named. We

need not speak of the lofty spiritual wisdom of Dante, nor of the profound glances of Shakespeare into the intricate depths of the human heart. There is a large class of readers who say that they find much in these writers that they cannot comprehend. But whose fault is that? Would any sensible man stand up now and say that these authors should have selected other forms for the expression of their ideas? They absolutely knew of no others. They were not selected. They came by a sort of necessity. They had to write as they did or not at all.

The present age partakes far more of the romantic than the classical. But it differs from both. That these later centuries have been of vast significance in the world's life, every one knows; more so, we are inclined to think, than many of the wisest divine. Take one feature of the age. It is one of doubt. Dante seems to take for granted that everybody's faith is as pure and invincible as his own. When Shakespeare wants to tell us that something is absolutely true, he compares it to "words of Holy Writ." If there were any skeptics among his audience, their number was not significant enough to be taken account of. But the "higher critics" of these times, with their numerously increasing following, tell us that we must first consult them, before we decide what between the lids of the Bible is true and what holy. Every earnest man at this day can give no better expression to the deepest solicitude of his soul than the exclamation of the Psalmist: "If the foundations be destroyed, what can the righteous do?"

The most cursory reader of Browning sees that he is abreast of his age. He has taken up into himself the intellectual and spiritual life of the world. He is carried along on the front wave of the current of history. He believes himself competent to encourage those who are at his side, and to lend a helping hand to those who lag behind. The method he adopts he did not choose. It was chosen for him. It was part and parcel of his vocation itself. If his great predecessors had let themselves down fully to the level of their cotemporaries,

they could not have accomplished their task,—that, namely, of raising them to a higher plane. They were not fully understood at first; but the time came when they were understood, and with it came the elevation aimed at. We believe that Browning did his work as he best knew how, and that as the years roll around, it will be seen that he did it wisely.

Who will blame Browning for introducing these higher heterogeneous elements into his poetry? The situation required it. If he had not done so, he could not have come before the public at all. The great substantial problems of the life that now is and of that which is tō come present themselves in a new form, and they are to be solved in a different way. They are to be solved for those who realize their significance, and are aware of the difficulties by which, in the present age, they are attended. The editorials of the leading papers say that he is too argumentative. He is convinced of the immortality of the soul. In his "La Saisiaz" he tells us why. The dialectic process requires close attention. The great question, *Cur Deus Homo?* presses itself upon his mind. In his "Saul" he gives us the answer that occurs to him. Is it to be wondered that in connection with verses of unsurpassed poetic beauty, we find passages which involve profound thought? The inquiry presents itself before him, Why have miracles ceased in the Christian Church? In a charming way he attempts to give us a reply in his "Death in the Desert;" but the cursory reader will often find it necessary to stop to see the force of the argument. In "Ferishta's Fancies" he grapples with some of the profoundest problems that Leibnitz handles in his great "Theodicy." He enters the lists with fervid zeal against the materialism and skepticism of the day, and exposes their weakness as it appears in the subtlest forms. He writes for those who are exercised—nay, troubled—in regard to these questions, and expects, on the part of his readers, a willingness to exercise and trouble themselves still further in the effort at their solution.

It is plain thus that the spiritual contents of Browning's

works assert their predominating significance, and that, accordingly, the form must sink into comparative unimportance. At times he seems to be careless in regard to the latter, and certainly presumes largely upon the ability of his readers. We have experienced this to our humiliation, sorrow and regret. But perhaps he would have replied: "Wait until you understand me better, and possibly you will agree with me that the mode of expression was the proper one."

Some one might ask, If his purpose was so lofty and his wisdom so exalted, why not confine himself to prose, for verse is not suited for learned disquisitions in philosophy, ethics and theology? He would have answered, that he did not aspire so *high* as to be listened to speaking *ex cathedra* on these branches of learning. Topics of this character forced themselves upon his attention. He could not help meditating upon them. But he had to put his thoughts in the garb of poetry. This was the instrument to which he was trained. This was the element in which the half of his life was lived. The assumption of another office or character would have placed him under constraint.

If the undue introduction of material foreign to its nature marred his poetry, this is his misfortune. If his artistic work is inferior to that of his predecessors, let theirs be read. Let his be tried only when theirs no longer adequately meet the demands of the public. If theirs is praised more than his, he would not be annoyed; only his should not be ridiculed until his aim is properly understood. If he is rewarded with the meed of appreciation, he would be thankful; and if he is found helpful in enabling any one to realize the purpose of the Creator in calling intelligent beings into existence, he would be glad.

VI.

EMERSON'S PROSE.

BY CHARLES H. LERCH.

THERE are two classes of critics who give their estimates of the prose and poetry of writers. The one class might be called the destructive critics; the other, constructive. The first class usually take up the prose or poetry, whichever it may be, dissect, analyze it, cast aside what is poor and defective in it, gather up what is left of it, and hand the remainder over to time, the great judge of all things, the guardian and protector of all that is worth preserving in literature.

The second class of critics does not pretend so much to point out the defects and merits of the prose and poetry as such, and to make a critical estimate, but rather to fix the eyes of the reader upon the noble sentiments, the high-thinking, which it itself sees and feels in what it criticises. These two classes of critics are well represented by Mr. Mathew Arnold and John Campbell Shairp. Both of them were professors of poetry at Oxford. It is interesting to notice the difference between the canons of criticism which these two writers represent. Mr. Arnold says by criticism is meant, "the disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world." In his criticism of Emerson he says, "I have given up to envious time as much of Emerson as time can fairly expect ever to obtain."

Professor Shairp, on the contrary, says, in his "Studies in Poetry and Philosophy," "These essays are in no sense criticisms of the poets they deal with, at least as that word is generally understood. To take the measure of these great and

good men, and assign them, as the phrase goes, their place in literature, I would not try if I could, and I could not if I would. Such attempts seem to me to be generally more pretentious than solid. Enough will have been done, if, by pointing to some of the sources of delight I found in them, others may be induced to study them and find the same."

The difference between the methods of criticism of these two critics is that of the difference between analysis and synthesis; between destruction and construction. Mr. Emerson has been subjected to both these tests. Mr. Arnold, after a rigid analysis, has told us that Mr. Emerson is not a great poet, a great writer, a great philosophy-maker.

Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes sees enough of the poet, great writer and philosopher at least, if not of the philosophy-maker, to select from his writings passages worthy of reading.

This seems to me to be the proper manner in which to approach the writings of Mr. Emerson or of any writer, not so much to analyze to criticise, for the sake of assigning his place in the ranks of the poets and prose-writers, but rather to catch the spirit of the author and see what lessons he can teach us.

Turning then to Mr. Emerson, the reader will naturally be led to ask. was he a prose-writer, or poet, or both? In what kind of ware does he deal? What are the titles of his books? Are they treatises of Logic, Metaphysics, Philosophy, Science?

However unattractive may be the style, the method of treating the subject, the substance itself, in his prose-works, one cannot help but be attracted by the titles with which his books are labeled, and the list of subjects in them. Read these titles on the bookshelves: "The Conduct of Life," "Society and Solitude," "English Traits," "Representative Men," and then open the essays and notice the list of subjects: "History," "Self-reliance," "Compensation," "Love," "Friendship,"—the topics of common every-day life. Surely one would think, from such a list of subjects and in the hands of the proper man, noble thoughts, seeds, if nothing more, could be dropped into the soul, which must expand the whole

being. And is the reader disappointed in Mr. Emerson? Open the essay on History. The reader looks up in confusion and says, What does he mean? One might ask in turn, And what do you expect? Are you looking for a definition of history? An account of the deeds of heroes and their battles? Do you expect some moral lessons drawn from the great events in history? You will be disappointed in Emerson if you look for these things in him. Emerson says Mr. Arnold, is "the friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit," and he is that in treating even of such a subject as history. He sees more deeply into the spiritual side of history than the mere moralist, who gathers up a few moral lessons.

It is a remark of Dr. Channing, that "history should be constantly used to exercise the moral judgment of the young, to call forth sympathy with the fortunes of the human race and to expose to indignation and abhorrence that selfish ambition, that passion for dominion, which has so long deluged the earth with blood and woe."

This is all very good, but one must not expect Mr. Emerson to point out such lessons. He leaves that work to men with less depth of spiritual insight. Nor again is he one of that class of men to whom history is only a series of events, and to whom the men who figure in these events are mere men.

Carlyle believed it to be his duty to teach to men the "divine idea of the Universe." Emerson teaches the same. "Idealism," says he, "sees the world in God." What makes all his essays such inspiring reading is the fact that Emerson continually looks and holds up to us all things in the light of the spirit.

We may not be able to tell what it is in the particular passage or passages that has this stimulating effect; much less can we paraphrase his sentences. As Mr. Lowell says, "If you undertake to paraphrase what he says, and to reduce it to words of one syllable for infant minds, you will make as sad work of it as the good monk with his analysis of Homer in the 'Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum.'"

To Emerson was given pre-eminently that spiritual faculty by which he could see the reality behind the symbol. Emerson, we are told, "would not undervalue nature as looked at through the senses." He himself says, "I have no hostility to nature, but a child's love of it. I expand and live in the warm day like corn and melons." But "seen in the light of thought, the world always is phenomenal; and virtue subordinates it to the mind."

To show Emerson's method of interpreting history,—namely, that man, the centre of all history, must be looked at in the light of the universal mind,—one need only quote the opening lines of his Essay on History. "There is one mind common to all individual men. Every man is an inlet to the same, and to all of the same. He that is once admitted to the right of reason is made a freeman to the whole estate. What Plato has thought, he may think; what a saint has felt, he may feel; what at any time has befallen any man, he can understand. Who hath access to this universal mind is a party to all that is or can be done, for this is the only and sovereign agent."

Sheakespeare says that the

> "Imagination bodies forth
> The forms of things unknown."

One might say, I think, that the imagination in Emerson bodies forth ideas, conceptions, forms of things, which he has gathered up everywhere by his keen spiritual perception, and that it is this which makes him a prose-poet. There are men who say that a prose-poet is an impossibility; that prose is not only the opposite of poetry, but even of verse or metre. There are others who say that "prose, when it rises into poetry, becomes as nearly musical as language without metre can be; it becomes rhythmical." Professor Shairp tells us that "the thoughts," in prose, "which are poetical appear to be dealt upon for the pure imaginative delight they yield, for their inherent truth, or beauty, or interest, without reference to anything beyond."

If this view can be maintained, passages can be cited from the great prose writers which are prose poetry. Jeremy Taylor, Carlyle, Cardinal Newman, Phillips Brooks, and others—all of them have passages of prose-poetry. And as for Mr. Emerson, there are men who go so far as to say that he is all poet. One, I think, could at least find numerous passages in his prose writings to substantiate the views of Professor Shairp.

I turn to his Essay on History once more and I read:

"A man is a bundle of relations, a knot of roots, whose flower and fruitage is the world. His faculties refer to natures out of him, and predict the world he is to inhabit, as the fins of the fish foreshow that water exists, or the wings of an eagle in the egg presuppose air. He cannot live without a world. Put Napoleon in an island prison, let his faculties find no men to act on, no Alps to climb, no stake to play for, and he would beat the air and appear stupid. Transport him to large countries, dense population, complex interests and antagonistic power, and you shall see that the man Napoleon, bounded, that is, by such a profile and outline, is not the virtual Napoleon."

I think that one cannot read very far in the prose works of Emerson before he is attracted by the style in which they are written. He does not seem to use the same style throughout. In the English Traits he seems to speak more connectedly; there seems to be more evolution than in his Essays. To describe the English and their traits would naturally require a more didactic, connected manner of expressing his thoughts. His want of evolution, the disconnectedness in his Essays, might be accounted for, perhaps, by Emerson's choosing simple subjects with which he expected his readers to be more or less familiar, and that he thought it unnecessary to speak in logical sequence.

Then, too, he might have assumed, on the part of his readers, as much intuition as he himself had, in stringing together passages which often seem to have very little to do with each other, if anything at all. Mr. Stedman says: "We are told

of his mode of preparing an Essay,—of the slow-growing medley of thoughts on a topic, at last brought out and strung at random, like a child's variegated beads. But I do not find that his best essays read backward as well as forward; I suspect an art beneath their loose arrangement, and I see at times the proof of continuous heat."

To illustrate how the reader is often confronted by ideas, thoughts, illustrations, which all seem to be put together haphazard, but which may have—no doubt have for Emerson—an underlying connectedness, one need only read this passage taken from his Essay on History:

"I hold our actual knowledge very cheap. Hear the rats in the wall, see the lizard on the fence, the fungus under foot, the lichen on the log. What do I know sympathetically, morally, of either of these worlds of life?" Then further on he says: "How many times we must say Rome, and Paris, and Constantinople! What does Rome know of rat or lizard? What are Olympiads and Consulates to these neighboring systems of being? Nay, what food or experience or succor have they for the Esquimaux seal-hunter, for the Kanáka in his canoe, for the fisherman, the stevedore, the porter?"

Dr. Holmes remarks about this passage, that "we cannot help smiling, perhaps laughing, at the odd mixture of Rome and rats, of Olympiads and Esquimaux. But the underlying idea of the independence of all that exists in nature is far from ridiculous."

It was the saying of Buffon that "the style is the man." So we must say of Emerson, that his style is himself. Study him, his mind, his conception of style, his literary methods, his manner of studying, and you will have a key to the explanation of his style. He himself says: "Here I sit and read and write, with very little system, and as far as regards composition, with the most fragmentary result; paragraphs incompressible, each sentence an infinitely repellent particle." Again he says, in speaking about veracity, "Style betrays you, as your eyes do. We detect at once by it whether

the writer has a firm grasp on his fact or thought"—— "There is no choice of words for him who clearly sees the truth. That provides him with the best word."

With Emerson the truth is the primary thing; style, art, the secondary. The thought is first in importance, then the word.

One can afford to sacrifice system, sequence, logic, for the high-thinking which he inculcates. What lessons of profound wisdom, for every-day usage, you can gather up from his writings! This is what Mr. John Burroughs refers to when he says, "I know of no other writing that yields the reader so many strongly-stamped medallion-like sayings and distinctions. There is a perpetual refining and recoining of the current wisdom of life and conversation."

Let me point out a few sayings of current wisdom, such as have impressed me. In his "Conduct of Life," in speaking of wealth, he says: "He is no whole man until he knows how to earn a blameless livelihood. Society is barbarous until every industrious man can get his living without dishonest customs." Again: "The manly part is to do with might and main what you can do. The world is full of fops who never did anything and who have persuaded beauties and men of genius to wear their fop livery."

"I have never seen a man as rich as all men ought to be, or with an adequate command of nature. The pulpit and the press have many commonplaces denouncing the thirst for wealth; but if men should take these moralists at their word and leave off aiming to be rich, the moralists would rush to rekindle at all hazards this love of power in the people, lest civilization should be undone." Again, he says of pride: "A good pride is, as I reckon it, worth from five hundred to fifteen hundred a year. Pride is handsome, economical; pride eradicates so many vices, letting none subsist but itself, that it seems as if it were a great gain to exchange vanity for pride. Pride can go without domestics, without fine clothes, can live in a house with two rooms, can eat potato, purslain, beans, lyed corn, can work on the soil, can travel afoot, can talk with

poor men, or sit silent, well-contented, in fine saloons. But vanity costs money, labor, horses, men, women, health and peace, and is still nothing at last—a long way leading nowhere. Only one drawback: proud people are intolerably selfish, and the vain are gentle and giving." These quotations are all taken from one essay. Let me now turn to another one, Culture, where he tries to teach the maxim, "he that loseth his life shall find it."

"He who aims high must dread an easy home and popular manners. Heaven sometimes hedges a rare character about with ungainliness and odium, as the burr that protects the fruit. If there is any great and good thing in store for you, it will not come at the first or the second call, nor in the shape of fashion, ease, and city drawing-rooms. Popularity is for dolls." Again, in speaking of manners, he says: "A beautiful form is better than a beautiful face; a beautiful behavior is better than a beautiful form; it gives a higher pleasure than statues or pictures; it is the finest of the fine arts."

And so we might quote numerous passages to show that Emerson's treasury of profound wisdom is almost exhaustless.

Dr. Mark Hopkins tells us that man is made up of intellect, sensibility and will. It might be interesting to inquire whether Emerson addresses the whole being of man in his teachings or only a part of it. We should think that that man had the widest range, the most light, who could illuminate, not a part, but the whole being of man. The Bible claims to be able to touch men at all points of their being. Jesus said: "Thou shalt love . . . with all thy heart, with all thy soul and with all thy mind."

It might be a question difficult for the philosophers to settle whether the intellect is capable of loving truth in and of itself, or whether the sensibility, the seat of feeling, is also the only seat of all feeling and of all love. One thing to me seems true, that if the intellect in itself has no capacity of love, that there is a love of truth which manifests itself in men that could only come through the medium of the intellect.

When we ask, then, to what part of our being Emerson appeals, we are only asking to what part of Emerson's being the truth appeals. The only way in which Emerson can create in us a love for the truth is to show us his love for the truth. Emerson is the medium through which the truth comes to us. Is it, then, through Emerson's whole being, the intellect, the sensibility and the will, as a medium, that the truth clearly shines? Is he, like your typical St. Paul, an intense man of action, moved by deep feeling and all that tempered and fused by the heat of deep intellectual perception?

Emerson, I think, speaks to us largely through the intellect. Not that he is not a man of feeling, but the intellect in him is preponderant. He often attempts to enter into the region of the sensibility with his intellect, and becomes lost in mysticism. "He was a man of intuition, of insight—a seer, a poet—with a tendency to mysticism. This tendency renders him sometimes obscure, and once in a while almost, if not quite, unintelligible," says Dr. Holmes.

But if Emerson's teaching is largely food for the intellect, has he nothing to offer to the sensibility? Does he ever point out to us vast, unexplored regions of the sensibility, where he cannot enter with his intellect? What is this region in which the sensibility "lives and moves and has its being?" God, Christ, the Holy Spirit. Not that one means that God, Christ, the Holy Spirit is not also the region of the intellect, in which it lives, moves and has its being. But the sensibility here has a wider sweep, and can enter into places where the intellect must be left behind.

God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, the Trinity—what is Emerson's position towards this? It is not my purpose to point out Emerson's belief. I could not if I would. We must attempt here, not so much to point out what he does not teach, as what he does teach. Was there a Supreme Being for Emerson? "Belief and love—a believing love will relieve us of a vast load of care. O my brothers, God exists," he says in his Essay on Scriptural Laws. "The ardors of piety agree at last with the

coldest scepticism, that nothing is of us or our works—that all is of God." "All writing comes by the grace of God, and all doing and having," he says in his Essay on Experience.

"It must be that when God speaketh He should communicate, not one thing, but all things," he says in his Essay on Self-Reliance. A long task, indeed, it would be to hunt out the number of passages and places where the name of God appears. I will quote one more passage from his Essay on Compensation: "The true doctrine of omnipresence is, that God reappears with all His parts in every moss and cobweb." Emerson is often called a pantheist, but Theodore Parker tells us that "he has an absolute confidence in God. He has been foolishly accused of pantheism, which sinks God in nature, but no man is further from it. He never sinks God in man. He does not stop with the law, in matter or morals, but goes to the Law-giver." So much for his attitude towards God. What was his attitude towards Christ? I take this passage from Dr. Holmes: "Through all nature Emerson looked up to nature's God; and if he did not worship the 'man Christ Jesus' as the churches of Christendom have done, he followed His footsteps so nearly that our good Methodist, Father Taylor, spoke of him as more like Christ than any man he had known." This Father Taylor also said that Emerson "knows no more of the religion of the New Testament than Balaam's ass did of the principles of the Hebrew grammar."

But what is Emerson's attitude towards the Holy Spirit? We are told that what theology means by the Holy Spirit he calls the Over-soul.

George Willis Cooke, who has made an analysis of Emerson's religious teachings, says that "if a pantheist is one who asserts the absolute unity of matter and mind, then Emerson is a pantheist. He rejects that sharp distinction between matter and mind, good and evil, which has sometimes been accepted as the characteristic of theism. Should this definition be maintained, Emerson could not by any possibility be called a theist. Does he also assert that there is but one thinker, one self-acting

agent? If he does, then is he a pantheist. He certainly would seem to do so, for what else does he mean by his doctrine of the Over-soul? He regards the mind of man as a part of the infinite mind, but he asserts for man moral freedom. He also strongly declares that each mind is different from every other mind, and he teaches the individuality of the soul in a very positive manner. In thus maintaining the freedom and uniqueness of the individual soul, he makes himself a theist."

As Emerson has been called the New England Poets' Poet, so I think he might be justly called the preachers' preacher. His insight, as Mr. Arnold says, is admirable. He sees continually what the typical prophet or preacher ought to see—all things in the light of God. This thought is what the Psalmist uttered when he said: "In thy light we shall see light."

There is a manliness, a courage, a heroism in his teaching, by which the modern world can be greatly benefited. He fixes our eyes upon God and teaches us to hate and despise evil. He does not hold up to us any rewards for deeds well done. But holiness, truth, God, must be sought for their own sake. I will close by a quotation from one of his Essays, showing his feeling towards any petty or low consideration of a subject. Whatever may be the truth of this statement, one cannot help noticing the undertone of manliness in it.

He tells us that he was lately listening to a preacher who, he says, was a "man esteemed for his orthodoxy," and who "unfolded in the ordinary manner the doctrine of the last judgment. He assumed that judgment is not executed in this world; that the wicked are successful; that the good are miserable; and then urged from reason and from Scripture a compensation to be made to both parties in the next life. No offence appeared to be taken by the congregation at this doctrine. As far as I could observe, when the meeting broke up, they separated without remark upon the sermon.

"Yet what was the import of his teaching? What did the preacher mean by saying the good are miserable in the present life? Was it that houses and lands, offices, wine,

horses, dress, luxury are had by unprincipled men, whilst the saints are poor and despised? and that a compensation is to be made to these last hereafter, by giving them the like gratifications another day—bank-stock and doubloons, venison and champagne? This must be the compensation intended; for what else? Is it that they are to have leave to pray and praise? to love and serve men? Why, that they can do now."

> "Though love repine, and reason chafe,
> There comes a voice without reply,—
> 'Tis man's perdition to be safe,
> When for the truth he ought to die.'"

VII.

THE IDEAL IN EDUCATION.

BY PROF. R. C. SCHIEDT.

FEW words are used as vaguely as the word ideal. It is generally called into service whenever it is intended to express a particularly lofty object. Some apply it to the beautiful in art, and the more it affects their emotions the higher the ideal appears to them; others, however, use it as a purely philosophical term. To the one it presents itself as a world of unapproachable aims; to the other it is the absolute truth, the alone real. The diversity of appellation resting on a broad antithesis of conception changes with the change of time and place, of sex, age, occupation and disposition. Of course if ideals are exclusively subjective, centring in the desire of being admired, loved, honored, they are mere vain aspirations not deserving of the name ideal.

This preface may suffice to introduce a topic of discussion over which the minds of men are agitated at present more than ever before. What is the ideal after which we strive in all our educational efforts?

The ideal is that which corresponds to the idea; ideals are the changeable, individual expressions of the idea. Ideality is both love for the idea and the capacity of apprehending the ideal; or it is the will and energy to receive into and develop within us the ideals, the world of ideas (Lotze).

What is an idea? Plato attached to this term at first a concrete meaning. According to him the idea is not only a subjective process, a dim conception of the beautiful, the good and the true, but a higher world of its own, including the

moral as well as the physical realm. Ideas constitute, according to Plato, the permanent in the flux of things, the general, the one, the invisible, the eternal. He recognizes ideas of justice, of health, of voice, of man, of water, etc. They are the really existing prototypes of being which the soul of man possessed before birth, when it still abode with God. How much of this Platonic view have we retained? We still hold that ideas are types and prototypes. They signify the real character and true calling of a species; they constitute the image in which all who belong to a species recognize their nature and the completion of their development. The idea, therefore, represents the necessary, the fixed, universally recognized conceptions of the perfect. The highest idea is also, according to Plato, the good in the ethical sense, and the good is the deity or God.

If, then, ideality is the love for the idea, and the highest idea is God as the good, the cultivation of the ideal must culminate in the knowledge and love of God, or in godliness and piety.

Thus it becomes evident that the cultivation of the ideal in educational institutions, which excludes the religious factor, is a contradiction to its own principle. The student who constantly needs to be directed towards the ideal, is checked in the midst of his course. All our young men would fall a prey to modern pessimism, if it were impossible to uphold before them the idea of a personal God, incorporating the idea of the absolutely true and good as the source and final goal of all existence. Religious and national education is the common bond of the cultivation of the ideal which ought to embrace all the institutions of learning from the primary school to the university.

On the basis of the foregoing remarks we define ideality as the application of all our energies to the realization of the types and prototypes of the beautiful, the true and the good. Ideality is, therefore, not merely an addition to culture, but an integral part of it, yea, more, it is the goal of our

spiritual development, and all educational institutions are founded upon the supposition of an ideal world, a world of higher aims.

But the present age is so much under the ban of modern materialism that external proofs are required for every proposition or statement, even for spiritual processes and movements. Unless you can prove your assertions with filtrum, spectrum, microscope and scales they are at least doubtful. How is the existence of such prototypes to be believed?

Yet the world is not quite as materialistic as it seems. Even those who deny the existence of the spirit and with it every ideal existence, who recognize only the sensuous as the real, will not admit that the cultivation of concrete realities should be the sole aim of life. In the face of materialism they cherish the ideas of conscientiousness, of faithfulness, of truthfulness, of patriotism as sacred possessions. They deny the world of ideas, but nevertheless desire to live in it. They are bound to recognize the moral demands of religion, because they cannot escape their ever present influence. However, such unconscious Christians like to attribute their good moral qualities, originated and nourished within the bosom of a religious community, to the innate force and virtue of their character.

There is no concrete external proof for such ideas, at least not in the materialistic sense, but just as little can reason be proved, and yet materialists take great pride in their reason.

But just as a man becomes a moral being only by his own free act, so he becomes rational by willing himself to be rational. If reason could be proved man would have to fulfill its demands just as much as he has to submit to the demands and proofs of his mind. He possesses freedom inasmuch as it is left to him to consider himself a rational spiritual being, and live according to reason, or worthy of a higher sphere than the merely sensuous, and capable of aspiring after his ideal or not. The existence of the ideal can not be proved mathematically; if it could be proved, its possession would be of no value;

all men would yield to the fact and it would be no longer a free decision and a free act to live for ones ideals.

Idealism is a *desire* within us, an ardent desire to enter into a state of perfection, be it in the sphere of art, or in science, or in the practical sphere of life, or in the development of personality. The more ardent the desire, the more forcibly we feel the chasm between the actual and the desired perfection.

And here it is where the distinction between mere notions of a wild fancy and pure, high ideals becomes apparent. The impossibility of realizing the former produces indifference and disgust, whilst the latter, even in fruitless attempts to obtain it, imparts courage, increases our strength and nerves us to repeated efforts, so promising of a glorious future. To be actively engaged in the boundless realm of history or nature, to inquire into the harmonious co-operation of the forces at work in all development, offers the mind ever increasing labor and undying delight, though it can only grasp a one-thousandth of the laws and of the facts and phenomena worth knowing. But even then, when the individual is conscious of the comparative insignificance of his own knowledge and ability, the desire after the perfect, after absolute truth is for every zealous student a constant stimulus. The effect is the same with him who strives to bring his own personality into a harmonious development towards the perfect as it is with him who endeavors to realize an ideal in art, intuitively conceived, or devotes his life to the investigation of abstract truth.

The conflict that arises when the wants of our heart and the results of science are at issue, when our faith in the organic unity of the world meets the unbiassed facts of observation, produces expectations that excite to ever new investigations and leads to the resignation of the heart, when former aspirations, one after the other, vanish away.

Shall we, therefore, give up ideals, or no longer cultivate ideality in our schools, because ideals cannot be realized? It is true, Schiller, the best interpreter of idealism, acknowledges in later life that all the ideals which once had "swelled the

drunken heart," had vanished, but the cultivation of these very ideals had made him the most beloved poet of his nation. In his "Worte des Glaubens," "Die Ideale," "Licht und Waerme," "Worte des Wahns," "Breite und Tiefe," "Die Ideale und das Leben," the poet pictures the wondrous beauty of the realm of ideals over against the contradictions and dissonances of this cold reality with a skill that calls the reader to loftier aspirations and nobler actions.

Moreover no one who strives after ideal aims ought be affected by the fact that the ideals change not only according to persons and their aims, but also according to times and nations in proportion to the degree of culture. What has been the ideal of the Greek is not the ideal of the Chinese, or of the American or the German. The ideal patriotism which inspired the Germanic nations to bloody expeditions, or the religious ideals prevalent during the crusades have given place to other modern ideals of patriotism and Christian zeal. The laurel granted in former times to heroic warriors of national fame is now offered to the international pursuit after discoveries, inventions, straits of commerce and the exchange of all spiritual and material goods; the merely subjective idea of Christianity is vanishing more and more and before all Christendom appears ever more promising and glorious its central objective truth the personality of our Lord Jesus Christ alone.

Ideals vary with time and place; they are as changeable as nations; one ideal, however, remains: the energetic enthusiasm for the beautiful and the good, however modified by the degree of civilization, in its view of the relatively best and most beautiful. When, we, therefore, speak of the cultivation of the ideal in our educational institutions, we emphasize that ideal sentiment which strives as conscious force after the highest aim, and not a certain ideal. We consider it a misdirected zeal to identify the ideal sentiment with humanity, with a human view of the world, and to give preference to humanistic culture, because it cultivates foremost the human ideal. Humanity is a pedagogic watchword, often misused and misun-

derstood, as if the concepts humanity and humanism were equivalents. The latter belongs to the sphere of pure knowing, the former to that of disposition and character and each can exist without and with the other. When in the middle ages the *studia humaniora* were contrasted with the *studiis divinis*, it was with the intention to distinguish those spheres of knowledge which were not influenced by Church doctrine and faith, the studies of antiquities. Here it was believed were found testimonials of the most beautiful development of humanity in knowledge and practice. Out of the narrow world of religious ties of superstition and fanaticism, man took refuge in the world of free thought, of æsthetics, of art. And yet the ideals of classic antiquity could not be retained as particular, personal ideals; in spite of the humanistic studies the views both of the nature and the requirements of humanity as that of love to human kind, and the striving after a beautiful, noble personality proved to be completely changed. Time and place, the all-ruling and revolutionizing forces, connections and relations of nations and especially Christianity have elevated all human ideals of classic antiquity. Of course the spiritual germs of national life were fructified by the study of classic antiquity, to which our modern classic poets bear witness, but the germ produced its own special, national view of humanity under the rejuvenating rays of Christianity. The "beautiful soul" became again a warm heart. Who of us would to-day nourish the religious, political, social and moral ideals of Greek culture? How could it be possible that they should remain the same for all time to come? The school cannot aim at the development of human perfection as such; just as little it is possible to choose the human ideals of a far distant past as ends of education; we mean to maintain that the humanistic studies as they are especially carried on in purely classic colleges and the cultivation of the ideal are by no means congruent conceptions; and therefore those higher institutions which do not have the study of the Greek language in their curriculum, are not by any means schools of lower rank in the cultivation of the ideal.

Every one must concede that the cultivation of the ideal, *i. e.* the striving after the good, because it corresponds to the idea of the good, and increases the demand for it, must be the chief aim of all education.

Perhaps this certainty becomes more evident in considering the opposite of the ideal, the real? Certainly not; we would have to hold that the college without Greek would be the opposite of the ideal College, because it is termed by the Germans the Real College.

A contradiction to the cultivation of the ideas of the beautiful, the true, the good, is the cultivation of the ugly, the lie, the bad. None of these three ought ever come in contact with the school. Just as little are the so-called personal ideals, which are mostly expressions of an egotistic aim of life, of admiration, honor, carelessness or riches, in any way ends of education.

Is, therefore, the *material* the opposite of the ideal? Only then when it signifies the tendency of the mind towards the material, towards possession, gain and enjoyment of the merely sensual; such materialism, generally called secularism, which sees only the concrete and sensuous, which measures the value of the good and the true by outward success is the greatest enemy of education and of the school, and with it our modern scepticism and atheism. This tendency hinders the school of the present age from carrying out its problems of education. How can the ideals be cultivated, if the parents are indifferent or irreligious, or if the only half understood problems of modern materialism are the cherished topic at the fireside, or if the doctrines of school and church are ridiculed as naive views of past ages. In this sense the material is the opposite of the ideal, but it ceases to be such as soon as it is only looked upon as the given, the real, and the means by which the ideal is realized. The ideal must have its outward form in the world and only under such form it can be grasped.

For the same reason the *practical* cannot be the opposite of the ideal, for practical ability and skill belong to every embodiment of the ideal as it is proved in every art. He is practical

who is quick and happy in finding the right means to an end. Shall then the school outside of the ideal serve also practical purposes? Certainly, since both are not contradictions but complement each other. The ideal takes form and life only when practically carried out; the practical owes its value and dignity only to the ideal. Dreamy ideals, the results of a wild imagination, are signs of a morbid excitement; only the virtual ideals which give impulse to the struggling, rising mind, reaching out after definite, even high aims of perfection may by the school be offered to the youth as a preparation for life. The ideal is not an absolute transcendentalism; all youth is to be educated for earnest work, for the realities of an energetic active life. Is then, the development of the capacity for the demands of practical life the only and final aim of all education? Not by any means. That would make the school after all simply a workshop where the art how to earn bread and butter is to be learned. There are of course different grades of schools in this respect. Lower schools ought to cultivate the ideal essentially through religious instruction, whilst the other branches are, aside of serving the purpose of cultivating the mind and developing the intellect, adapted to practical needs and aims. In technical schools which prepare young men for the different trades and commerical positions the ideal is cultivated both by means of historical and scientific instruction and through methods of discipline and through friendship. The happy combination of the study of modern languages and mathematics, carried on in almost every technical institution in this country, furnishes grand opportunities for the cultivation of the ideal in practical pursuits.

Different are the colleges, which devote themselves exclusively to the arts, *i. e.*, the *studies of a classic course.* They stand almost entirely in the service of the ideal. Why? Because they connect their education with a world, long dead; they endeavor to develop the mind by teaching languages and works whose practical value can be realized in only very rare cases; their studying is carried on for its own sake, under the influence

of a classico-humane spirit; elasticity and ideality of the mind is aimed at and apparently the best years of youth are squandered. It excites admiration, enthusiasm and ideal aspirations to study languages, for the sake of directing the thoughts, conceptions, judgments, conclusions in the right way; it brings intellectual enjoyment and strengthens the character to master the literature of a nation, to open up the treasures of its experiences and its knowledge, to learn to know the differences of national life in its political and moral aspects. We may venture to say, that the ideal tendency of man can only grow out of the past and its understanding; it is necessary to present to the spiritual eye of the meditating mind a world whose beauty and strength has vanished, but which appears to energetic characters worthy of aspiration for the future. "We feel, indeed, after a long reign of secularism, that a world without ideals resembles a grave, within which man suffers the punishment and torments of one buried alive." This tendency towards loftiness of the past grandeur has been inculcated into the youth of our classic colleges and it constitutes the highest value of the study of classic antiquity.

Does then the *scientific course* of a college curriculum not offer an equivalent for the classics? Let us investigate. There also languages are studied for their own sakes in order to school the intellect, and not merely for practical purposes; mathematics serve the purpose of developing the power of imagination and reasoning, of learning submission to objective truth, of harmonizing the concrete with the abstract in process of deduction; further natural sciences are to develop the faculty of observation and to recognize the apparently little and insignificant as a part of God's wonderful creation. Moreover the curriculum of the scientific course is likewise based upon classic antiquity; the students are taught to understand the Roman mind in language and history, the Greek in history and art; they share with the classical college all other ideal means of education in the different branches; but they refer in the same degree to the present as they do to the past, and therefore serve ideal and

practical purposes and they will be the *schools of the future*, unless the two are united in the lower classes and divided in the higher in the so-called electives, which plan has been adopted by Yale College. The latter is the best solution of all questions referring to college studies, and would at once remove the checkered character of modern educational systems. But if the classical college is unwilling to yield to these propositions then the scientific collegiate course will offer in the end the best *ideal and practical* preparation. For more than a preparation no college can offer.

What, then, is the relation of such a preparatory course to general culture? Can the latter be offered in our higher institutions of learning? General culture allows a two-fold definition. First of all culture in the wider sense or liberal culture, the development of the spiritual, intellectual and physical side of man, which results in love for knowledge, in the zeal for investigating the demand of truth and duty,—secondly, a definite measure of knowledge and skill, a certain sum of objects of knowledge, which fit the student for the various duties and studies in the service of his church and his country.

The last named constituent of general culture, the preparatory in its narrower sense, is organized by different schools according to their aim and their means, lower or higher; but the former part all possess in the same degree; all intend to carry on the *studia humaniora* in order to develop the whole man, to bring to light the hidden germs of his character. This aim of a development is to reach through the combined teaching, admonition and example of parents and teachers—through purely abstract as well as external means.

But more than all this, the *personality and character of the teacher* will do. Purity and energy, a clear mind and gift of observation, tact and conduct will exercise, at first, perhaps, unconsciously, but afterwards in the memory a marked influence over the student. A teacher whom the students love

educates more personalities and characters than much knowledge and the best method. Therefore, this general education is not only to be found in higher institutions, but is offered everywhere where the noble personality of the teacher goes out to the student, and never there, where the schoolmaster mechanically performs his duties as the horse before the wagon. The more complete the intellectual training of the teacher, the more energetic also the ennobling influence of this personality. How long is the list of sins to which a teacher is subject and what an influence upon the student? For, as according to Plato, virtue can only be taught by virtue, so much more vice by vice.

In this respect there is no difference between purely classical and scientific colleges. Both find in the training of the will, in the awakening and developing of intellectual forces, the real centre of education.

But it is not only word and example, but also *the external means of discipline* and order, so necessary to a College community, which will help to obtain that end. Every one ought to consider himself an important factor in the College community, and especially in his social intercourse in athletic exercises a powerful external impulse is given to develop ideal sentiment. College laws, accuracy, the *ακρίβεια* of the Greeks, both in external appearance and in all class-room work, also in thinking, the equality of all students without distractions of rank and social position, and the unconditional submission to the laws—which are the embodiment of the *esprit de corps* and not simply an external obligation to parents or a mere ornament—all that exerts its educational influence, mediately and immediately, and should therefore be common to all institutions of learning.

As little difference there is in this sphere so there is in the methods in the different institutions of learning; for I do not believe that in scientific institutions superficial methods are used in teaching languages because they are considered of less value than sciences nor do I believe that in classical institutions

with first-class laboratories the methods of teaching sciences are superficial.

We, therefore, concede that both schools do not differ essentially in the pursuit of this side of general culture, but that both strive with the same means and forces after the same ideal ends of education. The same is true in the other direction. Both do not differ in preparing a young man for life in the service of his country by the study of special branches.

At first it must be denied that one branch of knowledge is before all others worthy of consideration, or that it possesses a superior internal strength. Any language? Which one? Or mathematics, or philosophy? Neither the subject known nor the sum of knowledge decides character and ability for school and life, but the kind of knowledge and strength to use it. It depends, in the first place, upon the manner in which a branch is taught, upon the scientific method whereby the faculty of thinking is developed, and only secondly upon the amount of knowledge in a certain branch. Natural history and religion, drawing and athletics, may contribute just as well to a general education as, for instance, mathematics or Greek or Latin,—even more than they if instruction in languages is simply a mechanical drill in words and rules.

It is impossible and useless to arrange a scale of the different spheres of knowledge and branches of instruction with regard to their comparative value, because it depends upon the purpose and method of study. Therefore the affirmation falls to the ground, that one kind of higher institutions is unfit to impart that scientific spirit which is indispensable to the successful pursuit of every science, chiefly because it substitutes for branches hitherto taught other branches which serve ideal and practical purposes at the same time. But only then when these branches of education stand no longer in direct relation to the ethico-national culture, or whenever they only prepare in a one-sided, technical way, must an institution lose the right of being called preparatory to scientific pursuit and life. That can hardly be said even of purely scientific institutions, much

less of classico-scientific institutions. Every science, scientifically treated, produces scientific strength, and the more easily and immediately this can be practically utilized, the more healthy and really national the school is, not considering the ethico-national culture.

I may be permitted to omit a comparison of the scientific value of the individual branches of knowledge, for they all, religion and national literature excepted, gain only their ideal value through the method of their treatment. I do not venture to express an opinion on the general estimate of their value; inclination and individual ability are here the decisive factors. Personally, I would put the languages on the same level with the mathematical-scientific branches; and among the languages the Latin, which is generally recognized as producing the best results in logical thinking on account of its clear and yet complex syntax; it has been called the backbone of the college.

My object was simply to prove that ideal culture in higher institutions is not to be valued and estimated by individual branches and spheres of knowledge. Just as little as one of our ideal colleges is a technical school, just as little can technical schools be accused of unwillingness or inability to awaken and develop ideal aspirations. If this has disappeared among young men, if the tendencies of materialism are prevalent among the students, the times and the firesides have to be held responsible—not the schools, and it is especially wrong to ascribe the evil to the scientific tendencies of higher institutions.

Especially since the Civil War the American nation has grown in national consciousness. More and more the heterogeneous elements, composing so many different nationalities, are merging into one homogeneous, organic whole. Every close observer must acknowledge that mere secularism, in its widest sense, is not the guiding principle in this process, but the ideal tendency of the American mind, the feeling of a strength that is conscious of its high aim. The foundations to it have been and are still being laid by the institutions of

learning, and especially by those which find time and offer opportunity for a well-balanced course of education and receive their students from the better elements of the nation. If it is the principal aim of these institutions to awaken aspirations for the ideal, prosperity and salvation will be the nation's lot. But as long as the parties disagree which kind of institution will do the most in this direction, so long space must be given to carry on the contest until a final victory is achieved.

VIII.

SOME NOTICE OF DR. DALTON AND HIS WRITINGS.

BY PROF. H. J. RUETENIK, D.D.

Reisebilder aus Griechenland und Kleinasien. Randzeichnungen zu einigen Stellen des Neuen Testaments. 1885. Von Herman Dalton.

Die Familie Evangelische Betrachtungen. Von Herman Dalton. 2. Aufl. 1870.

Verfassungsgeschichte der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche in Russland. 1887.

Ferienreise eines evangelischen Predigers. Zeitgeschichtliche Studien. Von Herman Dalton 1876.

Urkundenbuch der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche in Russland. Von Herman Dalton. 1889.

The author of these works visited America in 1889, and became personally acquainted with the Reformed ministers and churches in many of our large cities. He has been, for more than twenty years, pastor of the German Reformed congregation in St. Petersburg, the capital of Russia, a very large church of several thousands of members and of great influence, some of the highest dignitaries of government being connected with it. A number of schools with a "Gymnasium"—college—at their head, and various benevolent societies and institutions, such as hospitals, etc., are connected with the congregation and are liberally and generously supported by its wealth.

Besides his extensive labors in this connection, Dr. Dalton has been very diligent as an author, and furthermore, he found time for extensive travels—Kirchen-Studien Reisen, as he calls them. In this activity he is a representative type of our modern Christian workers. Being strictly temperate in his habits, ab-

staining from all stimulants, especially from the use of tobacco, and regulating his whole diet by the best sanitary rules, he enjoys almost perfect health and almost unlimited vigor for brain-work and nerve-work.

With some of his works the readers of the Quarterly are probably well acquainted, especially with his sermons on the Heidelberg Catechism. Those that have special reference to the German churches in Russia may be of but little interest to us here. But his "Reisebilder" seem to deserve a special notice. They make us acquainted with that sphere of German church life which is much less known in our American Church than in American churches generally, but which deserves more study and attention than German theology.

When the Evangelical Alliance had its meeting in New York, about twenty years ago, the ministers of Cleveland, at one of their weekly meetings, proposed to invite one of the German visitors to come to Cleveland. The name of a prominent theologian was mentioned to them, but the American pastors said, that they would rather invite a practical man, one who could tell them all about the work of German missions, because they thought but little of the vagaries of German philosophical theology, whilst they had a very high opinion of the German inner mission. Without attempting to justify or to oppose this sentiment, we here recall the incident to call attention to Dalton's description of inner mission work contained in his Ferienreise. They are based upon personal observation, and Dalton is a keen and careful observer; they are clothed in words at once lovely and brave, breathing at the same time a spirit of earnest, living faith in Christ's salvation.

The first forty pages of the book are devoted to *Berlin* and to a description of what is being done to evangelize this city, growing so rapidly since it has become the capital of the Protestant German empire. Some interesting information is presented respecting *Stöcker*, the well-known Court preacher. Although connected with the very highest circles of society, he has felt constrained to mingle with the lowest strata of the

people because he saw that infidelity, communism, socialism and anarchism have obtained full sway over the very poor for whom Christ came, that to them the gospel should be preached.

Next, the author visits *von Bodelschwingh's* Arbeiter Kolonie. Von Bodelschwingh is the son of a Russian Cabinet Minister, the scion of one of its noblest families, who turned from the glitter of Court life and from the allurements of diplomacy, to study theology. Having become pastor of a congregation in *Bielefeld*, he soon turned his attention to works of charity, and founded a large asylum for epileptics. His kitchen being always open for hungry wayfarers, he came into contact with large numbers of vagabonds—tramps we call them in America. He found that some of these unfortunates were quite willing to work and to begin a new life. He found, also, extensive lands near Bielefeld, which were uncultivated, but which could be brought under cultivation by hard work. He set these men to work on these waste lands, in well organized colonies, and Christ blessed his work—He who loves the miserable—and hundreds of broken reeds have thus been restored to manhood.

Next, the author visits the *Salvation Army of England.* He tells the tale of *Booth* and his work. He visits one of their mass meetings in *Sheffield.* Filled with disgust and horror upon first sight of their low and frivolous ways, and upon hearing their almost blasphemous harangues, he overcomes his aversion, mingles with the "army," and begins to sing and to pray with them, and ends with praising God Almighty, who raises up His instruments in the manner needed for their special work, and who is powerful to save thousands of the most wicked and vulgar, by means far beyond the limits of what we would fain consider decency and good taste.

Dalton's next visit is to *Belfast*, where he attends the Pan-Reformed Alliance, and from here he returns to Germany to attend the "Konferenz Reformirter Prediger," in Marburg. He is not in full sympathy with the efforts made to reorganize the Reformed Churches in Germany. To him this appears as a revivistination. He compares the Reformed Church to the

glass of precious ointment broken by Mary, when she anointed the Lord for His death. The Reformed Church organization is broken up, that the Reformed spirit may be diffused to quicken the life of the Evangelical Church. To us this sentiment appears, "mehr geistreich als wahr." Nor does Dalton here seem to reason consistently with his own conception of the Reformed Church. For in his "Urkundenbuch" he expresses his unbounded admiration of the Reformed Churches of *Poland*, and takes special pains to praise them for their Presbyterian form of government. This form of Church Government, which in so many Christian States and countries has become the basis of that political form of self-government, which has come to prevail in America and in many other countries, where the Reformed spirit has come to prevail—justly excites Dalton's admiration, and no wonder, for we must remember that Dalton spent twenty years in Russia. But what becomes of the beloved Presbyterian form of government in the United Evangelical State Church of Prussia, where the King styles himself the first bishop of his church? And what has become of this same Presbyterian form of Government in those Reformed Churches on the Rhine, that have been absorbed in the Evangelical Union?

And now our traveler wends his way into France and Italy. Again he selects, as his objective point, such places as are of special interest to the Christian Worker. And his descriptions grow the more glowing and fascinating, since he passes from Germanic into Romanic Christian life. Romanic Christians are romantic Christians, and romantic scenes have special attractions for us sober Germanics—according to the law of complement. Here we break off, because we wish, that many of those who read this, may buy this book and see for themselves. Only this we add, that the description of a visit paid the Waldenses in the Italian Alps, and a visit to the Evangelical Alliance in Kopenhagen form the last two chapters of the book.

IX.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE LIFE AND WORK OF JOHN WILLIAMSON NEVIN, D.D., LL.D. By Theodore Appel, D.D. Philadelphia: Reformed Publication House, 907 Arch Street. 1889. Price, $3.00.

This work has been but a short time before the public. It has received favorable notices in some of the papers, particularly in the Lancaster papers, the *Reformed Church Messenger*, the *Christian World*, and in the two German papers of the Church,—the *Haus Freund* and the *Kirchenzeitung*. We heartily endorse the commendatory notices of these papers. The Committee of the Alumni Association has satisfactorily performed the duty assigned it, and the author of the volume has performed his work well.

As Dr. Nevin's official life was mainly spent in the service of the Reformed Church, in the positions of professor of theology in the Seminary and president of the College, his life and work were closely interwoven with the history of the Church during the same period. This was, in many respects, a formative period in the history of our church, and this work will be read with all the greater interest for the phase of that history which is thus presented.

Dr. Nevin's powerful intellect and his strong moral and religious character impressed themselves necessarily upon the whole church, and especially, in a moulding way, upon the students that received his instructions. We have space here to refer briefly only to his intellectual endowments, as these are brought out in the volume here noticed, though these, of course, cannot be separated from his moral and spiritual character.

No one who knew Dr. Nevin would have characterized him as brilliant. Though he was a thorough scholar, he never made a parade of his scholarship or learning. This appeared rather in the results it left on his power of thought. As a speaker, he was not what is called eloquent, nor did he possess what is often called a magnetic power over his hearers.

His mind was eminently *original*, taking this word in its etymological sense, as reaching to the roots or foundations of things, as grasping fundamental principles. This structure of his mind re-

vealed itself in his preaching. He never aimed to captivate his hearers by an attractive introduction. Rather he seemed to dissipate and disappoint any expectation of such a display. He halted and stammered at the opening of his discourse, as though his theme and his thoughts were too big for easy utterance. By the time he got through with his stumbling introduction, he had upset the expectations of easy-going, surface thinkers, and prepared the way for more earnest thinkers to be instructed by what followed.

To some this appeared somewhat tantalizing; but its effect was usually good. It was as much as to say to his hearers: "Do not be in too much of a hurry to plunge into the theme in a rapid and easy pace, as though you could not only take in easily all that is to be said, but even anticipate the speaker; but rather stop long enough to feel that there are depths and mysteries in the theme that will require all the power and thought of both speaker and hearer to penetrate and master them. He made the impression that the truth to be presented was greater than the speaker, and that it had mastered him rather than that he had mastered it. Then came the wonderfully profound presentation of the fundamental principles of his theme, reaching far deeper than the hearer expected, and at first those principles appeared somewhat remote from his theme, and somewhat obscure perhaps to ordinary thinking; but as he proceeded, it was felt that the discourse had a cumulative force, each position growing organically out of the preceding one, until towards the close its full meaning and power began really to burst upon the mind of the attentive hearer. His command of forcible words—words that expressed exactly the thought—was truly wonderful. Sometimes he hesitated in order to get the right word; but when it came, it carried more power of expression than a whole sentence of glittering generalities or cant phrases that are often called in by preachers in the absence, or want, of the right word.

We once listened to a powerful and most practical sermon he preached in the First Presbyterian Church in Easton, Pa., during the meeting of Synod in that place, in 1863, we think it was, on the words: "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." After the service we walked behind two intelligent-looking ladies of the congregation, and we could not fail to hear some of the comments made on the preacher. One remarked: "How I did pity that man to-day! I thought I had to give him some words to help him in his speaking!" I concluded they were not as intelligent as they looked, and yet such was the impression Dr. Nevin really made upon some comparatively intelligent persons, upon hearing him preach for the first time. It was not so much want of adequate words as fulness of thought that at times made him halt. His mind, burdened by some great theme, seemed introverted; he seemed scarcely to no-

tice his audience. If some were weary or sleepy, it had no effect upon him; he was not preaching for applause for himself, nor for those who were not thinking, and that earnestly; and so he often lost sight of the time passing, and after preaching for an hour and a half, or even an hour and three-quarters, he would pause and say: "We cannot develop our theme further to-day;" or, as in several instances in his later sermons: "We have now got through the *introduction* to our subject." He was utterly unconscious of any intention of producing a mere momentary impression; but he did struggle to plant some sense in his hearers of the profound truth that was in his own mind and seeking utterance. Among the last, if not the last, sermons he preached in the chapel were *three* which were merely introductory to his subject, but which subject, if our memory serves us, he never finished. So overwhelmed was he with his theme that we have seen him at the close of a sermon attempt, as it were, to utter a last thought, but in place of such utterance merely bring down his hand with an expressive gesture and end his sermon in silence. As he never cared for a taking introduction, so he seldom ended with what is called a peroration. He simply stopped when he was done, rather abruptly at times, just as he might close a lecture to his class.

In some of these peculiarities of manner he could not be held up as a model of preaching. They would be faults in ordinary preachers, yet less faults perhaps than many a promising introduction followed by a lean, meagre sermon, and many a peroration that is occupied mainly in repeating points in the sermon, together with empty exhortations. Dr. Harbaugh once remarked, in his humorous way, when he first began to lecture on theology to theological students: "If you run out of material in your lecture, you can't fill out with exhorting." It would be well for many a preacher if he were in the same predicament when before a congregation. How often an "as I have before said" is an apology for a mere repetition to fill out time, and a "now I want to call your attention to this point," or, "I want to impress this point upon your minds and hearts," is to the thoughtful hearer a transparent effort to hide a want of further thought!

Dr. Nevin was not what is called a conversationalist, because his mind dwelt but little on the surface of things. He seemed always to be occupied with those principles that lie down beneath the surface. Hence it required some little time and preparation to get him started on any subject, and then he talked more as though lecturing than conversing. While others were conversing in the ordinary style, he generally became a listener, and he was a good listener in the midst of ordinary conversation.

Dr. Schaff once remarked, on returning from a meeting of the celebrated Liturgical Committee: "Dr. Nevin has a wonderful power of silence." He could sit for hours in utter silence while a

debate was going on in such a committee, or in Classis or Synod, until perhaps towards the close he would be called upon, and then he would give an exhaustive, original and profound presentation of the subject. In the same connection Dr. Schaff added: "But though silent, he keeps up a tremendous thinking."

Hence, Dr. Nevin was not a leader in the usual sense of that word. He did not go before and point out to his followers the external surface-thoughts and acts the situation required; but he delved deep and brought up the ideas that were to work in the minds of his followers, and that were to become guides for them. And so he guided and directed young men in college, not, as it were, by a power from without, but by the force of his personal influence and the moulding power of thought, he influenced them in the way of self-government. His leadership, indeed, involved perils for those who sought to follow him. Being himself so little concerned with the mere surface of things, he sometimes errred, we think, in practical judgment of external policies, and needed to be supplemented and prompted by those around him. Moreover, he never aimed to influence others externally, never sought to gain their following in a partisan way, but gave out what he held as the truth, and then left others to be guided by it as best they might, and this, of course, involved the peril of making a wrong application of the truths he taught, and going in ways he disapproved. Yet, without anything like skill or policy of an external kind in the way of leadership, Dr. Nevin moved and influenced the Reformed Church more than any other man since it was established in this country.

But we dare not go on with this analyzing of the characteristics of his wonderful intellect. Pages might be filled with such personal description of this truly gifted man, in his intellectual power, and still more in his moral and spiritual life.

For such exhaustive description of the man the volume before us could not have found space in addition to the liberal collection of his writings which it contains. Those writings best present the intellectual and spiritual power which he exercised in his life.

A volume of his principal sermons would admirably complement the able presentation of his life in this book. The author has very properly given an abstract of some of his later lectures in his philosophic teaching. This, in the nature of the case, must be imperfect and inadequate to give a clear and full view of his teaching in the philosophy of history, and in Æsthetics and Ethics, especially as the author was dependent entirely on the notes of Dr. Nevin's lectures taken by his students; for he never wrote out his lectures on these subjects, but lectured from notes. Still the outline here presented is sufficient to reveal the general line of thought and the fresh and original presentation of these philosophic subjects. If some one would now reproduce these lectures for publica-

tion, it would, as in the case of his sermons, give the Church a still more complete portraiture of this gifted man and his work. The whole course, beginning with his later lectures on the Philosophy of History (which were somewhat more fully elaborated and methodized after the course quoted from by the author), on through Æsthetics and Ethics, is worthy of publication, and presents a course in philosophy, fuller and richer, we think, than any similar course in any college in the State, if not in the country. The students of Franklin and Marshall College are specially favored in having so rich a course in the department of philosophy, which combines the greatest excellencies of English and German thought.

The last half century has given us a self-consciousness as a denomination. Through much struggle and many difficulties we have come to develop a life of our own. We have a distinctive theology and a distinctive philosophy; our institutions in all their departments feel the power of one leading type of thought, one common life. These peculiar types of our Church life have been corrected from a certain one-sidedness, toned down, so to speak, from a tendency to go to extremes, certain excrescences have been eliminated, certain deficencies been complemented, all this through the long intestine strife and struggle through which we have passed, so that now, like North and South in our political organization, we have conquered a lasting peace, leaving us still in possession of our *Union* and the fundamental principles of our theology and Church life. Now we are ripe to publish this to the world, and if we do this adequately, it will reveal the fact that on many of the issues agitating the theological world our Church has anticipated by over a quarter of a century, much that is now brought forward as new.

Therefore we trust that this volume by Dr. Theodore Appel may be the precursor of other volumes that will give us a literature worthy our past toils and trials. But let us see to it that this literature is circulated among, and read by, our own people, so that it is not only *printed*, but really *published*, *i. e.*, made public.

THE RELIGION OF THE SEMITES. By W. Robertson Smith, M.A., LL.D. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1889. Pp. xii. and 488. Price $4 00.

It is no exaggeration to say that this book is of great value as well as of deep interest to the Biblical student. It comprises the first of three courses of lectures to be delivered in three successive years at Aberdeen. These lectures, when completed, will give a full presentation of the ancient religion of the Semitic peoples in its common features and general type. The importance of the subject is at once evident. It is not a matter of "mere antiquarian curiosity, but has a direct and important bearing on the origins of the spir-

itual religion of the Bible." The religion of the New Testament has its roots in the religion of the Old, and the religion of the Old Testament has its roots in an older traditional Semitic religion which served as a historical preparation for the higher religion of revelation. "No one of the religions of Semitic origin, which still exercise so great an influence on the lives of millions of mankind, can be studied completely and exhaustively without a subsidiary inquiry into the older traditional religion of the Semitic race." Few scholars are better fitted to institute such an inquiry than Professor Smith, whose extensive learning and wide research are apparent on every page of his book. The lectures are planned on a magnificent scale. The first series discusses the fundamental institutions of Semitic religion, the second will examine the religious beliefs of the Semites, and the third will exhibit the part played by Semitic religion in universal history and its influence on the general progress of humanity. The present volume deals with the fundamental institutions, or, rather (for the subject was too broad for adequate treatment in this first series) with the most important of all, viz.: sacrifice, the other institutions being reserved for consideration in the second series. Of the eleven lectures six are devoted to this central topic. But in the way of preliminary inquiry, the nature of the antique religious community, and the relations of the gods to their worshippers, as well as to physical nature, are discussed in chaps. II.–V., so far as is necessary for a right understanding of the material basis of ancient ritual. Three ideas underlie the teaching of the book-kinship, totemism and taboo. By means of these the author seeks to explain a large part of the Levitical law. Many of his explanations are new and very plausible. Whether they can stand the test of close criticism remains to be seen. To test them fully will require long and patient study. The book will compel the attention of scholars. It opens up an unexplored territory, and even if its hypotheses shall be found untenable, it will stimulate to fresh inquiry, which cannot fail to yield rich results for the student of the Bible.

THE UNKNOWN GOD; or, Inspiration among the Pre-Christian Races. By C. Loring Brace, Author of "Gesta Christi," "Races of the Old World," etc. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1890. (All rights reserved.) Price, $2.50.

Mr. Brace holds that "the only conception of the moral action of the Divine Being on the human soul which is *a priori* defensible and philosophical, is of a continual and impartial influence, limited to no time, or age, or race." To show that this conception is in full accord with the facts of human existence seems to be the chief object of this volume, which derives its title from Saint Paul's sermon on Mars Hill, and "is, in some respects, a search for the footprints of the Divine Being on the shifting sands of remote history."

The conclusion arrived at in this search by Mr. Brace is thus set forth: "The distant past is not alone dark with superstition and idolatry and bloody rites and sensual practices under the name of religion, but over the black waves is a long pathway of brilliancy from the great Pharos of the ocean of humanity,—the 'Light which lighteth every man,' the Spirit of God. Under this heavenly glow are the sweet and unknown virtues and sentiments of human history; the little acts of disinterestedness, the pure aspirations, the heroic deeds of quiet life, the sweet affections, the humble prayers, the unseen patience under suffering, the faithfulness which no danger could shake, and the love which the waters of death could not quench,—all that is best in human life, and which no historian or poet has ever recorded. All these have been stimulated among the non-Christian races by the faith in the Unknown God and union with Him. Morality has received its greatest impulse from religion."

The work is divided into nineteen chapters. The subjects treated of in them are,—Egyptian Monotheism, the Jews and Egyptians, Akkadian Penitential Psalms, the Greek Mysteries, Zeus as Spiritual God, the Religion of Socrates and Plato, the Faith of the Stoics, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Heathen Inspiration and the Scriptures, and the Conversion of Non-Christian Nations. On all these subjects much important and interesting information is presented in a clear and attractive manner. Though we are not prepared to agree with the author on all points, yet we have no hesitancy in recommending his work as a valuable contribution to theological science. It may, indeed, be said to be a striking commentary on the words of St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans: "That which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse."

THE BOOK OF REVELATION. By William Milligan, D.D., Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism in the University of Aberdeen, Author of "The Resurrection of our Lord," etc. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 714 Broadway. Price, $1.50.

This volume forms part of the series which is in process of publication under the general title of "The Expositor's Bible." The book of which it treats is admitted by all Scripture readers and interpreters to be the most mysterious and perplexing of all the sacred writings. Many commentaries have been prepared on it; but as yet the question as to what is the true meaning of its glowing imagery has not been satisfactorily answered. Of the various expositions of it, however, this of Dr. Milligan is, in our opinion, one of the very best. Instead of considering the Apocalypse as

giving, in symbolical form, a literal history of coming events, he regards it rather as a figurative representation of the sufferings, trials and triumphs of the true Church of Christ. His method of interpretation is elaborated with much skill; his exegesis is throughout reasonable and scholarly, and his style clear and attractive. We commend the work to all our readers as well worthy their attention. It is a book which can scarcely fail to prove serviceable to all who will carefully read it and properly consider its contents.

THE EPISTLES OF ST JOHN. Twenty-one Discourses, with Greek Text, Comparative Versions and Notes chiefly Exegetical. By William Alexander, D.D., D.C.L., Brasenose College, Oxford, Lord Bishop of Derry and Raphoe. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 714 Broadway. Price, $1.50.

This volume belongs to the same series as the one just noticed. It treats of an interesting part of the New Testament Scriptures in an unusually interesting and instructive manner. It differs somewhat from the other volumes of the series which as yet have been published, in that it is more of a commentary than is any one of them. First, we have four discourses which in the way of introduction treat, respectively, of the historical surroundings from which these epistles emanated, of the connection of the First Epistle with the Gospel of St. John, of the polemical element in the First Epistle, and of the image of St. John's soul in his epistle. Then follows the consideration of the epistles themselves, the first of which is divided into ten sections. At the beginning of each section the author gives five parallel texts,—the Greek, the Latin, the Authorized and Revised Versions, and a translation of his own. One or more discourses are attached to most of the sections, in which some great leading idea of St. John is drawn out with conscientious care. To each section are appended notes chiefly exegetical, but also in some cases relating to special points of text and grammar. Every part of the work gives evidence of fine scholarship. Its exposition of the text is, for the most part, admirable; its comments will generally be found helpful, and its style eloquent and forcible. In every respect the volume is worthy a place alongside the other volumes of the series. It cannot be studied without profit, and deserves a large number of readers.

VOICES OF THE SPIRIT. By George Matheson, M.A., D.D., Minister of the Parish of St. Bernard's, Edinburgh; Author of "Moments on the Mount," "My Aspirations," etc. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1890. Price, $1.25.

This work is designed to aid the moments of devotional life. It consists of ninety-five brief meditations, in which an effort is made "to exhibit, in their fulness and in their variety, the different

phases of the spiritual life and the different emotions which are awakened by them." Its author is a minister of the Church of Scotland, and a man of brilliant intellectual endowment. Though he lost his sight in youth, yet he took the first prize in logic and in moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, and is well known as the author of a number of valuable and scholarly works. Besides several devotional books, he has published "Aids to the Study of German Theology," "Growth of the Spirit of Christianity," "Natural Elements of Revealed Theology," "Can the Old Faith live with the New? or, The Problem of Evolution and Revelation," etc. Of the present volume it would be difficult to speak too favorably. We consider it one of the very best devotional works we have ever read. Its meditations are not only very suggestive and edifying, but also truly inspiring. No one, we think, can read them without being profited by them. In his brief preface to these meditations, Dr. Matheson says: "I have not sought out these phases (of the spiritual life); I have allowed them to find *me*. I have come to the task with no previous system in my mind; I have just walked beside the stream, and taken my impressions from its windings. The stream by which I have walked is the Bible." In reading what he has written, one feels that this must have been the case. Only a man who has himself clearly heard the voices of the Spirit can set forth the truths which they proclaim as Dr. Matheson does. The book is richly deserving a place in every Christian home.

THE SALT-CELLARS. Being a Collection of Proverbs, together with Homely Notes thereon. By C. H. Spurgeon. These Three Things go to the Making of a Proverb: Shortness, Sense and Salt.—M. Z. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1890. Price, $1.50.

This second series of Salt-Cellars completes the collection. We called attention to the first series in this REVIEW for October, 1889. All that we said of the earlier series is true also of this. Those who have the first volume will, of course, want this second one also. No richer store-house of "Proverbs and Quaint Sayings, Old Saws and Rhymes," than that offered in these two goodly volumes can anywhere else be obtained. In them ministers will find many points for their sermons, and all classes of persons much worthy their serious consideration. We would say to all, If you can, buy them, read them and ponder their contents well. So doing will tend to make you wiser and better.

THE SERMON BIBLE. Isaiah to Malachi. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 714 Broadway. 1890. Price, $1.50.

With this volume the series of the Sermon Bible is completed, so far as the Old Testament is concerned. The same character-

istics that distinguish the earlier volumes, heretofore noticed, distinguish also this. If properly used, the work will be found very serviceable to ministers generally. It will prove especially valuable to them in the way of suggesting themes for treatment in the pulpit, and in showing how some of the greatest and most successful preachers have handled the Word of God for the edification of those who have waited on their ministry.

THE PEOPLE'S BIBLE. Discourses upon Holy Scripture. By Joseph Parker, D.D., Minister of the City Temple, Holborn Viaduct, London; Author of "Ecce Deus," "The Paraclete," etc. Vol. XI. The Book of Job. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, Publishers, 18 and 20 Astor Place. 1889. Price, $1.50.

The Book of Job, which records the experiences of the famous patriarch of Uz, is a didactic poem of the highest merit. Thomas Carlyle calls it "one of the grandest things ever written by man." For commenting on the contents of such a book Dr. Parker has special qualifications. This volume, accordingly, is one of the best of the series to which it belongs. It abounds in striking thoughts brilliantly expressed, and can scarcely fail to impress its readers with a deep sense of the importance and beauty of a righteous and holy life.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION. By Th. Ribot, Professor of Comparative and Experimental Psychology at the College of France, Editor of the "Revue Philosophique." Authorized Translation. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 169 La Salle Street. 1890. Price, 75 cents.

This little volume treats of a highly important subject. Its author is one of the most distinguished psychologists of France. Some years ago he published a work on "English Psychology," and somewhat later one on "German Psychology of To-day." Both these works are devoted to the psychology of the Empirical School, and have been translated into English. Professor Ribot is also the author of other works. The special object of the one now before us is to analyze the mechanism of attention.

The work consists of a brief introduction and conclusion, in which its object is stated and the result of the discussion summed up, and of three chapters, which constitute its body, and which treat, respectively, of spontaneous or natural attention, of voluntary or artificial attention, and of the morbid states of attention. The discussion of the subject throughout is masterly and intensely interesting, and especially so that of the third chapter. "Attention," Professor Ribot maintains, "is not a faculty, a special power, but a predominant *intellectual state*, resulting from complex causes that induce a shorter or longer adaptation." The special conclusion at which he arrives is the following: "Attention depends upon emotional states; emotional states are reducible to tenden-

cies; tendencies are fundamentally movements (or arrested movements), and may be conscious or unconscious. Attention both spontaneous and voluntary is, accordingly, from its origin on, bound up in motory conditions."

We would yet add that a celebrated French crit'c has pronounced the present monograph the most remarkable production of the philosophical press of France during the past year. The work, it is scarcely necessary to say, will be found valuable by all who are interested in the thorough study of Psychology.